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I analyze Deleuze’s concept of temporality in terms of its ontology and axiological 
(political and aesthetic) aspects. For Deleuze, the concept of temporality is non-monolithic, in 
the senses that it is modified throughout his works — the monographs, lectures, and those works 
that were co-authored with Félix Guattari — and that it is developed through reference to a 
dizzying array of concepts, thinkers, artistic works, and social phenomena.  
I observe that Deleuze’s concept of temporality involves a complex ontology of 
difference, which I elaborate through reference to Deleuze’s analyses of Ancient Greek and Stoic 
conceptualizations of time. From Plato through to Chrysippus, temporality gradually comes to be 
identified as a form that comprehends the variation of particulars. Deleuze modifies the ancients’ 
concept of time to suggest that time obtains as a form of ceaseless ontological variation. Through 
reference to Deleuze’s reading of Gilbert Simondon, I further suggest that Deleuze tends to 
conceive of temporality as an ontogenetic force which participates in the complex process of 
individuation.  
 A standout feature of this dissertation involves an analysis of how Deleuze’s concept of 
temporality is modified in his works on cinema. In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 
2: The Time-Image, temporality comes to be characterized as something other than the measure 
of the movement of existents. In his detailed analyses of Bergson — in Cinema 1: The 
Movement-Image, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, and Bergsonism — Deleuze suggests that time 
involves an actualization of aspects of a virtual past as contemporaneous with the lived present. 
While not an outright denial of the relation of temporal succession, Deleuze’s claim implies a 
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diminishment of this relation’s significance in an adequate elaboration of the nature of 
temporality.  
Further, I observe —through reference to Deleuze’s readings of Marx, Kierkegaard, and 
Spinoza — that (the explicitly temporal) change of societal forms of economic organization is 
non-reducible to that suggested by linear evolution. The claim is that putatively discrete modes 
of economic organization do not enjoy temporal displacement with respect to one another. This 
suggests that linear evolutionary models of societal development are inadequate. This further 
implies that temporality is non-reducible to the relation of temporal succession. In concrete 
terms, societal change is characterized as immanent temporal variation. 
Taken together, these analyses yield the conclusion that Deleuze tends to conceive of the 
nature of temporality as involving the ongoing realization of multiple — non-identical, 
sometimes contrary — aspects of a stochastic process of creation that is expressed in ontogenetic 




INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF DELEUZE’S 
PHILOSOPHY OF TIME  
Perhaps there is no aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy as important as his nuanced thought 
on the nature of temporality. For Deleuze, the concept of temporality is non-monolithic, in the 
senses that throughout his works — the monographs, lectures, and those works that were co-
authored with Félix Guattari — he ceaselessly returns to elaborations on the nature of time. It is 
as though temporality is the thematic refrain of Deleuze’s philosophy. Throughout his published 
works and lectures, Deleuze draws on a dizzying array of philosophers, occult philosophers (i.e., 
mystics), novelists, filmmakers, poets, anthropologists, ethnologists, and political revolutionaries 
to develop a philosophy of time that is utterly without precedent in the Western philosophical 
tradition. From Plato to the Stoics, from Aristotle through to Kant, Husserl, and Bergson, from 
Marx and Stalin alike, Deleuze traces a remarkable path from the lost time of Proust through to 
the divergent temporal series illustrated in the fiction of Borges. There is the suggestion —hinted 
at in the fiction of F. Scott Fitzgerald and further developed in Deleuze’s reading of Marx — that 
time involves a stochastic progression. Through reference to Kierkegaard and Riemann alike, 
Deleuze develops the claim that time involves the repetition of axiological and ontological 
singularities (i.e., moments of creation). Deleuze’s elaborations on the nature of temporal 
expression in film reveal time to be of a wholly different nature than that suggested by the those 
who would claim that art tends to mimic reality. From his nuanced analysis of the Marxist 
prehistory of capitalism, Deleuze develops the claim that temporality is involved in the stochastic 
creation of the State, as well as associated modes of economic production. Taken together, 
Deleuze’s variegated analyses yield a concept of time that is not easily reducible to a single 
unifying feature, totalizing aspect, idea, or expressive trait — i.e., it is no more reducible to 
 
9 
hylomorphism than it is identical to a Kantian transcendental condition of reality; time is no 
more a pure ideation than it is merely a subsistent attribute of material existents; though time 
may enjoy expression as the linear succession of quanta, it also enjoys expression as immanent 
qualitative variation. For these reasons, there is no singular time of Deleuze. The aim of this 
dissertation is to elaborate on Deleuze’s multiple, sometimes competing, more often than not 
affirmative claims about the ontological, aesthetic, and political aspects of temporality.  
There are six chapters of argumentation. Each chapter elaborates on a crucial 
development of Deleuze’s thought about the nature of temporality or an aspect associated with 
the expression or realization of a particular concept of time. It should be observed that Deleuze 
produced no single great book on time, in the sense that there is no one text devoted exclusively 
to temporality among Deleuze’s numerous monographs and co-authored works. Rather than 
implying a paucity of substantive analysis, this illustrates a super-abundance of analyses — a 
philosophy of time is woven throughout virtually all of Deleuze’s publications; in both the 
monographs and co-authored texts, stunning insights about the nature of temporality abound. In 
this sense, the philosophy of time is the ambient theme of Deleuze’s philosophical career. 
Though the order of presentation of concepts in this dissertation roughly corresponds to the order 
of the publication of Deleuze’s major texts, conceptual coherence is also a substantive factor in 
the organization of the following chapters. Taken together, these arguments yield the claim that 
Deleuze conceived of time as a nuanced ontogenetic process that gains expression in aesthetics 




The first chapter may be read as an extended analysis of the theory of time first 
hinted at in Empiricism and Subjectivity1 and further developed in Difference and 
Repetition.2 Here, I observe that Deleuze conceives of time as a heteronymous formation 
involving analytically discrete syntheses. I suggest that just as the syntheses of time are 
discrete from each other, temporality — conceived of as a whole — is independent to the 
temporal serialization evidenced in the lived experience of psycho-social entities. I 
present this argument by specifying that this non-successive concept of time involves a 
modification of Ancient Greek theorizations of the nature of temporality. I observe that 
though the elaboration of the passage of time may enjoy measurement, the changes 
associated with temporal progression are not indexed on the putatively invariant cycles 
associated with the movements of celestial bodies. I further suggest that time is the 
expression of an ontogenetic process (i.e., the “contemplations” of a universal soul). 
These elaborations yield three substantive claims: (1) Deleuze tends to conceive of 
temporality as an ontogenetic process, which is non-identical to the thought processes of 
psycho-social entities — an adequate account of temporality does not involve 
psychologism; (2) I suggest that Deleuze tends to conceive of time as a creative process, 
in the sense that temporality is not merely the measure of the movement of physical 
entities; (3) I further observe that the temporal present can be characterized as a non-
decomposable moment (i.e., a continuum) involved in the production of the new. 
 
1 Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature, 
Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). 




In my second and third chapters, I develop the claim —first touched upon in Deleuze’s 
1966 review of Gilbert Simondon’s Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information3 
and further elaborated in The Logic of Sense4 — that temporality is involved in the ontogenetic 
process of individuation. Simondon stipulates ontogenetic processes enjoy expression as magic, 
in the sense that individuation involves the inter-relation of ill-defined, transformational, pre-
personal forces. I suggest that temporality obtains as one of these forces — time is involved in 
the formation of individuated entities. In concrete terms, I suggest that temporality and magic are 
analogues. The analogy between temporality and magic is demonstrated by shared aspects: (1) 
each of temporality and magic share the qualitative aspect of productive dynamism; (2) both tend 
to involve aesthetic representation —i.e., each analogue enjoys an expressive aspect, in the sense 
that each is involved in the expression of aesthetic values. I further observe that the ontogenetic 
field may be identified with a continuous multiplicity. One of the primary implications of this 
argument is that temporality may be expressed through differential equations.  
I continue my analysis of the Logic of Sense with the third chapter’s discussion of Stoic 
and Ancient Hellenistic concepts of time. I elaborate on the complex nature of time through 
reference to the Stoic’s and Gnostic’s concepts of Aion (i.e., eternity; the pagan God that 
comprehended the entirety of the Greek and Roman pantheons; that from which the discrete 
temporal moments represented by the various figures of the Western zodiac subsist). Here, I 
develop themes introduced in the second chapter, with the suggestion that temporality is an 
ontogenetic production of discrete entities. I observe that Deleuze characterizes temporality as an 
 
3 Gilbert, Simondon, Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information, Taylor Adkins 
(tr), (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2020).  





“empty form” that comprehends the ongoing production of variable particulars. In the third 
chapter, I also make the substantive claim that Deleuze’s philosophy of temporality involves 
repetition of moments of profound ontological and axiological variation. I further observe that 
time enjoys literary expression in the works of both Borges and F. Scott Fitzgerald. Finally, I end 
the third chapter by further developing the claim — first hinted at in the second chapter — that 
time (characterized as an ontogenetic field involved in the creation of reality) can be represented 
through reference to differential equations. 
In the fourth chapter, I elaborate on Deleuze’s reading of Kierkegaard’s identification of 
repetition as a tumultuous circumstance. I critically assess Kierkegaard’s beguiling concept of 
repetition to demonstrate that it enjoys qualitative identity with Deleuze’s concept of repetition. 
The claim is that both Kierkegaard’s and Deleuze’s concepts of repetition share an axiological 
aspect. For both thinkers, the temporal process of repetition involves value. I further demonstrate 
the axiological component of temporality by elaborating on Marx’s gut-wrenching description of 
the revolutionary horror that swept through Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
These analyses of Kierkegaard and Marx yield claim the Deleuze’s concept of temporality 
implies an axiological prioritization of the creation of unique social institutions, persons, and 
groups — the very entities involved in the political circumstance. In concrete terms, temporal 
moments are saturated with value — in this sense, history’s repetitions involve tragic or farcical 
elements. Taken together, these analyses suggest that time obtains as a process of ongoing 
axiological creation.  
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In the penultimate chapter of argument (chapter five), I turn to Deleuze’s two volumes 
about cinema — Cinema 1: The Movement-Image5 and Cinema 2: The Time-Image.6 Deleuze 
radically modifies his thought on the nature of temporality through reference to film. I observe 
that Deleuze elaborates on filmic expressions of temporality through reference to Bergson’s 
concept of virtual forces gaining expression as images. Perhaps the most interesting outcome of 
these analyses is the claim that putatively discontinuous dimensions of time — i.e., the past and 
the present — are co-extensively emerging, utterly contemporaneous actualities. In this sense, 
film presents the memorial past and the vital present as coextensive elements that enjoy 
simultaneous actualization. I further observe that Deleuze’s analyses imply a diminishment of 
priority of the relation of temporal succession (t1, t2...tn) in an adequate elaboration of the nature 
of temporality. In concrete terms, this implies that the time of cinema obtains as ongoing 
qualitative variation, which does not correlate with the temporal succession illustrated by clocks 
and calendars in the real world.  
In the ultimate chapter of argument, I elucidate the concept of time developed in the two 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia volumes.7 In these volumes, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that 
temporality involves the immanent variation of co-existing entities — time is characterized as 
involving the instantaneous change of spatiotemporally compresent social formations. They 
present their argument through reference to Marx’s and Jane Jacobs’s elucidations of the nature 
 
5 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(tr.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
6 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (tr.), 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
7 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seem, Helen R. Lane (tr.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); 
Gilles Deleuze and Guattari, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 




of the evolution of urban modes of socio-economic organization, the ethnological investigations 
of Clastres, as well as Spinoza’s notion of immanent causality. I observe that Deleuze’s and 
Guattari’s analyses yield the complex claim that temporality gains expression as variation within 
a single unified duration. This amounts to a substantial modification to Marxian claims about the 
origins of the State. Deleuze and Guattari borrow from Jacobs’ critical reassessment of Marxian 
evolutionism to suggest that the relation among social formations be radically re-conceptualized. 
I observe that Deleuze and Guattari echo Clastres’s revolutionary thesis that the State and 
primitive forms of social organization obtain as temporally co-existing entities that participate in 
relations of immanent modification. Here, Deleuze and Guattari apply Spinoza’s notion of 
immanent causality — i.e., the sort of causal relation in which both cause and effect are 
implicated as expressive aspects of the same ontologically-unified substance — to yield the 
suggestion that temporally co-existing social formations are involved in temporally immanent 
variation. The claim is that analytically discrete aspects of the same social substance modify one 
another within the same duration. These suggest that evolution — characterized as the serial 
progression of durations expressed as grand movements along the ever more nuanced arch of 
history — does not obtain in a linear fashion. This further implies that the relation of temporal 
succession (t1, t2…tn) is not adequate to represent variation of temporally co-existing social 
forms. Society changes in an instant. 
Taken together, these analyses suggest that Deleuze conceives of temporality as a 
(continuous) multiplicity of irreducible, implicated aspects involved in the ongoing process of 
axiological creation. The principal claim is that the times of Deleuze involve relatively 




CHAPTER 1: THE BEGINNING OF TIME 
Gilles Deleuze conceives of time as a multiplicity involved with analytically discrete 
ontological processes (i.e., “syntheses”).1 None of the syntheses are reducible to any other, thus 
implying the relative identity of each as a discrete process. I suggest that just as the syntheses of 
time are discrete from each other, time as a whole —as a unified entity or form — is autonomous 
with respect to the temporal serialization evidenced in the lived experience of psycho-social 
entities. The claim is that time begins independently of the experience of any psycho-social 
entity. This further implies that though the lived experience of time seems to involve temporal 
succession (or temporal series), time is fundamentally constituted as a pre-individual 
transcendental entity, which becomes actualized as temporal succession only secondarily.  
I begin by elucidating Deleuze’s concept of the first synthesis of time through reference 
to his early work on David Hume, Kant, and his — perhaps all too often overlooked — 
 
1 The suggestion that Deleuze has an ontology of time might seem vexing to those who are 
familiar with François Zourabichveli’s reading of Deleuze. In an otherwise superb reading of 
Deleuze, Zourabichveli starkly declares that “there is no ontology of Deleuze” (François 
Zourabichveli, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event Together with The Vocabulary of Deleuze, 
Kieran Aarons [tr.], Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. Smith [eds.], [Edinburgh: University of 
Edinburgh Press, 2012], 36). The basis of this claim is the observation that Deleuze’s 
metaphysics neither tends toward the production of, nor presupposes the existence of a single 
unified entity (i.e., the “one” of monist ontological systems). This observation is most certainly 
an accurate assessment of Deleuze’s philosophy. The validity of the claim that Deleuze’s is a 
metaphysics of multiplicities does not imply that it is not an ontology. Further, it does not imply 
that he has no ontology of time. There may be ontologies which involve multiplicities. One can 
be a champion of differential ontologies and still be an ontologist, in the strict sense of the term. 
That Deleuze’s philosophy favours concepts of flows, folds, multiplicity, nomadism, etc. to 
identity claims does not make him less of an ontologist, it makes him an ontologist of difference. 
One of the assumptions in all that follows is that Deleuze presents a rigorously detailed, highly 
variegated ontology of difference that is reflected in his theory of time. Any discussion of the 
various processes which constitute, participate in, comprehend, or otherwise involve a 
metaphysically loaded term like time, is necessarily ontological. Any ontology of time that 
involves three non-reducible, non-identical “syntheses” is a differential ontology of time. 
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appropriation of aspects of Husserl’s rejection of psychologism. Deleuze accepts Hume’s claim 
that time is constituted by a mind, but modifies this claim to excise Hume’s psychologistic 
premise.2 Psychologism is identified as the group of theories which attempts to assign properties 
of a mind to non-mental phenomena. One is guilty of psychologistic reasoning when they claim 
that something is reducible to psychological phenomena, when, in fact, it is not. Hume’s 
assertion that time is a conjured by the mind is (literally) a text-book example of psychologism. 
Both Kant and Husserl tirelessly rail against Hume’s psychologistic account of time.3 In the first 
Critique, Kant explicitly notes that the ontologically primary synthesis of a time is primary to the 
experience of temporal succession — i.e., the synthesis of time is the ontological pre-condition 
of the ontic experience of temporal organization; the experience of a realized temporal series is 
ontologically dependent on the transcendental synthesis of time. Husserl — in his Lectures on 
Transcendental Logic4, as well Experience and Judgement5 —suggests that time is an aspect of 
the non-decomposable (ontologically primary) hyletic data of transcendental apperception. (I.e., 
Husserl suggests that temporal succession obtains as the content of a passive synthesis which 
does not rely on the participation of any psycho-social entity). Deleuze draws from both Kant 
and Husserl to suggest that time, though it is the content of a mind, this mind is non-identical to a 
 
2 Deleuze registers his discontent with psychologism in his defense of Gabriel Tarde’s sociology. 
(cf. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Paul Patton [tr.], [London and New York: 
Continuum, 2001], 313-314, fn. 3).  
3 Immanuel Kant was among the first to level this charge against Hume. In the first Critique, 
Kant suggests that Hume is a “geographer of thought” who systematically tried to sensualize 
reason –i.e., reduce reason to cognitive processes of psycho-social, spatio-temporally extended 
entities. (cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A760-B794, Paul Guyer and Allen W. 
Wood W. [tr.], [Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press: 1998], 653-656).  
4 Edmund Husserl, Edmund Husserl Collected Works LX: Analyses Concerning Active and 
Passive Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, Anthony J. Steinbock (tr.), Rudolf Bernet 
(ed.), (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer, 2001), 395 
5 Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgement, James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (tr.), 
Ludwig Landgrebe (ed.), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
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human mind. The claim here seems to be that temporality is the consequence of an ontological 
synthesis that is autonomous to the actions and processes involved in the mental function of 
psycho-social entities. Though it might be the case that temporal order may come to be perceived 
by psycho-social entities — as the experience of temporal series; as the awareness of temporal 
succession; as the felt rhythm of one’s cardiovascular system; as the experience of days passing 
into weeks, passing into months, passing into years— these concretizations of time in one’s lived 
experience are ontologically dependent on the transcendental realization of time. Deleuze further 
suggests that the passive synthesis of time is characterized as “originary”, in the sense that it is 
through the passive synthesis that temporal order — e.g., the order evidenced by the sound of 
three notes played in quick succession— obtains. Deleuze suggests that the emergence of 
temporal order, though involving a mind, is non-reducible to the cognitive functions of spatio-
temporally localized, psycho-social individuals. Recently, scholars have begun to explore the 
systematic relation between Deleuze’s thought and the work of various phenomenologists.6 
Nicholas de Warren has suggested that Deleuze’s thought on the nature of time is “entangled” 
with that of Husserl.7 Husserl’s and Deleuze’s elaborations of the passive synthesis of time can 
be cited as evidence of this entanglement. I suggest Deleuze’s elucidation of the passive 
synthesis is analogous to Husserl’s account, in the sense that both identify an ontologically 
“empty” form of temporality as subsisting from the present.  
 
6 Perhaps the most notable (and most recent) among these is Judith Wambacq’s detailed 
elaboration of the “resonances” of Deleuze’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies. (Judith 
Wambacq, Thinking Between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, [Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2017]).  
7 Nicholas de Warren, “The Anarchy of Sense: Husserl in Deleuze, Deleuze in Husserl” 
Paradigmi: rivista di critica filosofica 1, no. 2 (2014): 49-69, 50.  
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In the second and third sections of the present chapter, I elaborate on Deleuze’s peculiar 
characterization of the first synthesis of time as involving both “contemplations” and “habits.” 
This discussion is informed by Deleuze’s elaboration of concepts of time in the Ancient world. I 
suggest that the immanent expression of time in the present involves the habitual — i.e., 
unthought — actions of material entities. The term “contemplation” —when associated with time 
— is a bit more fraught, in the sense that the term tends to be associated with the cognitive 
processes of humans (or other so-called higher mammals). Deleuze’s elaboration of the concepts 
of time in the Ancient world clarifies these terminological ambiguities. Deleuze suggests that 
from Plato, to Aristotle, to Plotinus the concept of time undergoes substantial modification, in 
the sense that time comes to be identified as a contemplation of the soul of the universe.  
The characterization of time —as involving the soul of the universe — suggests a 
liberation of time from both the cognitive processes of psycho-social entities and quantitative 
determination. The complex claim is that temporality enjoys autonomy from the mental 
processes of humans and quantitative determination — time is irreducible to the conscious 
awareness of the passage of moments in a temporal series; time involves something more than 
temporal succession. These imply that time is liberated, in the sense that it comes to be 
characterized as pre-individual force which allows for the emergence of the new. In the fourth 
section, I turn to Deleuze’s (odd) suggestion that his concept of time involves a series of 
paradoxical relationships between the past and the present. Through reference to Bergson, I 
suggest that the passive synthesis of time can be characterized as the creation of the new that is 
actualized in the present. The production of the new involves a sort of differentiation at the pre-
individual level (i.e., a level that is ontologically prior to any experienced by an individuated 
entity). One might think this implies paradoxical self-causation — i.e., in which an entity seems 
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to cause itself. I suggest that the new produced in the passive synthesis does involve does not 
imply a paradoxical self-causation.  
Taken together, these elaborations yield the three-fold conclusion that: (1) Deleuze’s 
account of the passive synthesis involves a modification of Hume’s psychologistic account of 
temporal series; (2) the passive synthesis of time is creative, in the sense that time is elucidated 
as not merely the measure of the movement of physical entities; (3) the present can be 
characterized as the production of the new.  
 
The Transcendental Aspect of Time: Deleuze’s Husserlian Modification of Hume 
Time begins in the present, in the sense that the “originary synthesis of time”8 is 
evidenced in the habitual behaviours of entities that populate the living present, which draws 
together (i.e., synthesizes) analytically discrete events. Deleuze’s characterization of time as 
emerging from habitual processes in the present is derived from his reading of Hume.9 
Constantin V. Boundas observes that Hume categorized time as a structure of the human mind 
that plays an essential role in forming subjectivity.10 For Hume, time is an abstract idea that is 
conjured in the human mind, in the sense that perceptual data are the basis of our idea of time.11 
 
8 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 80.  
9 Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human 
Nature, Constantin V. Boundas (tr.), (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); cf. Gilles 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (especially chapter 2). 
10 In his introduction to the English edition of Deleuze’s text on Hume, Boundas writes: 
“Time was initially introduced by Hume as the structure of the mind; but the subject, formed by 
the habit inside the mind, is the synthesis of time. The mind was succession; the subject is now 
durée and anticipation. The anticipating and inventing subject constitutes the past which weighs 
on the present, making it pass, while positing the past as the rule for the future. Time as the 
constitutive force of subjectivity, responsible for the bending and folding of the given and the 
formation of interiority, is indeed intensive.” (Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, 16). 
11 Hume writes: “The idea of time, being derived from the succession of our perceptions 
of every kind, ideas as well as impressions, and impressions of reflection as well as of sensations 
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Hume elaborates his concept of time through reference to the example of five notes played in 
succession on a flute, which produces an abstract idea of succession in the mind. Hume’s claim 
is that one’s most basic sense of time — temporal succession; t1, t2, … tn — is an abstract idea 
conjured by the cognitive organ of a psycho-social entity as a means by which to order the 
chaotic influx of sensory data. For Hume, the idea of time is abstract, in the sense that it 
produces other ideas. Negatively, the abstract idea of temporal succession produces neither 
emotional responses nor affections; positively, abstract ideas produce ideas that function in our 
reflections on — contemplations of — ideas.12  
For Hume, time is a relation between successive temporal instants which “resemble” each 
other, in the minimal sense that they appear as proximate sensations. In the Treatise, Hume 
explicitly notes that all relations of resemblance are entirely the province of the human mind.13 
Deleuze accepts the characterization of time as a “contraction” of successive temporal moments, 
but deprioritizes the human-centeredness of Hume’s account. Though Deleuze — in Empiricism 
and Subjectivity — suggests that the mind may be characterized as a series of temporal 
 
will afford us an instance of an abstract idea, which comprehends a still greater variety than that 
of space, and yet is represented in the fancy by some particular individual idea of a determinate 
quantity and quality.” (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 1, [London: J. M. Dent and 
Sons, 1964], 41-42).  
12 Hume writes: “Five notes played on a flute give us the impression and idea of time; 
though time be not a sixth impression, which presents itself to the hearing or any other of the 
senses. Nor is it a sixth impression, which the mind by reflection finds in itself. These five 
sounds making their appearance in this particular manner, excite no emotion in the mind, nor 
produce an affection of any kind, which being observed by it can give rise to a new idea. For that 
is necessary to produce a new idea of reflection, nor can the mind, by revolving over a thousand 
times all its ideas of sensation, ever extract from them any new original idea, unless nature has so 
framed its faculties, that it feels some new original impression arise from such a contemplation” 
(ibid., 43). 
13 Hume writes: “Resembling ideas are not only related together, but the actions of a 
mind we employ in considering them, are so little different, that we are not able to distinguish 
them.” (ibid., 65). 
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successions,14 in Difference and Repetition, this mind is clearly not to be identified with the 
cognitive organ of a spatio-temporally extended, psycho-social human being. Elaborating on the 
nature of the repetition of the same term in a series, Deleuze explicitly characterizes this 
repetition as non-reducible to any of memory, reflection, or content of understanding of a human 
mind.15 Deleuze’s modification of Hume involves the following inferential progression: (1) 
acceptance of Hume’s suggestion that time may be characterized as a succession of temporally 
discrete instants; (2) stipulation that a group of temporally proximate instants may be represented 
by the series of AB, AB, AB; (3) acceptance of Hume’s suggestion that this series is synthesized 
by a mind, and; (4) rejection of any identification of synthesis with any cognitive process of the 
human mind. Deleuze’s first claim — that temporally proximate instants can be represented as 
terms in a series — is not contentious. That the progression of time may be characterized as the 
progression from one term to another in a series is non-problematic. Hume’s suggestion that the 
operation of synthesis needs to be performed by a human mind is dubious, in the sense that it 
might be an ontological process — i.e., not merely a cognitive process. It would be more apt to 
suggest that the mind may represent the synthesis as the content of cogitation, or that the mind 
participates with the synthesis, than to argue that the mind performs a temporal synthesis. 
Hume’s psychologistic account seems to come uncomfortably close to suggesting that time is 
conjured by the finicky function of the human cognitive organ. It is for this reason that Deleuze 
rejects Hume’s dubious assumption. Though the first synthesis of time is indeed a synthesis of 
 
14 Deleuze summarizes Hume’s account of the human mind’s understanding of time: “The mind, 
considered from the viewpoint of the appearance of its perceptions, was essentially succession, 
time.” (Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, 92). 
15 Deleuze writes: “When A appears, we expect B with a force corresponding to the qualitative 
impression of all the contracted ABs. This is by no means a memory, nor indeed an operation of 
the understanding: contraction is not a matter of reflection. Properly speaking, it forms a 
synthesis of time.” (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 70).  
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temporal instants — represented by one musical beat to another, one electrical pulse to another, 
etc. — these do not need to be synthesized by a human mind for there to be time. Instants need to 
be synthesized in order for there to be time; the synthesis of time, however, does not need a 
human mind.  
Deleuze’s modification of Hume’s account of time amounts to a rejection of Hume’s 
psychologism. Roundly criticized by many early phenomenologists and early twentieth century 
psychologists —e.g., Stumpf, Husserl, Ingarden, and Koffka —, psychologism is the spurious 
pseudo-philosophical doctrine that attempts to reduce all philosophical phenomena (i.e., the 
entirety of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, logic, and all sub-divisions within 
these) to psychological phenomena.16 Characterized through reference to logic (as a field of 
study), psychologism is the view that “psychology is the necessary and sufficient foundation of 
logic.”17 Kurt Koffka elucidates psychologism as “the view that all logical, subsistent relations 
can be explained by psychological or even physiological existing relations.”18 Ingarden 
elaborates on the perils of psychologism when he defines it as the “untenable” position that 
 
16 Roman Ingarden elaborates on the unsatisfying nature of the psychologist position: 
“Psychologism, that is, the treatment as mental facts (or as conscious experiences) of objects that 
in their nature are not mental, finds support most readily among people without philosophical 
understanding who, nevertheless, think they need to proclaim philosophical views in order to 
impress others with their learning.” (Roman Ingarden, The Musical Work and the Problem of its 
Identity, Adam Czemiawski [tr.], Jean G. Harrell [ed.], [Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 
and London: Macmillan Press, 1986], 24 fn. 1). 
17 Herbert Spiegelberg provides an excellent — if brief — elucidation of psychologism as well as 
a detailed account of Stumpf’s anti-psychologism. Spiegelberg highlights that – much like 
Deleuze’s – Stumpf’s anti-psychologistic stance was motivated by a desire to modify Hume’s 
empiricism. (Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction 
1, [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff ,1965], 94). 




attempts to treat existent entities — like paintings, literary works, and musical works of art — as 
mere facts or experiences of a transcendental ego.19  
Nicholas de Warren presents a succinct definition of psychologism when he observes that 
the concept involves “the obfuscation of a distinction between ‘sense’ and ‘object’.”20 In the 
context of Husserl’s phenomenology, all objects of meaning (all thoughts, experiences, cognitive 
processes, intentional objects, etc.) are real, unique, and unrepeatable, in the sense that they 
occur in space-time — i.e., they occur in a here and now. (It is worth pointing out that Deleuze 
and Guattari echo the first aspect of these metaphysical assumptions when they observe that 
logical distinctions, categorical determinations, genera of being, words, and spiritual beings 
enjoy as much reality as physical entities).21 The sense of an object (i.e., its meaning) is 
identified as an intentional entity —i.e., an entity that enjoys an intentional mode of being— that 
subsists from the here and now enjoyed by any particular object. However, the meaning or sense 
of an object is also the same for all objects that are of the same type. (E.g., The term “city” —
defined as a large urban centre — remains constant, no matter if you are talking about Paris, 
Rome, Brussels, or the entire class of cities). Though the meaning of something is non-reducible 
to a given object, in the sense that the meaning of a term applies both to the general class of 
objects as well as any particular in that class, this does not imply that the meaning of the any 
given object is pure — i.e., utterly divested from — its object. Indeed, without reference to both 
its particularity and its generality, the term loses an aspect of its meaning. Psychologism tends to 
collapse the meaning of a term to either the particularity of an object (i.e., the psychological 
 
19 Roman Ingarden, The Musical Work and the Problem of its Identity, 4. 
20 Nicholas de Warren, “The Anarchy of Sense: Husserl in Deleuze, Deleuze in Husserl”, 54. 
21 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Brian 
Massumi (tr.), (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 64, 81. 
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processes of an individual) or “elevate” meaning to the generality of a transcendental ego. As 
Krzysztof Michalski elaborates: “psychologism denies that which makes its own claims 
understandable: namely, their independence from time and space, thus the situation from which 
they arose and were promulgated.”22 Psychologism is an absurdity, in the sense that it tends to 
elevate meanings to a realm of abstraction that has no clear tether to the partiality of particular 
individual experience of a given object.23  
A clue to Deleuze’s critique of psychologism can be found in his elucidation of a clear 
distinction between the transcendental field and the domain of psychological phenomena (i.e., 
the personal consciousness or subjective identity). For Deleuze, both the transcendental and the 
particular exist, and meaning subsists from the interaction of these. The transcendental field 
serves as the “foundation” of things, in the sense that it provides the conditions for the givenness 
of an object. Subjective consciousness “founds” things, in the sense that it constitutes (i.e., 
realizes) objects of cognition. These are constituted on the basis of transcendental existents. The 
claim here is that the transcendental entities (i.e., existents which enjoy the transcendental mode 
of being) are the ontological basis of an object of cognition — i.e., objects of cognition subsist 
from transcendental entities; the content of thought enjoys a relation of ontological dependency 
with respect to transcendental existents. The temporal implication of these ontological 
suggestions is that any particular moment of time — though realized (or actualized) as a lived 
experience or conscious thought of a psycho-social entity — is ontologically dependent on a 
 
22 Krzysztof Michalski, Logic and Time: An Essay on Husserl’s Theory of Meaning, Adam 
Czernaiwski (tr.), revised by James Dodd [Boston and London: Kluwer, 1997], 26. 
23 Krzysztof Michalski summarizes: “Meaning is an inseparable quality of experience itself: it is 
an intention, and with that, a characteristic of every experience as such; it is not an addendum 
tacked on from the outside. The independence of meaning from a situation in which it reveals 
itself is not the presence of an essence from another planet.” (ibid., 27). 
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transcendental form of time. Deleuze further elaborates on this form of ontological dependency 
when — in the fourteenth series (of Double Causality) in the The Logic of Sense — he 
characterizes the processes of consciousness constituting representations of transcendental 
entities as processes of unification. Throughout Difference and Repetition — which was written 
one year earlier — Deleuze elaborates these processes of cognition as types of “contractions.” 
Throughout these two texts, transcendental conditions are non-reducible to the psychological 
processes of consciousness. Though Deleuze cautiously acknowledges that an ego may “unify” 
metaphysical phenomena like time, he also pointedly notes that these are founded in “an 
impersonal transcendental field,”24 and that “the foundation can never resemble what it 
founds.”25 Here, Deleuze’s claim is that the time synthesis is primarily ontological, and it gains 
expression as something psychological only secondarily; awareness of time is a consequence of a 
synthesis, which is independent of any psychological awareness, or even the existence of 
psycho-social entities. 
Deleuze’s elaboration of an impersonal transcendental field that functions as the 
primordial (i.e., ontologically primary) foundation of time is indebted to both Kant and Husserl. 
Though all of Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger elaborate on the nature of temporal synthesis, the 
profoundly poor quality of the philosophical analyses of the Nazi does nothing but confound any 
serious discussion of the nature of temporality. Heidegger’s lugubrious, ontologically tortured 
thought has received far too much critical attention. For this reason, I focus on Kant’s and 
Husserl’s challenge to Hume’s psychologistic account of temporal synthesis.26 To clarify 
 
24 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (tr.), Constantin V. 
Boundas (ed.), (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 343-344 fn.5. 
25 Ibid., 99. 
26 Heidegger is of little importance, in the sense that his discussion — in Kant and the Problem 
of Metaphysics — is a reformulation of Kant that (in addition to being written in the opaque 
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Deleuze’s nuanced conceptualization of the past, I will: (1) specify Deleuze’s modification of 
Kant’s identification of the synthesis of memory; (2) elucidate Deleuze’s modification of 
Husserl’s characterization of this synthesis as passive. Kant and Husserl: these are the two 
figures to which Deleuze’s concept of the passive synthesis of the past is most indebted. Deleuze 
elaborations of these thinkers suggest that the past is the content of a synthetic operation that is 
ontologically primary to the level of cognition enjoyed by consciousness — i.e., primary to the 
use of the faculties. 
A clue to Kant’s influence on Deleuze’s conceptualization of the types of relations 
involved among the present and past is found in the observation that the synthesis of the past 
involves memory.27 In the first Critique, Kant explicitly points out that the synthesis of time 
 
linguistic style that is unique to Heidegger) substantially misinterprets Kant. The main problem 
with Heidegger’s position is that he makes the dubious assertion that Kant identifies the 
“transcendental imagination” with the formation of time. Heidegger writes: “If the transcendental 
imagination as the pure formative faculty in itself forms time, i.e., lets it spring forth, then the 
thesis stated above, that transcendental imagination is primordial time, can no longer be 
avoided.” (Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, James S. Churchill [tr.], 
[Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1965], 192). Makkreel demonstrates that Heidegger’s 
interpretive claim lacks merit in the sense that Kant stipulates that temporality — i.e., the 
common root of all experience — is “in principle unknowable and … cannot be identified with 
the imagination or any other faculty.” (Rudolf A. Makkreel, Interpretation and Imagination in 
Kant; the Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgement, [Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1990], 21).  
One might think that since Heidegger worked as Husserl’s assistant from 1919 to 1922, 
he might have something useful to say about Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of 
temporality. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Roman Ingarden observes that Heidegger was 
among Husserl’s Frieberg students, who “had been educated in a quite different philosophy and 
at first had rather little understanding of phenomenological analyses.” (Jeff Mitscherling, Roman 
Ingarden’s Ontology and Aesthetics, [Canada: University of Ottawa Press, 1997], 15). Ingarden 
further observes that Heidegger’s analyses of temporality in Being and Time have little relation 
to Husserl’s phenomenology. (ibid., 29, ft. 52). 
27 Take, for example, Deleuze’s summary observation that “the second synthesis, that of 
memory, constituted time as a pure past, from the point of view of a ground which causes the 




involves the mnemonic function of reproducing present moments arrayed in the whole of the 
past.28 Makkreel observes that, for Kant, representations of the sensory manifold are “not 
presumed to persist through time and therefore must be…produced from one moment to the 
next.”29 In this respect, memory has a two-fold function: (1) to associate representations derived 
from circumstances that obtain as part of the sensory manifold; (2) to file these away in a 
storehouse of recollections. The first of these operations poses the most conceptual difficulty, in 
the sense there is some dispute about whether the synthetic process of combining recollections 
produces (constitutes) the past, or merely records a pre-existing temporal ordering. Though one 
might be tempted to assign a productive role to memory with the suggestion that the synthesis of 
“recollection forms the past as such,”30 this would evidence a misreading of Kant. Makkreel 
observes, that — for Kant — all representations of the sensory manifold are given in 
succession.31 The implication here is that the past (as the element of temporality implied by the 
 
28 Kant elaborates on the synthesis (of reproduction in the imagination) in the second section of 
the transcendental analytic: “Now it is obvious that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the 
time from one moment to the next, or even want to represent a certain number to myself, I must 
necessarily first grasp one of these manifold representations after another in my thoughts. But if I 
were always to lose the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts, 
of time, or the successively represented units) from my thoughts and not reproduce them when I 
proceed to the following ones, then no whole representation and none of the previously 
mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most fundamental representations of space and time, 
could ever arise.” (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A102, 230). 
29 Rudolf A. Makkreel, Interpretation and Imagination in Kant; the Hermeneutical Import of the 
Critique of Judgement, 24. 
30 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 187. 
31 Rudolf A. Makkreel, Interpretation and Imagination in Kant; the Hermeneutical Import of the 
Critique of Judgement, 23. Makkreel is not exactly a voice in the wilderness. Béatrice 
Longuenesse makes a similar point when she notes that temporal succession obtains prior to its 
expression in the sensory manifold. Longuenesse writes: “Kant wants to show that for 
conjunction or succession to be present in appearances, an act of combination is necessary prior 
to the associative combinations made possible by repeatedly perceived conjunctions or 
successions.” (Béatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and 
Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, Charles T. Wolfe 
[Tr.], [Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000], 41). 
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succession of temporal moments) is evidenced in the sensory manifold. This suggests that though 
memory is involved in representing the past, its role is not that of creating the past. The temporal 
ordering of successive temporal events —e.g., the appearance of a chunk of red cinnabar, the 
duration of the longest day of the year, the progression of linguistic terms arrayed in a sentence, 
etc.32 — is a given aspect of the sensory manifold, not something conjured by memory. Kant 
explicitly claims that the temporal ordering of events is ontologically prior to any experience of 
temporal order as an aspect of the sensory manifold. This implies that the relation of temporal 
succession obtains as an aspect of the transcendental field — i.e., as a relation ontologically prior 
to experience; as an a priori relation.33 The proof of the validity of this deduction can be found in 
the demonstration of the absurdity of the counter-positive. Were it the case that this ordering was 
not already present as a precondition of experience, the imagination would have no occasion to 
combine the discrete representations into a temporal order. This implies that the temporal order 
of reality is the ontic precondition of the presence of a temporal ordering of reminiscences. At 
least, this is what Deleuze suggests with his observation that the succession of appearances of A 
is not a consequent of the processes of memory or understanding.34 Deleuze borrows the Kantian 
 
32 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A101, 229. 
33 Kant observes: “Now if we can demonstrate that even our purest a priori intuitions provide no 
cognition except insofar as they contain the sort of combination of the manifold that makes 
possible a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction, then this synthesis of the imagination would 
be grounded even prior to all experience on a priori principles, and one must assume a pure 
transcendental synthesis of this power, which grounds even the possibility of all experience (as 
that which the reproducibility of the appearances necessarily presupposes)” (ibid., A102, 230). 
Deleuze explicitly makes this claim with the observation that the experience of the present is 
ontologically dependent on a general domain of the past: “It is with respect to the pure element 
of the past, understood as the past in general, as an a priori past, that a given former present is 
reproducible and the present [sic.] is able to reflect itself.” (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and 
Repetition, 81). 
34 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 70. 
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suggestion that the synthesis of recollection involves the past as the content of the synthesis — 
that which is combined — not that which is produced by the action of memory.  
Deleuze observes that a passive synthesis “is not carried out by the mind, but in the 
mind.”35 The claim here is that the passive synthesis is a preconscious ontological event. In this 
sense, the passive synthesis operates is ontologically primary to (the activity) of conscious 
thought.36 Husserl echoes the Kantian suggestion that time is an aspect of an ontological 
organization that is prior to cognition, when he observes that temporality is an aspect of hyletic 
data. The material synthesized by the passive synthesis is the hyletic data that are the ontological 
precondition of the presentation of intentional objects, states of affairs, and events. Husserl 
explicitly identifies colours and sounds as types of hyletic data.37 It is important to note that 
hyletic data present as “immanent objectlike formations,” in the sense that they are ontologically 
primary to all of intentional objects, attributes, and properties.38 In this sense, hyletic data are the 
primordial givens of all sense-perception. Herbert Spiegelberg elaborates on the primordial 
nature of hyletic data when he notes that these are the “raw material” of all cogitations (i.e., 
doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, refusing, etc.).39 Notice how all of these, 
 
35 Ibid., 71 
36 Joe Hughes illustrates the nature of the passive synthesis — as distinguished from the active 
synthesis — with the example of a drunk person trying to count: “If you hold your index finger a 
short distance in front of your face and focus on it, there is only one finger. If you look past it 
into the distance, it becomes two fingers. When you refocus your attention, it becomes one finger 
again without you ever doing anything. That is a passive synthesis. If you were drunk, however, 
and still saw two fingers, you could tell yourself, ‘even though I see two, I know there is only 
one’. Such purely intellectual act would constitute an active synthesis” (Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s 
Difference and Repetition: A Reader’s Guide [London and New York: Continuum, 2009], 197, 
fn. 99). 
37 Edmund Husserl, Edmund Husserl Collected Works LX: Analyses Concerning Active and 
Passive Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, Anthony J. Steinbock (tr.), Rudolf Bernet 
(ed.), (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer, 2001), 395. 
38 Ibid., 55. 
39 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction I, 141. 
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all the constituent elements of thought, involve temporal organization. In concrete terms, the 
content of thought is given to perception as something which is already temporally organized. 
The implication here is that temporal elements are among the hyletic (i.e., the ontologically 
primary) data synthesized at a level that is primary to the active (conscious) involvement of the 
minds of psycho-social entities.  
Claire Colebrook notes the similarity between Deleuze’s and Husserl’s methodological 
approaches when she notes that “Deleuze’s work can also be seen as a radicalisation of 
phenomenology.”40 Joe Hughes has elaborated extensively on the similarity of Deleuze’s account 
of the first synthesis of time to Husserl’s identification of the transcendental form of time.41 
Though Boundas implies that this comparison is illegitimate when he suggests that Deleuze 
chooses “empiricism over phenomenology,”42 his remark seems altogether too hasty, if for no 
other reason than Deleuze identifies his philosophy as a “transcendental empiricism,”43 the very 
phrase that Paul Ricoeur uses to characterize Husserl’s phenomenology.44  
The overall structure of Deleuze’s elaboration of time’s first synthesis — the movement 
from observation of an empirical phenomenon (the repetition of a series of AB, AB, AB) to a 
transcendental field that is non-identical to a subjective ego (or any of its cognitive processes)—
bears more than a passing resemblance to Husserl’s analysis of time’s “constitution.” Robert 
Sokolowski highlights that the problem of constitution of various metaphysical entities is a 
 
40 Claire Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 6. 
41 Joe Hughes, Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation, (London and New York: Continuum, 
2008).  
42 Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, 5. 
43 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 56-57. 
44 Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1967), 107.  
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central concern of Husserl’s phenomenology.45 Ingarden suggests that by the time of Ideas I and 
Husserl’s Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness, Husserl seems to have accepted the claim 
that time’s primary ontological foundation — its primordial origin, the domain of its 
constitution— is transcendental.46 For Husserl, the transcendental nature of time “is unique in 
every respect” in comparison to the “sensuous time” of a temporal series apprehended by a 
human subject.47 Husserl’s claim seems to rest on the observation that a temporal series has a 
particular spatio-temporal locale (i.e., the locale occupied by the apprehending subject); the 
transcendental field of time is not constrained in such a manner. Husserl’s identification of the 
uniqueness of time’s transcendental basis is echoed in Deleuze’s suggestion that the foundation 
of time is an “empty form of time.”48 It is empty in the sense that it is a pure form — i.e., bereft 
of particular temporal content — that does not resemble the actualization of time in (content-
rich, empirically encountered) temporal series. Husserl’s argument for the uniqueness of the 
transcendental time seems to be based on the observation that any given temporal series has a 
determinate temporal position in two senses: (1) as an intentional object of a spatio-temporally 
localized individual, the series is spatio-temporally determined as occurring at a particular here 
and now; (2) time is also determined as a form of sensibility which is common to all perceiving 
beings in “every possible world of objective experience.”49 The second claim relies on the 
 
45 Robert Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution (The Hague: Mitinus 
Nijhoff, 1970), 6 fn. 3. 
46 Roman Ingarden, On the Motives which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, Arnor 
Hannibalsson, (The Hague: Mitinus Nijhoff, 1975), 21. 
47 Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (tr.), 
Ludwig Landgrebe (ed.), (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973), 164.  
48 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 110. 
49 Husserl writes: “We now have the inner truth of the Kantian thesis: time is the form of 
sensibility, and thus it is the form of every possible world of objective experience. Prior to all 
questions about objective reality — prior to the question concerning what gives priority to 
certain ‘appearances’ to intentional objects which are self-giving in intuitive experiences by 
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stipulation that in order for there to be any time at all, all of time cannot be localized to one 
particular time. For Husserl, this determination of time is properly characterized as 
transcendental, in the sense that it transcends the experiences of any individual. Elaborating on 
the transcendental nature of time, Husserl notes that it is ontologically prior to any lived 
experience of time, in the sense that it is the presupposition of any experience of a connection 
among temporal instants (i.e., the analytically discrete instants of a series).50 Deleuze echoes 
Husserl’s elaboration of the ontological primacy of transcendental time when he identifies the 
first synthesis as operating on the succession of temporally discrete instants to constitute any 
repetition of a series.51 Deleuze’s and Husserl’s elaborations of the nature of a temporal series 
yield the characterization of transcendental time as the ontologically fundamental form of time 
— i.e., the “empty form of time”— that allows for disparate temporal moments to be unified into 
a series. One implication of the empty form of time is that the temporal connections it makes are 
always experienced as fleeting, passing — i.e., not enjoying eternality. The predicate of 
eternality implies a sense of invariability (i.e., stability) that is not an aspect of the empty form of 
time. The claim that the empty form of time generates a series of successions that are always 
passing, implies that the empty form of time is precisely not eternal, but the form of the 
constantly changing, ceaselessly varying manifold of non-identical temporal series.52 Stated 
 
reason of which bestow on them the predicate ‘true’ or ‘real object’ — is the fact of the essential 
characteristic of all ‘appearances,’ of the true as well as those shown to be null, namely that they 
are time-giving, and this is in such a way that all given times become part of one time.” (Edmund 
Husserl, Experience and Judgement, 164). 
50 Husserl writes: “Thus, all perceived, all perceptible, individuals have the common form of 
time. It is the first and fundamental form, the form of all forms, the presupposition of all other 
connections capable of establishing unity” (ibid.). 
51Deleuze writes: “Time is constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the 
repetition of instants.” (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 70). 
52 Daniel W. Smith elaborates on changing nature of Deleuze’s concept of the “empty form of 
time”: “This is what Deleuze means, then, when he says that Kant reconceived time as a pure 
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positively, there is a transcendental time which is not constrained to any here and now, so that 
any variable succession of instants may be constituted as a series occurring here and now.  
 
The Habits of Time 
 At key points in his elaboration of the first synthesis of time, Deleuze refers to time’s 
contraction as involving “habit.” In addition to characterizing the first synthesis as the 
“contemplation” of a soul, Deleuze explicitly identifies time’s contraction as habit.53 What 
accounts for this terminological shift? Not merely a linguistic contrivance, the change from 
contemplation to habit designates a difference in two aspects of the same synthesis effected on 
different ontological registers. When Deleuze is referring to abstract temporal synthesis, he tends 
to use the term “contemplation.” Deleuze tends to use the term “habit” to designate when the 
contraction of instants involves material entities. While contractions of the soul define the 
transcendental aspect (i.e., an abstract, purely formal aspect) of time, these contractions are 
habitual when they involve physical bodies (i.e., when they involve anything which enjoys 
material existence).  
This terminological distinction invites misunderstanding, in the sense that in our all too 
ego-centric Western world view, we tend to think of habits as types of behaviours that we have 
some sort of control over. (I.e., we tend to identify habits with behaviours we can learn and 
unlearn, as though habits are answerable to some sort of human will). Deleuze characterizes 
 
and empty form: time is an empty form that is no longer dependent on either extensive or 
intensive movement; instead, time has become the pure and immutable form of everything that 
moves and changes — not an eternal form, but precisely the form of what is not eternal.” (Daniel 
W. Smith, Daniel W. Essay on Deleuze [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012], 133). 




habits as impersonal (i.e., “passive”) drives that are ontologically primary to the formations of 
human consciousness. The reasons for identifying habit with pre-conscious drives are stark. 
Were it the case that habits are subject to the human will, and that time is identifiable with habit, 
then we would be left with the absurd conclusion that the progression of time is subject to 
control by the ego. Deleuze attributes the false claim that we have control over our habits to one 
of the illusions of psychology.54 (Foucault illustrates this illusion when he notes that early 
psychologists tended to cast mentally ill people as morally blameworthy, because they lacked the 
wherewithal to learn good habits).55 The habits of time are impersonal, in the sense that they 
participate in the formation of consciousness. Habits are constitutive of consciousness, not the 
other way around. Elaborating on the relation between habit and consciousness, Deleuze writes: 
“Although it [habit] is constitutive it is not, for all that, active. It is not carried out by the mind, 
but occurs in the mind which contemplates, prior to all memory and all reflection.”56 Glossing on 
a remark he attributes to Bergson, Deleuze identifies the “habit of acquiring habits (the whole of 
obligation)”57 as the ephemeral, mercurial, often nameless, unconscious drives from which 
 
54 Ibid., 73. 
55 Foucault illustrates this by citing Philippe Pinel’s early nineteenth century diagnosis of 
“mania” as a habit that could be corrected by cold baths, confinement, and a stern talking to: 
“One maniac was in the habit of tearing at her clothes and breaking any object within her reach. 
She was given the cold-water treatment, and then tied up in a straitjacket, and appeared at last 
‘humiliated and deeply concerned’; but fearing that her feelings of shame were merely transitory 
and her remorse too superficial, ‘the director spoke to her in the strongest terms to ensure that 
she experienced a feeling of real terror; he did not show anger, but he informed her that 
henceforth she would always be treated as severely as possible’. The expected result was not 
long in coming: ‘Her repentance began in a torrent of tears, which she shed for nearly two 
hours.’” (Michel Foucault, History of Madness, Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa [tr.], Jean 
Khalfa [ed.], [London and New York: Routledge, 502). 
56 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 71. 
57 Ibid., 4. 
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consciousness emerges. Henri Bergson characterizes habit as “a dynamic series of states”58 from 
which consciousness drops “like an over-ripe fruit.”59 Human consciousness subsists from our 
habits. Our conscious adoption of what we deem to be a “good” or a “bad” habit is, in fact, us 
merely elaborating on the primordial forces which precede any conscious cognition. Though 
Deleuze cautiously notes that assigning ontological priority to habit runs the risk of implying a 
“mystical and barbaric hypothesis,”60 in the sense that it seems to generalize the meaning of 
“habit” so that it can account for all manner of unconscious actions performed by material 
entities, it seems that Deleuze’s characterization of habit as a passive drive that affects all 
material entities is perfectly adequate. Deleuze’s characterization of habit accurately elaborates a 
series of phenomena (e.g., the tics, taps, tumbles, contractions, and countless unthought gestures 
and actions that we — along with all other material entities — tend to perform or undergo), and 
it does not imply an account of time that is wildly egocentric. 
In one of the most elegant passages of Difference and Repetition — which begins with an 
(obscure) reference to a text of Samuel Butler and concludes with an elegant summary of 
Plotinus — Deleuze elaborates on how contractions and contemplations form habits, which, in 
turn, designate our sense of continuity. Temporality is the outcome of various contemplations. It 
is essential to point out that Deleuze uses the term “contemplation” to imply a certain disposition 
 
58 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, F. L. 
Pogson (tr.), (Minola, New York: Dover, 2001), 171. 
59 Ibid., 176. 
60 Deleuze writes: “This is no mystical or barbarous hypothesis. On the contrary, habit here 
manifests its full generality: it concerns not only the sensory-motor habits that we have 
(psychologically), but also, before these, the primary habits that we are; the thousands of passive 
syntheses of which we are organically composed. It is simultaneously through contraction that 
we are habits, but through contemplation that we contract. We are contemplations, we are 




or tendency of a given system to produce certain outcomes. The contemplating aspect of a 
system is that a reason — a principle — for various outcomes can be deduced. Borrowing 
Plotinus’ terminology, Deleuze refers to this process as the contemplation of a soul of nature.61 
From Butler, Deleuze identifies a three-stage inferential progression: (1) the stipulation that there 
are various types of contractions; (2) the claim that contractions imply contemplation; (3) the 
observation that contemplations imply a sense of continuity. Taken together, the separate events 
and processes of contraction and contemplation suggest a temporally continuous “habit.” Butler 
suggests that everything in existence emerges from various types of contractions. That these 
contractions don’t yield the utter chaos of the world bereft of any sense of order implies that they 
are expressions of a contemplating soul that is disposed to produce certain outcomes. The 
observed order of the world is adduced to demonstrate a sense of continuity. Butler draws his 
ontological hypothesis from observations about the growth of plants: the growth of corn 
produces a relatively higher degree of humidity in its local surroundings, which allows for more 
moisture in the soil, which creates the optimal conditions for the germination of formerly 
dormant wheat seeds.62 For Deleuze, the production of more moisture in the air is a “contraction” 
 
61 Plotinus writes: “But now that, in our discussion of nature, we have said in what way 
generation is contemplation, let us go to the soul before this and say how its contemplation, its 
love of learning, its inquisitive nature, the birth pangs from the things it recognized and its 
completeness have produced it, so that when it has become entirely an object of contemplation, it 
produces another object of contemplation.” (Plotinus, The Enneads, George Boys-Stones, John 
M. Dillon, Lloyd Gerson, R.A.H. King, Andrew Smith, James Wilberding [tr.], Lloyd Gerson 
[ed.], [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018], 3.8.5. 1-6). 
62 Butler writes: “for even the corn in the fields grows upon a superstitious basis as to its own 
existence, and only turns the earth and moisture into wheat through the conceit of its own ability 
to do so, without which faith it were powerless; and the lichen only grows upon the granite rock 
by first saying to itself, ‘I think I can do it ;’ so that it would not be able to grow unless it thought 
it could grow, and would not think it could grow unless it found itself able to grow, and thus 
spends its life arguing in a most vicious circle, basing its action upon a hypothesis, which 
hypothesis is in turn based upon its action)” (Samuel Butler, Life and Habit, [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, digital edition, 2009], 82). 
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of air and water, in the sense that each comes into a relation with (becomes a relata of) the other. 
The process of contraction involves two distinct steps: (1) the combination of two formerly 
discrete entities; (2) this combination initiating a process that yields the emergence of a new 
particular. The first of these is deduced through the observation that wheat tends to germinate 
when there is sufficient water content in the soil to penetrate the husk of the seed. The second 
stage of the contraction is suggested by observing the existence of a plant, where once there was 
only moist soil and seed. Contemplation is suggested by the fact that the wheat is an element in a 
cycle of repetitions. (I.e., the wheat seems to grow and grow again from year to year, in this 
field, during these months, provided that certain conditions are met). Butler generalizes his claim 
to suggest that social structures — i.e., laws, language, and commerce — are expressions of 
various contractions. That these seem to maintain implies that they reflect a principle or reason 
for their existence (i.e., they are not merely matters of happenstance, blind luck, or chance). The 
identification of a principle of reason implies that that these phenomena are dispositions realized 
from a field of possibilities — i.e., that they are immanent material expressions of the 
transcendental contemplations of contemplations of a soul, in Plotinus’ sense of the term. 
 
Measures of Time in the Ancient World 
To understand Deleuze’s reference to Plotinus, it is necessary to take a brief detour 
through Deleuze’s elucidation of concepts of time in the Ancient world — specifically those of 
Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. For the Ancient Greeks (Plato and Aristotle), time is identified as 
the measure of movement, though the nature of what is measured varies dramatically. For 
Plotinus (who was a Roman that spoke Greek),63 time is derived from the “movements” of the 
 
63 Porphyry of Tyre claims that the year of Plotinus’ “birth falls in the thirteenth year of the 
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soul. Deleuze notes that “every notion of Plotinus is already found in Plato,” but in The Enneads, 
Plato’s characterizations of time “undergo a displacement, a transformation, a radical change.”64 
In the Timaeus, Plato identifies time as that which reflects the order of the “moving image of 
eternity.”65 Reflecting on the movement of celestial bodies — the moon, the sun, and the 
“wanderers”66 — Plato observes that these have the dual function of “begetting” and standing 
guard over time.67 In his February 28, 1984 seminar on Ancient Greek concepts of time and 
truth, Deleuze notes that Plato conceived of time as being determined by privileged points on “a 
planisphere.”68 Time, as it is elaborated in Plato’s astronomy, is the measure of the movement of 
the planets, in the sense that were these to not exist (or — strangely — neglect their guard duties) 
time would cease to be. The circular movement of the celestial bodies was seen as the 
immutable, unchanging, temporal order that provided a sense of meaning to the various 
movements of “sublunar” (i.e., terrestrial) life. Plato characterizes the demiurge (δημιουργός) as 
creating the invariant circular movements of the celestial bodies which supply order to the very 
 
reign of Severus [ce 204].” (Porphyry, “On the Life of Plotinus and the Order 
of His Books” 35-36 in The Enneads, 18). 
64 Deleuze, Gilles. Truth and Time, seminar 56, dated February 28, 1984, Transcription, Alain 
Guilmot, my own translation, http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=331 
[Date Accessed: July 3, 2018]. 
65 Plato, Timaeus, 37d. Donald J. Zeyl (tr.), Plato: Complete Works, John M. Cooper (ed.), 
(Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997). 
66 Plato uses the term “wanderers” to refer to the five planets that were known to the Ancient 
Greeks (i.e., Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn). (ibid., 1240, fn. 15). 
67 Plato writes: “For the model is something that has being for all eternity, while it, on the other 
hand, has been, is, and shall be for all time, forevermore. Such was the reason, then, such the 
god’s design for the coming to be of time, that he brought into being the Sun, the Moon and five 
other stars, for the begetting of time. These are called ‘wanderers,’ and they came to be in order 
to set limits to and stand guard over the numbers of time” (ibid., 38c-38d).  
68 Gilles Deleuze, Truth and Time, seminar 56, dated February 28, 1984, Transcription, Alain 
Guilmot, my own translation, http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=331 
[Date Accessed: July 3, 2018].) 
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various movements of all those which enjoy material existence (i.e., life enjoyed by citizens as 
they go about their activities in the marketplaces, on seas, and in fields of the Ancient world).69  
Deleuze notes that the Platonic conception of time undergoes radical revision in Aristotle. 
In Aristotle, time becomes “undomesticated,” in the sense that time is no longer simply 
characterized as that which was created to measure movement. In Physics IV, Aristotle famously 
identifies time’s involvement with change.70 Aristotle observes that time does not condition — 
i.e., “work” — the creation and destruction of physical entities, even though creation and 
destruction are clearly events which happen in time. (E.g., the destruction of a ship in a sea battle 
happens at a particular temporal moment).71 Deleuze notes that, for Aristotle, “the closer we get 
to the earth, the more the circular movement presents aberrations, and the more these aberrations 
 
69Plato writes: “Next, he sliced this entire compound in two along its length, joined the two 
halves together center to center like an X, and bent them back in a circle, attaching each half to 
itself end to end and to the ends of the other half at the point opposite to the one where they had 
been joined together. He then included them in that motion which revolves in the same place 
without variation, and began to make the one the outer, and the other the inner circle. And he 
decreed that the outer movement should be the movement of the Same, while the inner one 
should be that of the Different. He made the movement of the Same revolve toward the right by 
way of the side, and that of the Different toward the left by way of the diagonal, and he made the 
revolution of the Same, i.e., the uniform, the dominant one in that he left this one alone 
undivided, while he divided the inner one six times, to make seven unequal circles. His divisions 
corresponded to the several double and triple intervals, of which there were three each. He set the 
circles to go in contrary directions: three to go at the same speed, and the other four to go at 
speeds different from both each other’s and that of the other three. Their speeds, however, were 
all proportionate to each other.” (Plato, Timaeus, 36c-d). 
70 Aristotle writes: “But neither does time exist without change”, (Aristotle, Physics, 218b21 in 
The Complete Works of Aristotle 1, Jonathan Barnes [ed.], [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1984]).  
71 Aristotle writes: “A sufficient evidence of this is that nothing comes into being without itself 
moving somehow and acting, but a thing can be destroyed even if it does not move at all. And 
this is what, as a rule, we chiefly mean by a thing’s being destroyed by time. Still, time does not 




give us an untamed time, or worse we deliver ourselves to a non-domesticated time.”72 
Elaborating on the nature of change and its relation to time, Aristotle notes that change involves 
three aspects: (1) there is the thing that changes; (2) there is something in which the change 
occurs, and; (3) there is that to which something changes.73 Taken in isolation, none of these 
aspects provide a comprehensive account of change or time. (I.e., one can no more give a 
complete elaboration of the nature of change or time by simply focusing on the human who 
changes, than one can aspire to a comprehensive account of time by only specifying all the 
minutes that relentlessly mark the passage of temporal moments of a life or by simply presenting 
an elaboration of the withered corpse that one will become). A comprehensive Aristotelian 
elaboration of the nature of time necessarily involves these three aspects. A comprehensive 
account of time yields the conclusion that time is a multiplicity which involves measurement as 
one of its aspects.  
In his February 28, 1984 seminar on Ancient concepts of time, Deleuze observes that 
Plotinus modifies Plato’s and Aristotle’s characterizations of time as the measure of movement.74 
Gordon H. Clark observes that —for Plotinus — motion is what determines time, in the sense 
that time is a reflection of motion (and not the other way around). Clark writes: “time's existence 
does not await our counting; and, instead of time's being a measure or unit of motion, it is more 
 
72 Deleuze, Gilles. Truth and Time, seminar 55, dated February 7, 1984, transcription: Tsiomo 
Mpika proofreading: Marie Brémond, my own translation, [Date Accessed: July 3, 2018].) 
73 Aristotle writes: “With regard, however, to the actual subject of change—that is to say that in 
respect of which a thing changes—there is a difference to be observed. For in a process of 
change we may distinguish three terms—that which changes, that in which it changes, and that to 
which it changes,” Aristotle, Physics, 236a36-236b18) 
74 Deleuze writes: “First point is the cry of Plotinus: no, time cannot be defined as the number or 
measure of the movement of the world.” (Gilles Deleuze, Truth and Time, seminar 56, dated 
February 28, 1984, Transcription, Alain Guilmot, my translation, http://www2.univ-
paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=331 [Date Accessed: July 3, 2018].) 
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true to say that motion measures time.”75 Plotinus observes that any and all measure of the 
motion of physical entities — the chase of the charioteer, the flowing of wine, the rhythm of the 
undulations of the wheat crowns outside the walls of the city-state, etc. — is an accidental 
property of motion, in the sense that any measure “will provide an indication of the quantity of 
the motion.”76 Elaborating on the measure of the universe itself, Plotinus cautiously suggests that 
observations of circuit of celestial bodies will reveal a sense of time.77 The key point that 
Deleuze develops is that time is not produced by the circuit of celestial bodies. The measure of 
time is an indirect image of time, which reveals time’s quantitative aspect, but is insufficient to 
the task of providing a comprehensive account of time’s nature.  
 
A Liberation from Putative Temporal Paradoxes 
Perhaps the most flummoxing aspect of Deleuze’s account of time is that it seems to 
involve the identification of various types of paradoxes — i.e., the contemporaneousness of past 
and present; the implied co-existence of past and present; the implied pre-existence of past to 
present; and the suggestion that there are multiple levels to the past. To these, we may add the 
paradox of self-causation — one might suggest that the Deleuze’s concept of time seems to 
 
75 Gordon H. Clark, “The Theory of Time in Plotinus” The Philosophical Review 53, no. 4 (Jul., 
1944), pp. 337-358, 355. Plotinus explicitly notes: “Next, when they took the quantity from one 
rising of the sun to the next, it was possible to work out the length of the interval of time since 
the type of motion on which we depend is uniform, and we make use of that sort of interval as a 
measure, a measure of time, since time itself is not a measure.” (Plotinus, The Enneads, 3.7.12, 
33-36). 
76 Ibid., 3.7.12, 43-44. 
77 Plotinus writes: “And so, it would not be absurd to clarify the nature of time by saying that the 
motion, that is, the circuit of heaven in a way measures time, as far as is possible, by indicating 
in its own length the amount of time, since it is not possible to grasp or understand the amount of 
time in any other way. What is, then, measured by the circuit of heaven — that is, what is 




imply that an entity obtains (in the same sense) as both the cause and effect of variation. Here, I 
argue that Deleuze’s concept of temporality does not yield a series of paradoxes.  
It must be observed that the suggestion of the contemporaneous existence of past and 
present is not paradoxical, in the strict sense of the term. (E.g., Bergson claims that analytically 
discrete temporal periods can obtain at the same temporal moment, only to validate this claim 
with the situation that each of the various moments constitute different aspects of the present).78 
Hughes suggests that one way to make sense of this difficulty is to recognize that Deleuze’s use 
of the term “paradox” implies an indebtedness to Bergson.79 In Matter and Memory, Bergson 
characterizes memory as any of an illusion derived from a metaphysical error,80 a mental 
phenomenon bearing no relation to our perceptions of the world,81 and the result of the 
indeterminant character of a transcendental will.82 One implication of such a proliferation of 
competing identifications is the observation that the only clarity enjoyed by the concept is that it 
is clearly fraught. Deleuze’s elaboration of the various paradoxes associated with memory may 
be interpreted as a way of working out the nuanced relations of past, present, and memory.  
 
78 Bergson suggests the relation of past to present may be illustrated with a cone in Matter and 
Memory (Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, Nancy Margaret Paul and W, Scott Palmer (tr.), 
(New York: Zone Books, 1991], 152-162) — a text which Deleuze identifies as Bergson’s “great 
book.” (Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition, 81). Deleuze elaborates on the nature of 
Bergson’s cone in numerous places. Of interest are the discussions in the third chapter of 
Bergsonism (Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam [tr.], [New 
York: Zone Books, 1991), 51-73), and Proust and Signs (Deleuze, Gilles. Proust and Signs: The 
Complete Text, Richard Howard [tr.], [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000], 56-
60). 
79 Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Reader’s Guide, 113. 
80 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 48. 
81 Ibid., 50; 61. 
82 Ibid., 65. 
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Deleuze begins his elaboration of the nature of the past by asking how it is possible “to 
constitute time while passing in the time constituted.”83 The formulation of the question raises 
logical and ontological red flags, in the sense that it seems to imply a contradiction, and the 
resolution of the contradiction seems to yield the absurd claim that the past does not exist. Each 
of these difficulties must be addressed. The suggestion that Deleuze’s question involves a 
contradiction is altogether too quick, in the sense that it fails to acknowledge that the constituting 
and constituted aspects of time might represent different senses of time. Deleuze resolves this 
implied contradiction by demonstrating that the relation of past to present involves multiple 
senses. Essentially, the temporal duration of the past — which is created by the regressive 
temporal movement of the present— is logically distinct from that present. Though the general 
category of time may comprehend both the past and the present — i.e., the constituted and the 
constituting — this does not imply that these are conceived in the same sense. That past and 
present are not thought of in the same sense, diminishes the concern that these enjoy a 
paradoxical relation to one another. The ontological difficulty associated with the putative 
paradox results from a vague sense of the nature of contradiction. Were it the case that there was 
a contradiction, one means of resolving it would be to modify the relation of one of its terms. 
(I.e., a denial of the claim that the present moves into the past; an assertion of the existence of 
temporal void or vacuum in place of the immediate past. Were it the case that the relation or one 
of the terms were changed, the contradiction would not obtain). The possible existence of a 
temporal vacuum is based on the observation that memories seem to become less vivid if they 
exist further in the past. Proponents of the existence of a temporal void claim that the 
 
83 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 79. 
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diminishment of memories implies the existence of a period in which there is no time (i.e., a 
zero-point at which there is no temporal change).84  
The stakes involved in the stipulation of a temporal vacuum are profound. Le Poidvin 
points out that proponents of a temporal vacuum tend to suppose that it involves not just the 
mere rejection of the possibility of temporal change of physical entities (i.e., first order change), 
but also a denial of existence of logically secondary changes that temporal “events suffer…as 
they cease to be present and slip into the ever more distant past.”85 The claim of those who assert 
the existence of a temporal vacuum is that the passage of time itself does not occur — i.e., any 
temporal moment would diminish into non-temporal nothingness, thus precluding the possibility 
of any temporal progression. Were a temporal vacuum to exist, the emergence of a temporal 
moment that is dependent on the movement of present into past — would not. Instead of 
embracing this absurd conclusion, Deleuze argues for the view that the present moves into the 
past. Deleuze explicitly notes that the past, in this sense, “gives us a reason for the passing of the 
present.”86 The enthymematic stipulation here is that the past exists as an entity that is 
analytically discrete from (enjoying existence in a different sense than) the present. Thus, the 
contradiction implied by the formulation of the paradox is resolved by the assertion of the claim 
that temporality involves at least two domains, conceived of as different aspects comprehended 
by the same category. It is for this reason that Deleuze’s observation that time moves from 
 
84 Taking his inspiration from Aristotle, Robin Le Poidvin defines a temporal vacuum as “a 
period of time in which nothing happens.” (Robin Le Poidvin, Travels in Four Dimensions: The 
Enigmas of Space and Time, [Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003], 17). 
Aristotle proposes — and quickly rejects — the existence of a temporal vacuum in his argument 
for the dependency of time on the change and movement of physical, sub-lunar, terrestrial 
entities. (Aristotle, Physics IV, 218b21-219a2, Jonathon Barnes [ed], [Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1991], 68).  
85 Robin Le Poidvin, Travels in Four Dimensions, 17. 
86 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 81. 
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present to past does not imply a contradiction — i.e., it does not yield the absurdity of denying 
the existence of the past. 
There is an ambiguity in the concept of ontological comprehensiveness that is resolved 
with Deleuze’s formulation of the second paradox — that the past and present obtain as discrete 
co-existent entities. In his formulation of the second paradox, Deleuze explicitly suggests that the 
present enjoys a co-existence with the past.87 Elaborating on the ontological pre-suppositions of 
this paradox, Henry Somers-Hall observes that the present (characterized as the duration which 
enjoys the content of all the particulars that obtain in the present circumstance) is of a different 
kind than the past (characterized as a generality of all temporal instants that have come to pass; 
every particular obtained as an aspect or element of a lived duration that is no more; any 
temporal duration or period which is prior to the present; the totality of all that once was).88 The 
stipulation that particulars are non-identical to generalities suggests a problem with the claim that 
the past comprehends the present. If an entity comprehends another, and both entities are granted 
to be complex unities of analytically discrete elements, this implies that either of two possible 
forms of ontological comprehension could be actualized in the relation: (1) a comprehension 
involving a correspondence of each element in the comprehensive entity to each element in the 
comprehended entity (i.e., a comprehension involving a series of one-to-one relations among the 
elements); (2) a comprehension involving a relation of all elements of the comprehensive group 
to be comprehended by each element of the comprehended group. The first form of the 
comprehensive relation would amount to a variation to the outcome of the first paradox — i.e., 
 
87 Deleuze elaborates: “A second paradox emerges: the paradox of coexistence. If each past is 
contemporaneous with the present that it was, then all of the past coexists with the new present 
in relation to which it is now past.” (ibid., 81-82). 
88 Henry Somers-Hall, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: An Edinburgh Philosophy Guide, 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 70. 
 
46 
each temporal present would be comprehended by each past moment that it was.89 Deleuze’s 
claim that the present and the general past are co-existent implies a second outcome: all of the 
past co-exists with the present. The implication here is that a profound comprehension exists in 
which all of the past (i.e., each and every past moment; the totality of moments that have come 
before; the entirety of temporally prior moments) is involved in each moment of the present. 
Deleuze explicitly notes that the relation of the past to the present involves the second form of 
comprehension, with his echo of the “Bergsonian idea that each present [sic.] is only the entire 
past in its most contracted state.”90 Lampert suggests this form of comprehension is more readily 
understood as a type of temporal compression, in which the “past will be contemporaneous with 
everything past and present.”91 Deleuze elaborates on the mercurial nature of this co-existence, 
when he notes that “the present designates the most contracted degree of an entire past, which is 
itself like a coexisting totality.”92 The suggestion here is that the entirety of the past —i.e., the set 
of all previous temporal moments — is conserved as a highly contracted aspect that is 
ontologically concomitant with each instant of the temporal present.  
One implication of this type of comprehensive relation — of all elements of the past to 
each element of the present —is that no temporal moment entirely disappears as an existent that 
is potentially accessible as the content of a reminiscence. It is difficult to overstate the 
ontological weight this claim lends to the observation that the content of the past — which, 
though it may fade, seemingly now diminished, only to soon seem readily accessible and almost 
actual — never fully disappears. For Deleuze, the past survives the putative diminishment 
 
89 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 81. 
90 Ibid., 82. 
91 Jay Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2006), 47. 
92 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 82. 
 
47 
wrought by temporal distance, because the entirety of the past is ontologically involved in each 
moment of the present. Deleuze explicitly validates the claim that all of the past exists in each 
temporal moment with the summary observation that the past “insists with the former present, it 
consists with the new or present [sic.].”93 The weight of this observation is staggering: aspects of 
disparate temporal moments arrayed throughout the past — the moment of one’s birth, the birth 
of one’s parents, the birth of one’s ancestors, the birth of a species, the birth of the spatio-
temporally extended universe that one inhabits, the death of one’s mother — inhere as aspects of 
the present. This seems to be akin to the type of memory Bergson attributes to the “dreamer” 
who keeps before “his eyes at each moment the infinite multitude of the details of his past 
history.”94 Somers-Hall points out that such a memory is “a pure memory” that “contains a 
complete record of the past.”95 Deleuze adduces the existence of this type of memory with his 
observation that at certain privileged instants — i.e., moments of profound psychological stress; 
moments so called heightened-awareness, etc. — human memory accesses the “whole of life.”96 
The claim here is that human memory involves a continuing regress through all of historical 
time. The suggestion is that this process first draws upon one’s own temporally prior lived 
experience, and then — having exhausted these — draws on the details of the general experience 
of materially instantiated entities. The accuracy of the claim that human memory can grasp (as its 
 
93 Ibid. 
94 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 155. 
95 Henry Somers-Hall, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: An Edinburgh Philosophy Guide, 
68.  
96 (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 83). Bergson illustrates through reference to cases 
of near-death experience: “But there is nothing more instructive in this regard than what happens 
in cases of sudden suffocation, in men drowned or hanged. Such a man, when brought to life 
again, states that he saw, in a very short time, all the forgotten events of his life passing before 
him with great rapidity, with their smallest circumstances and in the very order in which they 
occurred.” (Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 155). 
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content) the experiences of other entities is adduced from Bergson’s explicit observation that 
human memory is capable “of moving in the universal” — i.e., apprehending the generalities 
(habits) that are distinct from the experience of any particular material entity.97 
Though Deleuze explicitly distinguishes between the third and fourth paradoxes of time, 
Lampert cautiously observes that the fourth paradox (of different levels of temporal contraction) 
is a property of the third paradox (of the pre-existence of the past to the present).98 The 
suggestion that the past pre-exists the present is adduced from the observation that there is a 
general domain of the past (i.e., the domain represented by the volume of Bergson’s time cone) 
which is partitioned into different levels of temporal contraction. A hint of Bergson’s influence is 
found in Deleuze’s passing observation that the general past exists as a supplemental dimension. 
The enthymematic implication here is that this dimension involves the immediate past and the 
present moment.99 Bergson elaborates on the natures of these through reference to the process of 
trying to recall the details of a nearly forgotten experience. This process involves four discrete 
moments: (1) a moment “by which we detach ourselves from the present”100 — a disengagement 
with from the sensory data provided by our immanent lived experience; (2) a moment of placing 
ourselves in the totality of the past — i.e., “in the past in general”;101 (3) a moment of placing 
ourselves in some more particular region of the past, and; (4) performing a psychic operation that 
is an analogue of the physical action of focussing a camera — i.e., a process of rendering 
 
97 Ibid. 
98 Jay Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History, 49. 
99 Deleuze elaborates on the complex dependency relation of the involved in the relation among 
the general past, the immediate past, and the present: “if the new present is always endowed with 
a supplementary dimension, this is because it is reflected in the element of the pure past in 
general, whereas it is only through this element that we focus upon the former present as a 
particular.” (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 82). 




particular intentional objects clear to the mind’s eye.102 Ignoring the decidedly psychological 
tenor of Bergson’s observations, Deleuze derives the general claim that the past is constituted of 
analytically discrete (but ontologically implicated) levels — the immanent duration of present; 
the localized past; the more general temporal level in which all of the past is “preserved in 
itself.”103 
One implication of the suggestion that the different aspects of time obtain as implicated 
aspects of the same duration is that there is no quantitative temporal distinction among these 
aspects. This amounts to a denial of the claim that the relation of temporal succession obtains 
between the past and the present. Stated again, there is no quantitative difference among what 
occurs as temporally prior and the present circumstance. This generalizes to the claim that 
temporality is non-reducible to numerical determination. Daniel W. Smith characterizes the 
separation of time from number as a “liberation” of time, in the senses that: (1) time is not 
conceived of as something that is subordinated to — dependent on — the movement of physical 
bodies, and; (2) time is no longer conceived of as ordered by — i.e., determined by — any 
system of enumeration (which would apply to the movement of physical bodies).104 Deleuze 
suggests a positive formulation of this liberated aspect of time when he identifies it as “a 
movement of the soul” that gives rise to the new.105 Deleuze tends to define the “new” in 
 
102 Ibid. 
103 Deleuze —in his discussion of the ontological implications involved in Proust’s concept of 
time — identifies this as the primary function of the pure (non-personal; virtual) past. (Gilles 
Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 59). 
104 Smith writes: “Time ceases to be the number of movement, and no longer depends on 
anything but itself; time no longer measures movement, but movement itself (whether originary 
or derived, anomalous or aberrant) now takes places within time.” (Daniel W. Smith, Essays on 
Deleuze [Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2012], 133). 
105 Deleuze writes: “Time is the expression of the movement of the soul, that is to say, it is the 
rhythm of the figures of light. How can we define this movement of the soul which gives rise to 
time and, moreover, which constitutes time? It is the movement of the soul that gives birth to 
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reference to the “singular” and singularities.106 To understand the nature of the new, the nuanced 
meanings Deleuze assigns to each of these terms must be clarified. 
Smith elaborates on the nature of the new by specifying that the singular point (or 
“singularity”) is the temporal instance at which something novel happens.107 Zourabichvili 
clarifies the “liberated” aspect of temporal habits when he identifies the field of singularities as 
explicitly pre-individual — i.e., ontologically primary to the formation of any concept of person, 
self, or discrete identity.108 For Deleuze, the singular (or singularity, or singular point) is one of 
the “little selves” that function both in bearing witness to the various processes involved with the 
formation of individual entities, and participating in determination of the conditions which 
 
time; I can say at the same time, see, it continues to maintain, that's what's weird, it keeps on 
maintaining the subordination of time to movement. Only it's such a new movement, so new. 
What is it? The movement of light in itself and the movement of the object on which light is 
reflected, the movement of luminous forms in themselves and not the movement of rigid forms, 
solid forms, the movement of figures of light and not the movement of the figures of geometry, 
everything has changed, it is another time, it remains subordinate to the movement, it is a 
movement quite new, radically new.” (Deleuze, Gilles. Truth and Time, February 28, 1984, 
Transcription, Alain Guilmot, my translation, http://www2.univ-
paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=331 [Date Accessed: July 3, 2018]). 
106 An example of this is found in Deleuze’s elaboration of the nature of philosophy: “Philosophy 
creates concepts, which are neither generalities nor truths. They are more along the lines of the 
Singular, the Important, the New.” (Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and 
Interviews 1975-1995, (tr.) Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina [New York: Semiotext(e), 2006], 
238).  
107 Smith writes: “The singularities are precisely those points where something ‘happens’ within 
the multiplicity (an event), or in relation to another multiplicity, causing it to change nature and 
produce something new. For instance, to take the example of a physical system, the water in my 
kettle is a multiplicity, and a singularity in the system occurs when the water boils or freezes, 
thereby changing the nature of the physical multiplicity (its phase space). Similarly, the point 
where a person breaks down in tears, or boils over in anger, is a singular point in their psychic 
multiplicity, surrounded by a swarm of ordinary points” (Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze, 
247). 




render these processes possible.109 While it might seem that this dual function suggests a causal 
paradox with respect to the nature of singularities’ capacity to determine the new — i.e., it seems 
that singularities function as both the cause and the effect — this paradox only obtains if one 
accepts a strictly linear concept of causality (i.e., the type of causality illustrated in Hume’s 
example of the “conjunction” of the billiard balls, or that specified by Aristotle’s efficient cause). 
It is worth pointing out that the linear conception of causality ranks among the most emaciated in 
the history of Western philosophy, and that there are other modes of determination that need not 
be causal, in the sense indicated by concepts of linear causality. Singularities may involve all 
sorts of modes of determination that need not involve any sort of causal relation, linear or 
otherwise. Deleuze explicitly notes that determinations of the passive synthesis form the 
“conditions” for causal relations. 110 Addressing the problem of how singularities may avoid the 
causal paradox of self-determination, Smith observes that there are forms of determination which 
are non-causal — i.e., reciprocal interactions, mechanical determinations, dialectical 
determinations, statistical determinations, etc.111   
 
109 Deleuze writes: “Underneath the self which acts are little selves which contemplate and which 
render possible both the action and the active subject. We speak of our 'self only in virtue of 
these thousands of little witnesses which contemplate within us: it is always a third party who 
says 'me'.” (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 76). 
110 Deleuze explains in his (approving) discussion of Husserl’s claims about the nature of the 
problematic present: “The synthesis of the problem with its own conditions constitutes 
something ideational or unconditioned, determining at once the condition and the conditioned, 
that is, the domain of resolvability and solutions present in this domain, the form of the 
propositions and their determination in this form, signification as the condition of truth and 
proposition as the condition of truth.” (Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 122). 
111 Smith elucidates: “Causality, in other words, must be distinguished from the more general 
question of determination, since determination can be not only causal, but also statistical or 
probabilistic (determination of a result by the joint action of independent entities), structural or 
wholistic (determination of parts by the whole), teleological (determination by ends or goals), 
dialectical (determination by internal strife or synthesis of opposites), as well as dynamic or 
causal.” (Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze, 236). Reciprocal interactions tend to apply to the 
determination of the qualitative identities of any two — or more — entities are the consequent of 
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Determinations such as these tend to apply to the formation of individuals at a level that 
is ontologically primary to causality. (Causality tends to apply to individuated entities). Also, 
causal relations are regarded as one class, within the more general category of determinations. In 
The Logic of Sense — the second Appendix, Phantasm and Modern Literature — Deleuze 
explicitly notes that singularities are pre-personal (i.e., not yet individuated) “dissolved selves” 
whose determinations tend to be ontologically primary to those effected by causality. The 
determination of any given singularity is not yet causal, provided that we recognize that this “not 
yet” is used in its non-temporal, strictly ontological sense. Deleuze writes:  
The dissolved self opens up to a series of roles, since it gives rise to an intensity, 
which already comprehends difference in itself, the unequal in itself, and which 
penetrates all others, across and within multiple bodies. There is always another 
breath in my breath, always another thought in my thought, another possession in 
 
mutual action (e.g., the function of each gland in the human body being determined by the 
function of other glands). Mechanical determinations are seen in cases in which the consequent 
of an action is determined by the antecedent and additional — not directly linked — forces (e.g., 
the forces of a power-plant on the production of a car in a factory linked to the power grid). 
Statistical determination occurs following the end of any series of the discrete actions of entities 
that enjoy a relative independence from one another. (E.g., the tendency of about fifty percent of 
the live births of humans in a developed nation to be biologically sexed as female). A wholistic 
determination obtains in any situation in which the range of possibilities enjoyed by a particular 
is limited by the group of which it is a part (i.e., the determination of an individual in a social 
group). An entity undergoes a teleological determination when its behaviours or actions are said 
to be motivated by the attempt to achieve some not yet realized end. (E.g., a cat’s behaviour of 
hiding in a dark cupboard in order to get over a case of feline conjunctivitis). A dialectical 
determination obtains when two (or more) entities of group are in some sort of opposition that 
affects the nature of a group. (E.g., when the competing interests of the petite bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat of a given country affect the nature of that country’s economy). (Cf. Mario Bung, 




which I possess, a thousand things and a thousand beings implicated in my 
complications, every true thought is an aggression.112 
Though Deleuze seems to suggest that singularities may favour determination through strife — 
i.e., a dialectical determination — this mode of determination might only apply to this particular 
elaboration. That is, there is nothing in the rest of the passage that implies that singularities only 
enjoy aggressive modes of determining the new. What is key is that (1) the singular enjoys a 
means of determination; (2) because these determinations occur on a level that is ontologically 
primary to that of individuated entities — at the level of conditions of individuation — these are 
not subject to the paradoxical self-causation.  
 
Concluding Remarks: The Passive Creation of the Present 
The passive synthesis of the present is the origin of temporality. Entities in the present 
actualize time through their habitual — i.e., unthinking, pre-individuated — actions in the world. 
The temporal series of notes played on a recorder are habitual, as are the undulations of crops in 
the field. Though Hume tends to conceive of temporal progressions (all these moments in time), 
in essentially psychologistic terms, Deleuze denies Hume’s suggestion that temporality is 
reducible to the cognitive processes of psycho-social entities. Deleuze’s elaboration of the first 
synthesis of time is analogous to Husserl’s, in the sense that both suggest that an ontologically 
primordial empty (i.e., transcendental) form of time allows for time’s actualization in the present. 
The passive synthesis of time — for both Deleuze and Husserl — occurs on an ontological level 
that is antecedent to the formation of individuals, thus precluding any reduction to the cognitive 
processes of individuals (i.e., psychologism).  
 
112 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 298. 
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Deleuze observes that Plotinus modifies Plato’s concept of time. The Platonic cosmology 
yields the observation that time is fixed to the movement of the celestial bodies. That time is 
identified as fixed by the constant — i.e., invariant — movement of the heavenly spheres 
suggests that temporality is ontologically dependent on the heavens. For Plotinus, time becomes 
liberated (i.e., it is conceptualized as ontologically autonomous, not ontologically derived). The 
contemplations involved in the formation of time are the contemplations of a universal soul. 
Deleuze observes that, in the context of Plotinus’s theory of temporality, if we must accede to the 
Ancients’ claims that time is a measurement of movement, we should do so only with the 
recognition that these measurements are but one aspect of time — i.e., an expression of the 
movements of the ontologically primordial soul of the universe.  
Further, I observed that though time is involved in the process of individuation, this does 
not imply that creation in (and by) time is paradoxical. The particular concern here is the paradox 
of self-causation — which suggests that an existent cannot cause itself. Through reference to 
Bergson, I suggested that time enjoys determination as an ontogenetic force. This identification 
of time — as an element that obtains at a pre-personal ontological level — yields the claim that 
the paradoxical creation of autonomous creation of an entity from itself, does not apply to 
temporal ontogenesis of existents.    
Taken together, these suggest that Deleuze characterizes temporality as an ontological 
process that is free from subordination to any of the cognitive operations of psychosocial entities 
or quantitative determination of the types illustrated by the relation of temporal succession. 
Arguing from the observation that the present involves the production of the new, the unique, the 
different, etc., Deleuze suggests that the passive synthesis of time operates on an ontologically 
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primordial level of pre-individuated singularities to produce changes in the lived present. In these 




CHAPTER 2: TIME AND INDIVIDUATION — SIMONDON AND 
DELEUZE ON TEMPORAL ONTOGENESIS 
Gilbert Simondon’s complex thought on the nature of magic and the role of temporality 
in relation to the processes involved with individuation is a significant (if often overlooked) 
influence on Deleuze’s thought on the nature of time. Though Deleuze wrote little on Simondon 
— the number references to Simondon in Deleuze’s published works amount to a surprisingly 
brief review of L’Individu et sa gènse physico-biologique,1 two comments in The Logic of 
Sense,2 a two-page analysis in the second volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia,3 and a 
footnote on the nature of “modulation” in Cinema 14 — Deleuze seems to have intertwined 
Simondon’s thought on time with his own.5 Deleuze echoes Simondon’s suggestion that 
 
1 Gilles Deleuze, “On Gilbert Simondon” Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974, David 
Lapoujade (ed.), Michael Taormina (tr.), (South Pasadena: Semiotext[e], 2002). 
2 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (tr.), (London: 
Continuum, 2004).  
3 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Brian 
Muassumi (tr.), (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
4 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Hugh Thomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(tr.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).  
5 The paucity of Deleuze’s explicit references to Simondon might be one of the reasons for what 
seems to be the near deafening critical silence on Simondon. David Scott, Muriel Combes, 
Andrew Iliadis, and Alberto Toscano are notable voices in the wilderness (David Scott, Gilbert 
Simondon’s Psychic and Collective Individuation: A Critical Introduction and Guide, 
[Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014]; Muriel Combes, Gilbert Simondon and the 
Philosophy of the Transindividual, Thomas LaMarre [tr.], [Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 
2013]; Andrew Iliadis, “A New Individuation: Deleuze’s Simondon Connection” Media Tropes 
4, no. 1 [2013], pp. 83-100; Alberto Toscano, “Gilbert Simondon”, Deleuze’s Philosophical 
Lineage, Graham Jones and Jon Roffe [ed.], [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009]). 
One can only hope that the lack of critical engagement with Simondon’s thought will be 
remedied by the recent English language translations of Simondon’s major works (Gilbert 
Simondon, Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information, Taylor Adkins [tr], 
[Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2020]; Gilbert Simondon, On the 
Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, Cécile Malapina and John Rogove [tr.], [Minneapolis 
and London: University of Minnesota Press]).  
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temporality is an ontologically primary force that participates in the formation (and modification) 
of individuated entities.   
For Simondon, individual entities are ontologically dependent on — i.e., derived, 
subsistent from — a metastable process of individuation. Simondon further observes that the 
process of individuation involves an assemblage of productive forces undergoing modification. 
Temporality is among these, in the sense that it is one of the pre-individuated forces involved in 
the creation of entities.6 It is perhaps important to note that the relata involved in the process of 
individuation are ontogenetic, immaterial forces, which have not yet obtained as individuated 
substance; these are “energetic conditions” and the ontological pre-conditions of physical matter; 
the qualitative aspects that participate in the formation of entities, not the quantified aspects 
typically associated with realized physical entities. Simondon’s identification of individuation as 
a metastable process suggests that it involves temporality in the form of a unified duration 
involving irregular or regular temporal intervals, or as a unified non-decomposable duration such 
as a continuum without internal temporal division. Either state of affairs implies that time is 
ontologically primary to entities — time is a pre-personal force that is involved in the creation of 
discrete particulars, genera, and species (in the senses that these may be thought of as 
analytically distinguishable entities).7 Taken together, these suggest that temporality obtains as a 
 
6 Simondon specifies the temporal aspects of individuation, when he observes: “Thus, there is a 
historical aspect to the manifestation of a structure in a substance, insofar as the structural germ 
must appear. Pure energetic determinism does not suffice for a substance to attain its state of 
stability. The beginning of structuring individuation is an event for the system in a metastable 
state. Thus, in general, even in the simplest process of individuation, a relation takes place 
between the body under consideration and the temporal existence of beings external to it that 
intervene as the evental conditions of its structuration.” (Gilbert Simondon, Individuation in 
Light of Notions of Forms and Information, 70.) 
7 Simondon explicitly notes that the process of individuation is primary to form, and functions to 
comprehensively modify all of particular, species, and general milieu (i.e., genera). Simondon 
writes: “There is a genesis of forms when the relation of a living ensemble to its milieu and to 
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force that is ontologically prior to — and participates in — the formation of individuated entities. 
In concrete terms, this implies that temporality, though it may be analytically distinguishable 
from magic, enjoys an analogical relation to ontologically primary processes of modification. In 
this sense, time and magic are correctly identified as ontogenetic forces which participate in the 
process of individuation. 
In the present chapter, I suggest that Deleuze echoes Simondon’s identification of 
temporality as an ontologically primary force involved in the formation of individuated entities. I 
argue that Simondon’s elaboration of the nature of magic —characterized as an ontogenetic force 
that participates in the formation of existents — enjoys a complex analogous relation to 
temporality. The analogy between temporality and magic is demonstrated by shared aspects: (1) 
each of the analogues tends to be identified as dynamic processes involved in ontological 
production of the new — i.e., temporality and magic share the qualitative aspect of productive 
dynamism; (2) both temporality and magic tend to be the subject matter (i.e., content) of art — 
i.e., each analogue enjoys an expressive aspect, in the sense that each is involved in the 
expression of aesthetic values  — which further implies that each is in involved in the production 
of aesthetic objects of various kinds.  
 
The Mercurial Natures of Magic and Time 
 
itself passes through a critical phase rich in tensions and virtuality, a phase that ends with the 
disappearance of the species or the appearance of a new life form. The situation in its entirety is 
constituted not only by the species and its milieu, but also by the tension of the ensemble formed 
by the relation of the species to its milieu wherein the relations of incompatibility become 
increasingly strong. Moreover, the species isn't the only thing that is modified, for the entire 
ensemble of the vital complex formed by the species and its milieu also discovers a new 
structure.” (ibid., 259)  
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In the opening pages of a text published in 1895, the disgraced seminary student, 
shoemaker, and radical French socialist Éliphas Lévi claims that magic is real and a potent force 
of ontological modification.8 Lévi justifies his claim by citing the evidence provided by works of 
aesthetic and archaeological significance, ancient religious and scientific practices, and the 
behaviour of mystics (i.e., “occult philosophers”). Lévi observes that the archaeological record 
suggests a cultural awareness that magic functioned as a pre-personal force of modification. Lévi 
specifies that inscriptions on the walls of ancient temples — those which can be found in the 
ruins of “Nineveh or Thebes” — and the paintings that inspired the creation of the Vedas contain 
inscriptions that describe the creation of unique entities.9 Lévi further specifies that the music of 
the lyre of Orpheus is identified as comprehending magical properties. In concrete terms, the 
notes plucked on the lyre yield a qualitative transformation that is illustrated in myth and legend. 
Further, magical transformation is identified as a represented objectivity, as well as a concrete 
effect of the lyric poetry of Ancient Greece.10 Throughout Lévi’s elucidations, magic is 
 
8 Éliphas Lévi, The Doctrine of Transcendental Magic, A. E. Waite (tr.), (England: Rider & 
Company, 1896), 6. 
9 Lévi writes: “Behind the veil of all the hieratic and mystical allegories of ancient doctrines, 
behind the darkness and strange ordeals of all initiations, under the seal of all sacred writings, in 
the ruins of Nineveh or Thebes, on the crumbling stones of old temples and on the blackened 
visage of the Assyrian or Egyptian sphinx, in the monstrous or marvelous paintings which 
interpret to the faithful of India the inspired pages of the Vedas, in the cryptic emblems of our 
old books on alchemy, in the ceremonies practiced at reception by all secret societies, there are 
found indications of a doctrine which is everywhere the same and everywhere carefully 
concealed. Occult philosophy seems to have been the nurse or godmother of all intellectual 
forces, the key of all divine obscurities and the absolute queen of society in those ages — when it 
was reserved exclusively for the education of priests and of kings (Éliphas Lévi, The Doctrine of 
Transcendental Magic, 1). 
10 Lévi writes: “It [magic] reigned in Persia with the Magi, who perished in the end, as perish all 
masters of the world, because they abused their power; it endowed India with the most wonderful 
traditions and with an incredible wealth of poesy, grace and terror in its emblems; it civilized 
Greece to the music of the lyre of Orpheus; it concealed the principles of all sciences, all 
progress of the human mind, in the daring calculations of Pythagoras; fable abounded in its 
miracles, and history, attempting to estimate this unknown power, became confused with fable; it 
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characterized variously as a secret that gives the magician the power to affect great political and 
personal change, as a criminal activity, and (perhaps most strangely) as the universal answer to 
all problems.11 Taken together, these suggest that magic may be identified as process of antiquity 
that yields modification or creation — i.e., individuation, ontogenesis — of existents, and which 
enjoys a plurality of expressions.  
Further evidence that magic functions as an ontologically primary mode of variation is 
provided by the observation that it is the basis of the discrete social phenomena of art, science, 
and religion. Though it has been taken as a given that magic might have been the nascent form 
involved in all of the science of antiquity, primitive art, and tribal religion, the precise nature of 
the involvement tends to elude critical consensus, in the sense that identifications of the nature of 
magic vary wildly in the writings of philosophers and anthropologists. In an overlooked section 
of On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects,12 Gilbert Simondon suggests that magic is 
both a “primitive unity” and a “phase” that marks the transition into religious, scientific, and 
aesthetic modes of thought. Henri Bergson seems to echo the first part of Simondon’s claim, 
while rejecting any connection between science and religion, only to then begrudgingly accept 
 
undermined or consolidated empires by its oracles, caused tyrants to tremble on their thrones and 
governed all minds, either by curiosity or by fear” (ibid.). 
11 In a specification of his reasons for publishing the text, Lévi elaborates seemingly limitless 
potential benefits of studying magic: “No less is proposed, therefore, than a universal solution of 
all problems?” The answer is yes, unquestionably, since we are concerned with explaining the 
Philosophical Stone, perpetual motion, the secret of the Great Work and of the Universal 
Medicine. We shall be accused of insanity, like the divine Paracelsus, or of charlatanism, like the 
great and unfortunate Agrippa. If the pyre of Urban Grandier be extinguished, the sullen 
proscriptions of silence and of calumny remain. We do not defy but are resigned to them. We 
have not sought the publication of this book of our own will, and we believe that if the time be 
come to bear witness, it will be borne by us or by others” (ibid., 14). 
12 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, Cécile Malaspina and John 
Rogrove(tr.), (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2017). 
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that there is a relation between religion and magic.13 Both Mircea Eliade and Susan Langer 
highlight the religious and aesthetic aspects of magic, as well as highlight its status as an 
ontogenetic process when they identify its involvement in artistic practices of antiquity (i.e., 
dances or myths that are related as oral or written literary works of art, etc.) that illustrate the 
birth of the cosmos.14 Elaborating on the practices of hunters, contemporary Philippe Descola 
highlights the binding aspect of magical practices, in which two (or more) ontologically discrete 
forces to enter into a state of fusion that produces a distinct entity (i.e., a hybrid that is non-
reducible to either of the constituents).15 Perhaps motivated by a sense of frustration at the 
proliferation of competing views on the nature of magic, Peel has suggested that magic simply be 
regarded as a “catch-all” concept that is hopelessly over-determined.16  
 
13 Bergson writes: “This brings us to an essential point. It has been asserted that religion began as 
magic. Magic has also been considered as a forerunner of science. If we confine ourselves to 
psychology, as we have done, if we reconstitute, by an effort of introspection, the natural 
reaction of man to his perception of things, we find that, while magic and religion are akin, there 
is nothing in common between magic and science” (Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion, R. Ashley Audra, Cloudesley Brereton, and W. Horsfall Carter [tr.], [Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1977], 163). David Scott elaborates on the “complicated and 
ambiguous” relation that obtained among Bergson’s and Simondon’s thought. (David Scott, 
Gilbert Simondon’s Psychic and Collective Individuation: A Critical Introduction and Guide, 
56).  
14 Cf. Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return, Willard R. Trask 
(tr.), (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1954); Susan K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A 
Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art New York: Mentor, 1954). 
15 Descola writes: “A hunter’s relationship with animals may take other forms over and above 
these marks of consideration: seduction, for example, in which the prey is seen as a lover, or 
magic coercion that annihilates the animal’s willpower and forces it to approach the hunter. But 
the most common of such relationships and the one that best emphasizes the parity between 
humans and animals is the bond of friendship that the hunter establishes over time with one 
particular member of the species” (Philippe Descola, Beyond Nature and Culture, Janet Lloyd 
[tr.], [Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2013], 20). 
16 J. D. Y. Peel, “Understanding Alien Belief-Systems” British Journal of Sociology 20 (1969), 
pp. 69-84, 73. 
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The saturation of philosophical and anthropological reflection on the nature of magic and 
the difficulty in conceptualizing magic as an ontologically unified entity, imply that magic is a 
pre-personal process of creation — i.e., an ontogenetic multiplicity (or assemblage) — in Gilles 
Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s sense of the terms. Here, I suggest that both time and magic are 
aspects of an ontogenetic circumstance. My argument involves two complex claims: (1) I 
critically assess Gilbert Simondon’s elaborations of magic and its relation to aesthetic practices, 
in order to suggest that Simondon’s analyses demonstrate that though the phenomenon of magic 
is vague, it is not hopelessly indeterminable; (2) I specify the natures of temporality and magic 
through reference to Deleuze’s and Guattari’s elaboration of the nature of multiplicities. It should 
be observed that though multiplicities vary in type, (e.g., in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and 
Guattari identify numeric, literary, political, economic multiplicities), this does not imply that a 
multiplicity lacks formal determination. Multiplicities tend to fulfil three conditions: (1) they 
tend to involve ontogenetic processes; (2) their elements are mutually implicated; (3) these 
variations tend to gain expression through differential equations. I further observe that both 
magic and temporality fulfil these conditions. This implies that magic and time are analogues 
— they obtain as relata in an analogy of shared aspects. An analysis of literature will 
demonstrate satisfaction of the first condition — i.e., both magic and time are presented in fiction 
as involving a plurality of non-reducible, non-identical aspects. The satisfaction of the second 
condition is elucidated through reference to the transformations of one seemingly discrete entity 
into another (e.g., the transformation of hunter to prey). The fulfilment of the third condition is 
adduced through reference to the use of quantitative variables in magical practices as well as in 
the expression of temporal variation — i.e., through clock time, calendar time, or the 
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formalization of a series of temporal succession (t1, t2…tn). Taken together, these suggest that 
time and magic are analogous compresent elements of an ontogenetic multiplicity.  
 
Aesthetic Representations of “Key-points” as Nexuses of Time and Change 
In the beginning, there was magic. Perhaps the most interesting claim of On the Mode of 
Existence of Technical Objects is that the ontologically primary state of the universe involved 
magic. Simondon observes that the most fundamental relation among forces is identified as a 
“primitive magical unity,” in the sense that it “corresponds to a primitive union, prior to any 
split, of subjectivity and objectivity.”17 The claim is that magic is involved with creation at the of 
the most basic ontological level —i.e., it obtains as an attribute of a relation that is ontologically 
antecedent to the emergence of any sort of concretized distinction among entities. Simondon — 
in Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information — explicitly observes that the 
process of individuation  involves relations among noumena that are akin to “exchanges of 
energy or passages of structures from one domain of reality to another domain of reality.”18 
Deleuze aptly identifies this dynamic interaction of pre-personal forces as the expression of 
difference in the relation of “noumena [sic.] closest to the phenomenon.”19 In concrete terms, 
these suggest that the ontogenetic circumstance involves a relation of analytically discrete pre-
personal forces, which participate with one another to yield a variegated sensible world 
populated by a vast menagerie of different modes of thought, temporal displacements, different 
orders and scales of time, as well as discrete thought objects, unique social structures, 
 
17 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 178. 
18 Gilbert Simondon, Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information, 75. 
19 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 222. 
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individuals, species, and substance.20 Simondon — in Individuation in Light of Notions of Form 
and Information — explicitly observes that there is an implicit organization to the constellation 
of pre-personal forces involved in the ontogenetic circumstance —i.e., they obtain as reticulated 
aspects of a network that is ontologically prior to the distinction among form and matter.21 
Simondon further suggests that this ontogenetic organization transduces into a real order 
predicated of entities arrayed in actuality. Perhaps the most striking implication associated with 
this claim is the observation that all of past, present, and future (characterized as discrete 
durations comprehended by eternity) enjoy realization as elements of the reticulated order of 
actuality.22 This implies that temporal duration is one of the plurality of ontogenetic forces 
involved in the creation of individuated entities. Taken together, these suggest that the 
ontogenetic circumstance is a reticulated unity — a unified network — which involves temporal 
duration; time is among the differentiating forces from which actuality is born.23  
Once the fundamental ontogenetic circumstance (i.e., the ontologically primordial unity) 
has been actualized as various individuals and forms of mediation that obtain between 
individuals and their localized circumstances — “associated milieus” — both time and magic 
 
20Simondon writes: “In the magical universe, the figure was the figure of a ground and the 
ground, ground of a figure; the real, the unity of the real, was at once figure and ground; the 
question of a possible lack of the figure’s efficacy on the ground of the ground’s influence on the 
figure could not arise, since ground and figure merely constituted a single unity of being.” 
(Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 183-184).  
21 Gilbert Simondon, Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information, 376. 
22 Ibid., 324. 
23 Simondon writes: “The magical mode of relation with the world is not devoid of all 
organization: on the contrary: it is rich in implicit organization, attached to the world and to man; 
in the magical mode the mediation between man and the world is not yet concretized and 
constituted as standing apart, by means of specialized objects or human beings, but this 
mediation does exist functionally in the most elementary of all structurations, which is also the 
first: that from which erupts the distinction between figure and ground in the universe” 
(Simondon, Gilbert. On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 169).  
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subsist as aspects of this reality. Simondon stipulates that these aspects enjoy heightened 
expressivity at particular spatio-temporally extended “key-points.” The suggestion is that time 
and magic are more substantive agents of change at particular privileged moments in space-time. 
While the particular nature of any of these key-points is acknowledged to vary in comparison 
with any other key-point, the identity of key-points seems to be reducible to the possession of 
three fundamental attributes: (1) they are spatio-temporally located sites of mixture of entities; 
(2) they are singularities that are “exceptional in character”24; (3) they form networks with other 
key-points, which emulate the unity that defined the ontogenetic circumstance. Simondon 
characterizes key-points as concentrations that maintain an axiological privilege when compared 
to objects in their immediate vicinity.25  
That there are certain geographic places of great magical significance has been well 
documented by anthropologists, poets, and philosophers. Georges Dumézil notes that the citizens 
Kay Kaūs (i.e., Iran) built a magical castle for their king, upon his return from the conquest of 
the demonic Māzandarān.26 Arthur Rimbaud observes the magical qualities of numerous natural 
and fabricated physical structures in his poem “vigils.”27 Georges Bataille identifies the caves at 
Lascaux as the sites of magical operations.28 Jean-Hugues Barthélémy has noted that Simondon 
 
24 Ibid., 180. 
25 Simondon writes: “These places [i.e., key-points] and these moments keep hold of, 
concentrate, and express the forces contained in the ground [fond] of reality that supports them. 
These points, and these moments are not separate realities; they draw their force from the ground 
they dominate; but they localize and focalize the attitude of the living vis-á-vis its milieu. (ibid., 
178). 
26 Georges Dumézil, The Plight of a Sorcerer, Jaan Puhvel and David Weeks [tr.], [Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1986], 22). 
27 Rimbaud writes: “The back of black hearth, real suns from shorelines: Ah! magical wells; only 
a glimpse of dawn, this time” (Arthur Rimbaud, “Vigils” in Rimbaud Complete: Poetry and 
Prose, Wyatt Mason [tr.], [New York and Toronto: Random House, 2003], 247). 
28 Georges Bataille, Prehistoric Painting: Lascaux or the Birth of Art, Austryn Wainhouse (tr.), 
(Switzerland, Skira, 1955), 129. 
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tends to identify magical key-points with natural objects, and that this seems to suggest that 
artifacts cannot function as key-points.29 While it is the case that Simondon does typically 
identify natural geographic formations (e.g., mountaintops, summits, entrances to gorges, etc.) as 
key-points, he also suggests that human-constructed objects (i.e., artifacts) like watchtowers — if 
they are unusual, in the sense that they stand apart from their immediate natural environment and 
form a node in a network of unique places — can be identified as key-points.30  
Simondon further identifies key-points as a type of singularity — i.e., a spatio-temporal 
location at which something transformative happens.31 It might also be observed that, in addition 
to involving physical instantiation, magical key-points involve temporality. (One of the 
positivities of key-points is that they enjoy at least one kind of duration — in my ultimate 
chapter, I reference Marx to develop the claim that key-points may involve multiple durations. 
 
29 Jean-Hughes Barthélémy, “Fifty Key Terms in the Works of Gilbert Simondon”, Gilbert 
Simondon: Being and Technology, Arne De Boever, Alex Murray, Jon Roffe and Ashley 
Woodward (ed.), Arne De Boever (tr.), (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1988), 223. 
30 Simondon writes: “Technical thought retains only the schematism of structures, of that which 
makes up the efficacy of action on the singular points; these singular points detached from the 
world whose figure they were, also detached from one another, losing their immobilizing 
reticular concatenation, become capable of being fragmented and available, as well as 
reproducible and constructible. The elevated place becomes an observation post, a watchtower 
built on a plain, or a tower placed are the entrance to a gorge” (Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode 
of Existence of Technical Objects, 182). 
31 Though he uses the term “singularity” at essential moments of his elucidation of the nature of 
key-points, Simondon leaves the term (surprisingly) under-determined. Singularities are essential 
to Deleuze’s ontology of multiplicities which I elaborate below. Perhaps the clearest concise 
specification of the nature of a singularity comes from Daniel W. Smith: “The singularities are 
precisely those points where something ‘happens’ within the multiplicity (an event), or in 
relation to another multiplicity, causing it to change nature and produce something new. For 
instance, to take the example of a physical system, the water in my kettle is a multiplicity, and a 
singularity in the system occurs when the water boils or freezes, thereby changing the nature of 
the physical multiplicity (its phase space). Similarly, the point where a person breaks down in 
tears, or boils over in anger, is a singular point in their psychic multiplicity, surrounded by a 
swarm of ordinary points” (Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze [Edinburgh: University of 
Edinburgh Press, 2012], 247). 
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The negative implication of this claim is that there is no realized phenomenon of timeless 
change; further, the concept of atemporal modification is incoherent, in the sense that 
modification involves time as one of its essential aspects; there cannot obtain a variation which 
involves none of duration, modification over the course of irregular temporal intervals, immanent 
variation at a temporal instant, or differentiation correlated with temporal succession).  
The claim here is that key-points are explicitly spatio-temporal locales associated with 
modification with any (or all) of the qualitative and quantitative aspects associated with 
individuated entities. In concrete terms, this implies that key-points are sites of variation which 
are associated with ontological variation that transpires over the course of one or many durations. 
The comprehensive and radical nature of the variations that obtain at these sites supports the 
identification of these as magical. 
Perhaps because of the profound nature of the changes that tend to obtain at key-points, 
these tend to enjoy frequent elaboration in literary works of art. Referencing E.T.A. Hoffmann’s 
Mines of Falun, Simondon elaborates on the descent into a mine as an illustration of a not 
entirely formalizable, “co-natural” relation with one’s surroundings that tends to result in a 
fundamental “phase change” in one’s mode of existence — i.e., the acquisition of knowledge, 
death, or obtaining some vague sense of control over the seemingly chaotic aspects of one’s 
existence in relation to the world.32 A brief exegesis of the plot of Hoffmann’s tale is 
 
32 (Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 109). This is illustrated in 
Elis’s encounter with the old man in Hoffman’s tale: “The old man's strange way of speaking of 
all these subterranean marvels as if he were standing in the midst of them impressed him deeply. 
His breast felt stifled; it seemed to him as if he were already down in these depths with the old 
man and would never look upon the friendly light of day again. And yet it seemed as though the 
old man were opening to him a new and unknown world, to which he really properly belonged, 
and that he had somehow felt all the magic of that world in mystic forebodings since his 
boyhood” (E.T A. Hoffmann, “The Mines of Falun” in The Best Tales of Hoffmann, E.F. Bleiler 
[ed.], [New York: Dover, 1967], 292). 
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illuminating: a young man, who is bereaved by the death of his mother, follows the advice of an 
old man, and sets about to become a miner. After experiencing terrifying hallucinations (e.g., the 
images of “a thousand red-hot irons tearing at his heart”33), the boy becomes engaged, only to die 
in the mines on the day of his wedding. Upon his encounter with the mine, the boy undergoes a 
series of physical, social, and psychological changes that are as comprehensive as they are 
unexpected. The magical key-point of the mine is characterized as a nexus of discrete realities 
(along with their associated durations) — the domain of the living and the explicitly temporal 
eternal realm of the dead — that, when encountered, causes profound transformation. Simondon 
further illustrates the transformative aspect of key-points when he likens the encounter with a 
key point as the encounter with a new continent.34 
In literature, it is quite often the case that profound magical transformations tend to 
involve the use of a potent artifact (i.e., physical ointment, potion, gem, imbued with unique 
powers). This is particularly evident in the literature of antiquity. Sophocles’ Deianira slays her 
husband by smearing a magical ointment on his robe.35 Homer’s Nestor relates the tale of how 
Juno procured the magic girdle of Venus in order to enchant Jupiter.36 Perhaps one of the most 
remarkable aspects of Simondon’s theory is that while he recognizes that there is a relation 
 
33 Ibid., 301. 
34. Simondon writes: “An expedition or a navigation allowing one to reach a continent by a 
definite route do not conquer anything; and yet they are valid according to magical thought, 
because they allow one to make contact with this continent in a privileged place that is a key-
point. The magical universe is made of a network of access points to each domain of reality: 
thresholds, summits, limits, and crossing points, attached to one another through their singularity 
and exceptional character” (Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 
180). 
35 Sophocles, “The Women of Trachis,” Sophocles II: Ajax, The Women of Trachis, Electra, 
Philoctetes, The Trackers, Mark Griffith and Glenn W. Most, and John Moore (ed.), (Chicago 
and London, University of Chicago Press, 2013) 575-585. 
36 Homer, The Iliad of Homer, Alexander Pope (tr.), (London, New York, Toronto, Melbourne: 
Cassell and Company, 1909), 259. 
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between potent objects and variation of actualized existents, he deprioritizes the role of the 
potent objects with the suggestion that potent objects only enjoy their special powers in a 
derivative fashion. For Simondon, while there are such things as aesthetic objects that are 
involved in magic, these seem to only enjoy their magical status due to the fact that they are 
participating in an actualized network of reticulated key-points. In concrete terms, the powers of 
potent objects are derived from their circumstance; magical objects are non-autonomous, in the 
sense that the ontological source of their transformational powers is dependent on both the 
circumstance in which they are actualized as well as the ontogenetic process from which they are 
derived. This complex relation of potent objects to space-time and transformation may be 
expressed in two claims: (1) potent objects are identifiable with magical objects, in the sense that 
these are concrete actualizations of the virtual forces of a primitive unity;37 (2) a potent object is 
magical, in the sense that it participates in transformative relations between two or more entities 
that were discrete at some prior duration. The first of these is uncontentious, in the sense that 
there is a wealth of anthropological data that evidences that primitive religion — taken as the 
first social fragmentation (i.e., the “fall”) from the magical unity — involves aesthetic elements 
that are identical to those of magical rituals. For example, Susan K. Langer observes that the 
Christian ritual of Eucharist (i.e., the Roman Catholic Holy Communion, the Greek rite (circa. 
100 C.E.) of the Lord’s Supper (Κυριακὸν δεῖπνον) — is a magical transmutation of form that 
has its basis in non-formalizable animistic processes of individuation.38 The second claim 
requires further development. 
 
37 Simondon writes: “Aesthetic thought appears at the primitive magical unity; it is not a phase, 
but rather a permanent reminder of the rupture of the unity of the magical mode of being, as well 
as a reminder of the search for its future unity” (Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of 
Technical Objects, 174). 
38 Susan K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 131. 
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In his close reading of Simondon’s aesthetics, Yves Michaud suggests that Simondon 
seems to treat aesthetic objects as subsistent entities that emerge from (i.e., are ontologically 
dependent on) their integration with a system of magical key-points.39 The magical object is a 
subsistent object, in the sense that its existence is ontologically dependent on its function within 
a network. The aesthetic object is the end result of a series of “integrations” that imbue it with 
aesthetic values. Simondon cautiously notes that though the aesthetic object may be construed as 
involving mimesis (i.e., imitation) of aspects of various natural and human-created objects, the 
mimetic qualities of a work of art are not among its essential ontological features.40 (I.e., though 
the shape of Picasso’s Baboon and Young (1951) may seem to hearken back to statuettes used in 
Ancient Egyptian fertility rites, and seem to symbolize actual baboons, these are inessential 
qualities of the object, in the sense that were they non-existent, the object would still be 
considered a work of art).  
The suggestion here is that the essential quality that makes a potent object an aesthetic 
object is its aesthetic values (i.e., beauty, ugliness, sublimity, etc.). Simondon suggests that all of 
these values emerge from an object’s active integration (i.e., participation) in a network of key-
 
39 Michaud writes: “Simondon thereby defends an aesthetics of the local and the in situ, an 
aesthetics of sensitivity to places and moments, an aesthetics of structures grafted on to reality to 
give it form and signification; the aesthetic object depends on the gesture of placing, inscribing, 
inserting a mark in the natural or technical or religious world” (Yves Michaud, “The Aesthetics 
of Gilbert Simondon: Anticipation of the Contemporary Aesthetic Experience”, Justin Clemens 
[tr.], Gilbert Simondon: Being and Technology, 125).  
40 Simondon illustrates this point through a comparison of aesthetic objects and tools: “It is 
indeed this integration that defines the aesthetic object, and not imitation: a piece of music that 
imitates noise cannot become integrated into the world, because it replaces certain elements of 
the universe (for instance the noise of the sea) rather than completing them. A statue, in a certain 
sense, imitates man and replaces him, but this is not why it is an aesthetic work; it is an aesthetic 
work because it becomes integrated into the architecture of a town, marks the highest point of a 
promontory forms the endpoint of a wall, or sits atop a tower” (Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode 
of Existence of Technical Objects, 195). 
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points.41 That an aesthetic object exists (as an object that is different in kind from technical 
objects) is dependent on its possession of aesthetic values. An object only has aesthetic value, in 
the sense that it is involved in a dynamic network of other objects. Were this system to cease 
functioning, then any object in the system would no longer be an aesthetic object — e.g., 
Simondon characterizes a tractor in a garage as a technical object, whereas a tractor ploughing a 
field is a dynamic object of beauty; aesthetic values subsist from participation in a reticulated 
system.42  
In his elaboration of the function of the magic of the Aguaruna, Michel Taussig 
characterizes the spatio-temporal transformations associated with magic as a temporally 
extended process (i.e., a continuum) that “takes language, symbols, and intelligibility to their 
outermost limits, to explore life and thereby to change its destination.”43 It should be further 
observed that these types of variation enjoy aesthetic expression in Ancient Greek elaborations 
of mystically tinged circumstances of murder and seduction. These have been adduced to 
illustrate that profound transformation that takes place at precise spatio-temporal locations, 
which are reticulated nodes comprehended by actuality. Simondon’s analyses diminish much of 
the ambiguity associated with these transformational circumstances, in the sense that he suggests 
 
41 Simondon illustrates: “The telephone call center is beautiful in action, because at every instant 
it is the expression and realization of an aspect of the life of a city and of a region; a light is 
someone waiting, an intention, a desire, immanent news, a ringing telephone that one won’t hear 
but that will resound far away in another house. Here we witness the beauty found within the 
action; it is not simply instantaneous, but it is also made up of the rhythms of use in peak hours 
and evening hours. The telephone call center is beautiful not because of its characteristics as an 
object, but because it is a key-point in collective and individual life. In the same vein, a traffic 
light on a train platform is not beautiful in itself, but is beautiful by way of its functioning as a 
traffic light, which is to say through its power to indicate, to signify a stop or a track to be left 
free” (ibid., 197). 
42 Ibid. 197. 
43 Michael Taussig, The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America. (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 15.  
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specifies the contours of a conceptual apparatus that involves an account of ontogenetic 
processes of variation. Simondon’s identifications of the primary magical unity of the universe, 
the priority of realized magical key-points, and the production of aesthetically represented potent 
objects in reference to the network of these key-points, all serve to clarify the nature and the 
function of magic in the process of individuation: it is a transformation that happens at unique 
moments, over a single duration or throughout many varying durations, which obtain at 
privileged locales.  
 
Time as an Element of a Continuous Multiplicity  
Grasping the nature of a multiplicity in relation to oncogenic variation is as crucial as it is 
complex. A multiplicity functions to group together a series of disparate circumstances without 
arraying them into a hierarchical order of ontological dependency. A dubious reductionist 
strategy might yield the suggestion that multiplicities obtain as a species of any of hierarchical, 
organic, or dialectical organization. It should be observed that (both) hierarchical and organic 
modes of organization tend to involve elements which lend themselves to designation as 
qualitative or quantitative aspects, arrayed in a —spatio-temporally or conceptually — 
contiguous fashion.44 Manuel DeLanda elaborates on the non-contiguity of multiplicities when 
 
44 Roman Ingarden aptly characterizes an organic unity as involving a discrete organization of 
conceptually contiguous, mutually implicated elements. Ingarden further observes that (as a 
consequence of their mutual implication) each element of an organic unity may vary its function 
in reference to other elements of the organism. (cf. Roman Ingarden, Ontology of the Work of 
Art; The Musical Work, the Picture, The Architectural Work. Raymond Meyer and John T. 
Goldthwait [tr.], [Athens OH: Ohio University Press, 1989,], 27-39). The identification of 
hierarchical organization can be traced to Aristotle’s identification of a continuum of infinitely 
subdivisible parts arranged in a manner that implies ontological dependency relations. (Aristotle, 
On the Heavens I, 268a1-268b10, J.L. Stocks[tr.], The Complete Works of Aristotle I, Jonathon 
Barns [ed.], [Princeton NJ: Princeton university Press, 1991], 171).  
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he observes that the elements of multiplicities tend to be arrayed in a manner akin to terms in a 
disparate series.45 The suggestion that the elements of a multiplicity tend to be non-adjacent 
might cause one to posit that multiplicities enjoy dialectical organization — i.e., a relation of 
contraries, in which the relata might not enjoy conceptual proximity, in the sense that they may 
be oppositions of any of a secondary, tertiary, quaternary, (etc.) order. Deleuze explicitly denies 
the identification of dialectic and multiplicity when he starkly notes that multiplicities are non-
identical to “the overly loose mesh of a distorted dialectic that proceeds by opposition.”46 Taken 
together, these observations suggest that a multiplicity is conceptually distinct from all of 
hierarchy, organic organization, and dialectic.  
In one of the most conceptually dense passages of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze 
specifies three conditions associated with multiplicities: (1) they are ontogenetic, in the sense 
that their pre-individuated elements “have neither sensible form nor conceptual signification”47; 
(2) their elements tend to enjoy reciprocal determination; (3) multiplicities involve differential 
relations that tend toward actualization — i.e., the sort of relation that gains expression as a 
differential equation; the peculiar sort of diffuse ordering that attains actuality as a plurality of 
disparate spatio-temporal locales conjoined in a reticulated network of physical places that tend 
 
45 Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2002), 204-205.  
46 (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 182). Brian Massumi elaborates on the non-
dialectical character of multiplicities through reference to their mode of organization. Massumi 
writes: “Rather than analyzing the world into discrete components, reducing their manyness to 
the One of identity, and ordering them by rank, it sums up a set of disparate circumstances in a 
shattering blow. It synthesizes a multiplicity of elements without effacing their heterogeneity or 
hindering their potential for future rearranging (to the contrary)” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, xiii). 
47 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 183. 
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to be associated with the production of the ontologically new.48 Both time and magic — 
characterized as forces involved the processes of creation or modification of individuated entities 
— satisfy the first condition. Time and magic: these are among the forces that are involved in the 
ontogenetic modification of entities. The correlate of the observation that there is no ontological 
dependency among these forces — i.e., they obtain as non-reducible, analytically distinguishable 
forces that enjoy mutual implication — suggests that time and magic satisfy the second 
condition. It might be further observed that time and magic enjoy reciprocal determination, in the 
sense that the magical transformation of entities tends to correlate with the progression of time, 
as is illustrated in the correlation of the temporal moment of lunar perigee with lycanthropy.  
Satisfaction of the third condition —that multiplicities involve differential relations, 
which tend toward actualization — is more complex, if for no other reason than the condition 
involves claims about the nature of the expression of a differential equation, as well as 
observations about the outcomes of ontogenetic circumstances. These may be elaborated through 
reference to Riemann’s distinction between discrete and continuous multiplicities. Simon Duffy 
characterizes Deleuze’s theory of multiplicities as an attempt to resolve the ontological problem 
of one and many by stipulating the existence of a field of interrelated forces. Duffy further 
suggests that Deleuze developed his theory “by clarifying and drawing upon the full potential of 
Riemann’s mathematical developments.”49 Indeed, Riemann — in On the Hypotheses which Lay 
 
48 Deleuze summarizes: “A multiple ideal connection, a differential relation, must be actualised 
in diverse spatio-temporal relationships, at the same time as its elements are actually incarnated 
in a variety of terms and forms. The Idea is thus defined as a structure. A structure or an Idea is a 
'complex theme', an internal multiplicity - in other words, a system of multiple, non-localisable 
connections between differential elements which is incarnated in real relations and actual terms” 
(ibid.).  
49 Simon Duffy, Deleuze and the History of Mathematics: In Defense of the New, (London and 
New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 89.  
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at the Bases of Geometry —explicitly claims that his aim is to elaborate on conditions at work in 
the creation of measurable physical space.50 This suggests that the object of Reimann’s analysis 
is the ontogenetic process involved in the formation of physical domains and the individual 
entities that populate these. In this sense, Reimann was doing ontology under the guise of 
geometry, as is apparent in the implied identification of an ontogenetic field with a continuous 
multiplicity (i.e., a continuous manifold, a continuous magnitude). Here, it is important to 
elucidate the distinction among a discrete manifold, and a continuous multiplicity. There are two 
important differentia involved: (1) each of discrete manifolds and continuous multiplicities tend 
to comprehend different sorts of elements; (2) this implies that distinct modes of determination 
are involved in the identification of each type of array. José Ferreirós observes that a discrete 
multiplicity involves numerals — i.e., any element comprehended by the set of natural numbers 
ℕ — as the content of their determination.51 Both the elements of discrete multiplicities and 
discrete multiplicities (when they are characterized as individuated entities) are countable. The 
claim here is that discrete multiplicities may be ascribed specific quantitative values of the type 
used in arithmetic calculation. In concrete terms, a discrete magnitude is illustrated by the totality 
of votes cast in a general election, in the sense that the quantitative values associated with the 
ballots is determined through correlation to a set of extrinsic values (i.e., the elements of the set 
ℕ). Daniel W. Smith observes that Deleuze’s concept of a continuous multiplicity involves the 
relation of a “variable number of dimensions (its n-dimensionality), and the absence of any 
 
50 Bernhard Riemann, On the Hypotheses which Lay at the Bases of Geometry, Jürgen Jost (ed.), 
Switzerland: Birkhäuser, 2016), 31. 
51 José Ferreirós, “A New Fundamental Notion: Riemann's Manifolds”, Labyrinth of Thought: A 
History of Set Theory and its Role in Modern Mathematics 2nd ed., (Basel, Boston, Berlin: 
Birkhäuser, 2000), 41. 
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supplementary dimension which would impose on it extrinsically defined coordinates or unity.”52 
The suggestion here is that continuous multiplicities enjoy no recourse to an external set of 
values with which to correlate in the determination of their value or identity. Echoing Aristotle, 
Ferreirós observes that continuous multiplicities tend to involve “line,” “surface,” and “body” as 
their content.53 The further implication is that the value of a continuous multiplicity is 
determined through measurement of this content — e.g., the length of a line is determined in 
relation to another line that obtains as an element of the same (numerically and qualitatively 
identical) continuous multiplicity. The claim is that determinations of the value of the elements 
comprehended by continuous multiplicities tend to rely on measurement, not ordinal (or serial) 
numeration. In this sense, a continuous multiplicity is akin to a gamut of hues of a particular 
colour, in which the values of the various hues are relatively determined through comparison to 
other hues comprehended by the same colour tone. Stated again: discrete multiplicities derive 
their quantitative value (i.e., their quantitative magnitude) through reference to a series of 
magnitudes conceptually discrete from the ontological domain in which they obtain; elements of 
a continuous magnitude derive their relative value through reference to other values with which 
they are implicated (as elements of the same ontological domain); the relativity of the criteria of 
measurement implies the potential for radical transformation (ontogenesis) of elements; in terms 
of their identity and value, the elements of a continuous multiplicity enjoy ongoing determination 
 
52 Daniel W. Smith, “Mathematics and the Theory of Multiplicities: Badiou and Deleuze 
Revisited,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, XLI (2003), pp. 411-449, 429. 
53 It would not be misguided to credit the identification of discrete and continuous multiplicities 
to Aristotle. In Categories, Aristotle distinguishes among distinct and continuous magnitudes. 
Aristotle writes: “Of quantities some are discrete, others continuous; and some are composed of 
parts which have position in relation to one another, others are not composed of parts which have 
position. Discrete are number and language; continuous are lines, surfaces, bodies, and also, 
besides these, time and place.” (Aristotle, Categories, 4b20-24, J. L. Ackrill [tr.], The Complete 
Works of Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes [ed.], [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991], 8). 
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by variable criteria; because the criteria involved these determinations obtain as aspects of an set 
of elements undergoing dynamic transformation, the variations associated with continuous 
multiplicities are properly characterized as intrinsic ontogenetic variations which are expressible 
as differential equations (e.g., 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
). Taken together, these observations have been adduced to 
suggest that the forces — i.e., time and magic — involved in an ontogenetic circumstance are 
elements of a continuous multiplicity.  
Perhaps it should be further observed that literary works of art can be identified as 
actualizations of an ontogenetic multiplicity. The claim is that books illustrate the ontogenetic 
process of individuation involving temporality and magic. The validity of the suggestion that 
literary works involve magic is implied by the number of authors that have been practitioners of 
magic.54 Further support for the identification of magic as an element of literary texts may be 
adduced by the Frazer’s observation that there are certain Chinese texts that, when read, cause 
trees to come to life, bleed, and cry out in indignation.55 Deleuze and Guattari augment the claim 
that books are magical with their suggestion — in A Thousand Plateaus — that books are 
multiplicities.56 Within the context of the co-authored text, the implication is that the book is a 
multiplicity simply because it is non-reducible to the thought of one person. Elsewhere, Deleuze 
and Guattari highlight the metaphysical stakes of their claim, when they note that in order for an 
entity to be a multiplicity there must be (at least) two other entities that constitute it.57 But what 
 
54 Mircea Eliade notes that, among others, Stanislas de Guaita, William Butler Yeats, S. L. 
Mathews, and Aleister Crowley were members of magical societies (cf. Mircea Eliade, 
Occultism, Witchcraft, and Cultural Fashions: Essays in Comparative Religion [Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1976], 51). 
  55 James Frazer, The Golden Bough: The Roots of Religion and Folklore, (New 
York: Avenel Books, 1981), 272. 
56 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 4. 
57 Deleuze and Guattari write: “There must be at least two multiplicities, two types, from the 
outset. This is not because dualism is better than unity but because the multiplicity is precisely 
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is the guarantee that what is constituted will obtain as a multiplicity? (I.e., why don’t two 
multiplicities simply produce a unity that, though non-reducible to either of its constituent 
elements, still may be characterized as a one that is explicitly not a multiplicity?) Deleuze and 
Guattari assuage these concerns by suggesting that the formed multiplicity is a highly variable 
(i.e., “metastable”),58 non-individuated, schematized organizational structure that is formed from 
the series of relations among the ontological constituents (i.e., the multiple possible relations that 
could occur between any two or more elements that participate with one another).  
In his analysis of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s aesthetics, Daniel W. Smith suggests that 
works of art are akin to continuous multiplicities when he observes they involve a relative 
variation of mutually implicated elements.59 Deleuze and Guattari —in Anti-Oedipus — observe 
 
what happens between the two. Hence, the two types will certainly not be one above the other 
but rather one beside the other, against the other, face to face, or back to back.” (Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari. What is Philosophy?, Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell [tr.], [New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1994], 152). 
58 Deleuze characterizes metastability as a mode of being that is ontologically prior to any sense 
of individuation, but nonetheless identifiable as a system: “But what essentially defines a 
metastable system is the existence of a ‘disparation,’ the existence of at least two different 
dimensions, two disparate levels of reality, between which there is not yet any interactive 
communication. A metastable system thus implies a fundamental difference, like a state of 
dissymmetry. It is nonetheless a system insofar as the difference therein is like potential energy, 
like a difference of potential distributed within certain limits. Simondon's conception, it seems to 
me, can in this respect be assimilated to a theory of intensive quanta, since each intensive 
quantum in itself is difference” (Gilles Deleuze, “On Gilbert Simondon”, Desert Islands and 
other texts: 1953-1974, David Lapoujade[ed.], Michael Taormina [tr.], [Los Angeles and New 
York: Semiotext[e], 2002], 87).  
59 Smith elaborates: “The elements brought together by the work of art cannot be said to be 
fragments of a lost unity or shattered totality; nor can the parts be said to form or prefigure the 
unity of the work through the course of a logical or dialectical development or an organic 
evolution. Rather than functioning as their totalizing or unifying principle, the work of art can 
only be understood as the effect of the multiplicity of the disconnected parts. The work of art 
produces a unity, but this product is simply a new part that is added alongside the other parts. 
The artwork neither unifies nor totalizes these parts, but it has an effect on them because it 
establishes syntheses between elements that in themselves do not communicate, and that retain 
all their difference in their own dimensions” (Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze, 104). 
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that a literary work of art is akin to a continuous multiplicity, in the sense that it is a “non-
totalized” unity composed of discrete transformational parts.60 To get a concrete sense of the 
nature of the book as a non-totalized unity, it’s helpful to borrow the terminology of Roman 
Ingarden (who also characterizes a book as a multiplicity — i.e., an ontologically heteronomous 
formation), which has many actual and potential aspects, and involves discrete ontogenetic parts 
and processes.61 The distinct aspects of a book are non-reducible to a numeric or qualitative one, 
in the sense that though any given aspect may be drawn in relation to something else (e.g., a 
physical text that forms a relation to a reader); one person’s act of reading of a given book does 
not allow any authoritative stipulation of the story’s identity (i.e., the reader could be profoundly 
wrong in his reading of the text, or simply not form any conclusions about it). The observation 
that the book was written by someone or some group of people, and is made up of material parts 
(i.e., pages and a cover), immaterial parts (i.e., the meanings of the words written on its pages) 
can be adduced to yield the claim that a book is non-reducible to a simple unity. In addition, the 
fact that the book obtains as a concretized entity in the ongoing and open-ended social 
elaborations of its meaning can be adduced to support the claim that the book is a multiplicity, in 
the senses that its meanings are (1) never fully elaborated, and (2) undergoing continual revision, 
for the duration of the book’s existence. Deleuze and Guattari cautiously note that though a book 
is a type of multiplicity that defies all attempts to reduce it to an ontological one, this does not 
 
60 Deleuze and Guattari write: “[the book] is a whole of these particular parts but does not 
totalize them; it is a unity of all of these particular parts but does not unify them; rather, it is 
added to them as a new part fabricated separately” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane [tr.], 
[Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983], 42). 
61 Ingarden elucidates the formal conditions (i.e., heteronomy, multiple aspects, and involvement 
of discrete ontological parts and processes) of the literary work of art in his magnum opus, The 
Literary Work of Art. (cf. Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, George Grabowicz[tr]. 
[Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973], 3-16).  
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preclude the possibility of discussing it as an organization of elements that affects its readers 
(i.e., it changes both their emotional comportment to the world, as well as values that they 
ascribe to objects in the world).62 In this sense, the book is a multiplicity that is involved in a 
modification of the affections of those who read it. Brian Massumi notes that Deleuze borrows 
his sense of the term from Spinoza’s affectus, which is “a pre-personal intensity corresponding to 
the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or 
diminution in that body’s capacity to act.”63 
This modification of an entity’s capacities to act (and be acted upon) is perhaps the most 
mysterious aspect of an ontogenetic multiplicity. Descola identifies the ontologies of the Aschur 
and the Mukama, in which the categorical distinctions among human, animal, and plant are 
blurred by a magical power of metamorphosis.64 Dumézil relates the tale of the demon llvala, 
who turned his brother Vātāpi into a goat so that Vātāpi could get revenge on his enemies.65 
Rimbaud summarizes these magical transformations in the poetic formula “I is someone else,” in 
which neither the poetic narrator nor the entity referred to in the grammatical predicate are 
characterized as possessing discrete, rigorously distinct identities.66 These have been adduced to 
suggest that one might recognize the validity of the claims that an ontogenetic circumstance is 
primary to any ontological system involving identity claims of a categorial nature, and that this 
 
62 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 4.  
63 Ibid., xvi. 
64 Philippe Descola, Beyond Nature and Culture, 17. 
65 Georges Dumézil, The Plight of a Sorcerer, 73. 
66 Rimbaud writes: “For I is someone else. If the brass awakes as horn, it can't be to blame. This 
much is clear: I'm around for the hatching of my thought: I watch it, I listen to it: I release a 
stroke from the bow: the symphony makes its rumblings in the depths, or leaps fully formed onto 
the stage” (Arthur Rimbaud, “Battle Song of Paris” Rimbaud Complete, 366). 
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circumstance enjoys expression as the subject matter or implied substratum of literature, 
philosophy, and anthropological investigation. 
Deleuze and Guattari elucidate the nature of these magical transformations in reference to 
the becomings involved in the wasp’s and orchid’s reproductive cycles — i.e., “The orchid 
deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that 
image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid's reproductive 
apparatus .”67 The suggestion that the transformation takes place at the level of “images” is 
revealing, if for no other reason than all visual images are schematized, in the sense that all 
images are a structure, awaiting completion by a viewer. The images that Deleuze and Guattari 
elaborate are ontological analogues of visual images. The respective images formed by the wasp 
and the orchid are schematic (i.e., non-material, virtual) organizations that are ontologically prior 
to any realization as material (i.e., individuated) entities. Though Deleuze and Guattari 
acknowledge that the reciprocal processes of “deterritorialization” and “reterritorialization” may 
be characterized as mimetic, they caution that the various processes involved with imitation are 
ultimately inadequate to describe the radical nature of transformation, in the sense that imitation 
 
67 Deleuze and Guattari write: The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a 
wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, 
becoming a piece in the orchid's reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the orchid by 
transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. “It could 
be said that the orchid imitates the wasp, reproducing its image in a signifying fashion (mimesis, 
mimicry, lure, etc.). But this is true only on the level of the strata—a parallelism between two 
strata such that a plant organization on one imitates an animal organization on the other. At the 
same time, something else entirely is going on: not imitation at all but a capture of code, surplus 
value of code, an increase in valence, a veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a 
becoming-orchid of the wasp. Each of these becomings brings about the deterritorialization of 
one term and the reterritorialization of the other; the two becomings interlink and form relays in 
a circulation of intensities pushing the deterritorialization ever further. There is neither imitation 
nor resemblance, only an exploding of two heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed 
by a common rhizome that can no longer be attributed to or subjugated by anything signifying 
(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 10). 
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operates at the level of already formed individuals, and the transformation of becoming occurs at 
the schematic level of “ontogenetic” (i.e., not yet individuated, ontologically prior) forces.68  
Perhaps it is worthwhile to observe that while the ontogenetic transformations of 
multiplicities may involve numeric expression, these numerations tend to be intrinsic values (i.e., 
values derived from mutual implication; relatively corelated values which need not correspond to 
any extrinsic series). Mauss highlights the importance of the magical numbers (i.e., 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 
11, 13, 20) in the rhythmic patterns of non-verbal magical rituals.69 It should be further observed 
that temporality is explicitly involved with these transformations, as can be adduced from 
Frazer’s remarks about the importance of the ages of the young maidens that the Algonquin and 
Huron tribes married to fishing nets in the third month of the year.70 While sometimes number is 
merely used to count the number of elements that should be used in a specific ritual, or to denote 
the number of times a specific practice should be performed, Lévi points out that in some forms 
of magic (i.e., the Kabala), number plays an altogether different role.71 Rather than merely 
having a fixed value in relation to the set of natural numbers (ℕ), the magic numbers of Kabala 
and tarot have no fixed role in ordering any set of elements, but rather their values emerge from 
the complex set of relations in which they are involved. In concrete terms, the quantitative values 
associated with magic are the solutions to problems posed immanent to ontogenetic creation and 
modification of existents.  
 
 
68 In chapter five, I further elaborate on Deleuze’s nuanced thought on the function of mimesis 
and art through particular reference to Alain Robbe-Grillet’s theory of how time is expressed in 
novels land the cinematic artform. 
69 Marcel Mauss, A General Theory of Magic, Robert Brain (tr.), (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2001), 72. 
70 James Frazer, The Golden Bough, 117-119. 
71 Éliphas Lévi, The Doctrine of Transcendental Magic, 62-65. 
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Concluding Remarks: Time is Involved in the Ontogenetic Circumstance 
 Today, in this perhaps too wearied age, in which notions of ontological transformation 
and difference seem to have become anathema, we have lost the magic which once unified the 
world. Now, if we think of magic at all, we are most likely to think of it as a fraud; as some more 
or less clever illusion, that — perhaps performed on the poorly constructed stages of some less 
than fashionable vaudevillian show; perhaps performed under all the brilliant the lights and 
bombastic music that a major media company can muster for an hour’s enjoyment — transfixes 
us, who, too tired from the search for an ontology of difference, seek nothing more than an 
amusement. This is a profound disservice to the nature of ontogenesis.  
 In the foregoing, I suggested that Simondon stipulates that the ontogenetic circumstance 
involves the inter-relation of pre-personal, transformative forces. The concrete claim is that 
temporality is among these. Simondon claims that magical transformation and temporality are 
elements of an ontogenetic circumstance. Here the suggestion is that magic and time are among 
the forces involved in the formation of discrete entities — they are the ontologically primitive 
elements from which substance, species, and particular subsist. Simondon further observes that 
aspects of both magic and time enjoy actualization in reality as spatio-temporally extended 
features of a landscape. The validity of these observations may be demonstrated by the reality of 
the phenomenon of change over a duration. Simondon further suggests that locales in which 
transformative aspects enjoy actualization tend to be linked in network. Perhaps the most 
fascinating aspect of this network is that it tends to be productive of aesthetic values, in the sense 
that all aesthetic values are a species of qualitive value, and the modifications associated with 
this network tend to be qualitative in nature. 
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 Deleuze develops Simondon’s observation about the nature of individuation with the 
claim that the ontogenetic circumstance is akin to a continuous multiplicity. Here, one might also 
observe that ontologically implicated qualitative values tend to enjoy relative determination, in 
the sense that they tend to be mutually implicated. The negative claim is that qualitative values 
need not be correlated with an extrinsic series of values — i.e., values of a transcendental sort. 
This yields the suggestion that the sort of modification over a duration associated with 
ontogenesis shares a formal attribute — reciprocal determination — with a continuous 
multiplicity. The transformational capacities and tendences toward mutual implication of 
elements satisfy the other to formal conditions associated with continuous multiplicities. 
Whereas a discrete multiplicity enjoys correlation with an extrinsic set of values (i.e., the set of 
natural numbers ℕ), continuous multiplicities tend to involve intrinsic values (i.e., relatively 
derived values). Deleuze explicitly claims that multiplicities enjoy a plurality of expressions — 
in all of literary artform, myth, philosophy, folklore, anthropology. In addition to providing 
further elucidations of the natures of magical transformations and ontogenesis, this plurality of 




CHAPTER 3: TIME IN THE LOGIC OF SENSE 
Perhaps the most fascinating of the multitude of nuanced — logical, ontological, and 
axiological — distinctions that Deleuze makes in The Logic of Sense involves Aion and Chronos. 
Deleuze explicitly identifies Aion as a type of eternity that has two senses: (1) it is the 
ontologically “complete” entity that is coextensive with the entirety of time —the memorial past, 
the lived present, and the undisclosed future;1 (2) it subdivides any temporal series into both a 
proximate past and an immanent future state of affairs.2 In the latter sense, Aion is a complex 
multiplicity that has aspects of the eternality (i.e., timelessness) and is involved in the production 
of indeterminate future states of affairs. Chronos, on the other hand, tends to be characterized as 
the “living present,” in which everything is a temporally simultaneous “blended mixture” of 
physical bodies and (immaterial) causes.3 Though Deleuze cautiously notes that these are 
analytically distinct, there appears to be some sort of involvement among these two “readings” of 
time. The concise nature of Deleuze’s elucidations tends to suggest a potential problem 
 
1 Elaborating on the natures of both Aion and Chronos, Deleuze pointedly observes that each is 
ontologically complete and non-reducible to the other: “We have seen that past present, and 
future were not all three parts of a single temporality but that they formed two readings of time, 
each one of which is complete and excludes the other: on one hand, the always limited present, 
which measures the action of bodies as causes and the state of their mixtures in depth (Chronos); 
on the other, the essentially unlimited past and future, which gather incorporeal events, at the 
surface, as effects (Aion).” (Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, Mark Lester [tr.], [London and 
New York: Continuum, 1990], 72). 
2 Deleuze writes: “The Aion endlessly subdivides the event and pushes away past as well as 
future, without ever rendering them less urgent. The event is that no-one ever dies, but has 
always just died or is always going to die, in the empty present of the Aion, that is, in eternity.” 
(ibid., 74). 
3 Deleuze writes: “Inside Chronos, the present is in some manner corporeal. It is the time of 
mixtures or blendings, the very process of blending: to temper or to temporalize is to mix. The 
present measures out the action of bodies and causes.” (ibid., 184) 
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concerning the nature of Aion: what exactly does it mean to be an empty form that — despite its 
putative emptiness — still involves time?  
Though explicit discussion of the term “Aion” is mainly confined to the elaborations 
given in The Logic of Sense, this does not imply that the term is without significance in 
Deleuze’s philosophy, as is demonstrated with the observation that Aion’s various aspects are 
touched upon in many of Deleuze’s other texts. (E.g., the identification of Aion with Borges’ 
formulation of time as “one Greek labyrinth which is a single straight line”4 that (strangely) 
involves both previous temporal events and future states of affairs is mentioned again in 
Deleuze’s preface to Kant’s Critical Philosophy: the Doctrine of the Faculties,5 Cinema 2: the 
Time-Image,6 and A Thousand Plateaus7). While Deleuze seems to maintain that at least one type 
of distinction obtains among Aion and Chronos, the precise nature of Aion remains tantalizingly 
ambiguous. Deleuze’s further identification of Aion with a temporal future conceptualized as the 
“pure empty form of time”8 (in The Logic of Sense) or the “form of empty time”9 (in Difference 
and Repetition) does little to alleviate the difficulties that plague the concept. As Lampert points 
out, each of these formulations has quite different entailments.10 The claim that the form is 
something empty is not equivalent to a stipulation about the ontological status of those entities 
 
4 Jorge Luis Borges, Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, Donald A. Yates and 
James E. Irby (ed.), (New York: New Directions, 1964), 94. 
5 Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, Hugh Tomlinson 
and Barbara Habberjam (tr.), (London: Althone, 1984), vii.  
6 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (tr.), 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, 49). 
7 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 192-208. 
8 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 189.  
9 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Paul Patton (tr.), (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2001), 86. 
10 Jay Lampert, “Problems with the Future (Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition)”, Deleuze and 
Guattari Studies 13, no. 3 (2019), 416-434.  
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which putatively populate the form, in the sense that each proposition identifies attributes 
(predicates) of different types of entities. (I.e., just as it would be a category mistake to suggest 
that a species has the same attributes as an individual, there seems to be some ontological funny 
business in an identification of emptiness as an attribute of both the form of time and a temporal 
entity — like a moment of time.) The claim that Aion is an empty form implies that time is a 
structuring process that is bereft of ontological content. In this sense, Aion is akin to a Platonic 
“moving image of eternity”11 that has not participated with — brought order to — any of the 
existents that populate the universe. The characterization of Aion as the shape of empty time is 
amounts to a stipulation of the existence of a temporal vacuum — i.e., a temporal zero-point; a 
necessarily vague entity which enjoys none of temporal value, participation in temporal 
succession, or any sort of temporal change or modification; an ontological space which defies the 
predication of any sort of “when.”12 Each of these characterizations of Aion — as the generality 
which comprehends nothing in particular; as the non-temporal particular — implies a difficulty; 
the inexorable vagueness of a general category bereft of content, or the stipulation of the 
existence of an explicitly temporal entity that is strangely excised from any temporal continuum. 
Aion is fraught. 
 
11 Plato, Timeaus, 37d, Donald J. Zeyl (tr.), Plato: Complete Works, John M. Cooper and D.S. 
Hutchinson (eds.), (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 1241. 
12 As I observed in the first chapter, Robin Le Poidvin defines a temporal vacuum as “a period of 
time in which nothing happens.” (Robin Le Poidvin, Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas 
of Space and Time, [Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003], 17). Aristotle 
proposes — and quickly rejects — the existence of a temporal vacuum in his argument for the 
dependency of time on the change and movement of physical, sub-lunar, terrestrial entities. 
(Aristotle, Physics IV, 218b21-219a2, The Complete Works of Aristotle I, Jonathon Barnes [ed], 
[Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991], 68). 
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The complex nature of Aion is reflected in the literature elaborating on the concept. 
Perhaps drawing on Blanchot’s suggestion that time is the mercurial, “scarcely human force”13 
that compels one to write fiction, Flaxman characterizes Aion as an ontological process that 
seems to transcend the lived experience of individuals.14 Though Reynolds seems to amplify 
Flaxman’s suggestion that Aion is ontologically transcendent to chronometric time, he 
complicates the relation by pointing out that Deleuze also identifies Aion as a “wound” that 
punctuates the flow of linear (chronometric) time by forming a “cut” between temporal instants 
— i.e., Aion is that which separates any two instances in a relation of temporal succession (t1, 
t2…tn).15 Taken together, these suggest that Aion is ontologically transcendent and immanent; 
both removed from empirically measurable temporal progression (i.e., the kind that can be 
adduced from the observation of change in physical entities) and that which marks a temporal 
gap between two durations. François Dosse characterizes the Aion as a “paradoxical eternity 
where something incorporeal and ineffectual exceeds and opens onto the indefinite time of the 
 
13 Blanchot writes: “The hand moves in a tempo which is scarcely human: not that of viable 
action, not that of hope either, but rather the shadow of time, the hand being itself the shadow of 
a hand slipping ghostlike toward an object that has become its own shadow. This hand 
experiences, at certain moments, a very great need to seize: it must grasp the pencil, it has to.” 
(Maurice Blanchot. The Space of Literature, Ann Smock [tr.], [Lincoln and London: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1982], 19). 
14 Flaxman writes: “While the family triangle draws together on the basis of the aura of death, 
the impersonal line of life (Aion) unfolds beyond the organization of the subject and object, in 
the passage between “the livable and the lived” — the passage of writing itself.” (Gregory 
Flaxman, Gilles Deleuze the Fabulation of Philosophy: Powers of the False 1, [Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2012], 224). 
15 Reynolds writes: “In Logic of Sense, the incorporeal wound is the wound of time, but not of all 
time understood as some kind of whole; rather, it is the wound of a particular disjunctive aspect 
of time – Aion rather than Chronos.” (Jack Reynolds, “Wounds and Scars: Deleuze on the Time 
and Ethics of the Event”, Deleuze and Guattari Studies 1, no. 2 [2007], pp. 144-166, 157). 
 
89 
event.”16 While this elucidation of the empty form of time is helpful, in the sense that it 
highlights that Aion is indefinite and involves some sort of relation to the event, it does little to 
clarify the nature of the relation — what exactly does the stipulation that eternity is both 
“excessive” to and “open” to another sort of time (i.e., the temporally non-decomposable 
moment of the living present; the event) actually mean, and what sort of relation does this imply 
with the sort of temporal successions that define the empirically measurable time denoted by 
Chronos (i.e., chronometric time)? Elaborating on Deleuze’s first “poetic” characterization of 
time as “out of joint,”17 Zourabichvili attempts to shed some light fraught ontology of Aion, 
when he suggests that both Chronos and Aion are to be regarded as ontologically complete (i.e., 
analytically discrete ontological wholes), that can each be correlated with a different temporal 
modality: Aion is the eternal that is associated with incorporeal entities; Chronos is the present 
associated with the chronometric time that pertains physical existents —marking their change, 
etc. Zourabichvili further suggests that Aion is to be identified as the time of the event, whereas 
chronometric time is to be identified as that in which the event is effectuated (i.e., actualized).18 
Though these characterizations of Aion and Chronos enjoy copious textual support, there is the 
 
16 François Dosse, “Deleuze and Foucault: A Philosophical Friendship”, Between Deleuze and 
Foucault, Nicolae Morar, Thomas Nail and Daniel W. Smith (ed.), (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2016), 27.  
17 Deleuze often repeats this formulation in his elaborations of the nature of time —particularly 
the temporal mode of the future. (Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of 
the Faculties, vii; Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. 
Greco [tr.], [London and New York: Verso, 1998], 27). He offers a substantive elaboration of 
this formulation in a 13 December 1983 lecture of the subject (http://www2.univ-
paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=271 ; Date Accessed: 9 September 2019). Deleuze 
attributes this formulation to Shakespeare, who has the fictitious Prince of Denmark utter the 
phrase. (William Shakespeare, Hamlet: Prince of Denmark, 1.5.188, Shakespeare: Complete 
Works 2nd edition, W. J. Craig [ed.], [London: Oxford University Press, 1966], 878). 
18 François Zourabichvili, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event together with The vocabulary of 
Deleuze, Kieran Aarons (tr.), Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. Smith (ed.), (Edinburg: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2012), 110. 
 
90 
lingering difficulty that Aion — a metaphysical entity that seems to be readily identifiable as a 
being somehow involved with time — is now characterized as enjoying no relation to 
temporality (i.e., something a-temporal). How can something be both temporal and a-temporal 
(or nontemporal)? — this is the question. 
In the present chapter, I thread a path through the ontologically fraught elaborations of 
the nature of Aion (i.e., eternity; Eion; an indeterminate length of time). My aim is to 
demonstrate that Deleuze’s identification of Aion as an empty form (of time) offers a fascinating 
model of temporality that prioritizes variation. First, I suggest that Deleuze’s identification of 
time as an empty form is supported by Ancient Greek and Gnostic concepts of the relation of 
Aion and Chronos. From Plato, through Aristotle, to Plotinus, the concept of time undergoes 
substantive revision, in the sense that temporal measurement becomes removed from the 
measurement of movement of physically instantiated entities. This gradual untethering of time 
from movement gives rise to the development of the concept of eternity as an ontologically 
comprehensive mode of time that is devoid of content (i.e., a progression or variation not 
indexed to the movement of cosmic or sublunar entities). Eternity is characterized as: (1) a 
temporal “all” (i.e., generality) that is non-reducible to the determinacy implied by any particular 
temporally localized existent or temporal series (i.e., a succession relation of temporally discrete 
moments); (2) that which tends toward a diversity of possible states of affairs. Perhaps one of the 
most interesting aspects in the long history of Aion is that — in the Ancient world — it was used 
in magical incantations. For the Gnostics and Oracles, Aion was a deity, and a potent one at that. 
From the gnostic papyri, we get a vision of Aion as an eternal being, in many senses of this term. 
I suggest that the papyri conjure an image of Aion as a deity that is liberated from time, in the 
sense that it enjoys a neutrality with respect to the movements of any particular entity or group of 
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entities — a form, in the most general sense of the term. In the second stage of argument, I 
clarify the nature of an empty form of time through reference to a complex analogy among Aion 
and Deleuze’s concept of an “ideal game” — an analogy that Deleuze specifies through 
reference to Fitzgerald and Borges. The claim here is that Aion is an analogue of an ideal game 
in the (limited) sense that both share essential properties. Both Aion and the ideal game involve 
the multiplication of chance. Finally, I suggest that the differential aspects of Aion (i.e., its 
capacities to comprehend any future contingency; to multiply chance) imply that it is pure 
variability, something which can be illustrated by means of differential equations.  
 
Stoic Concepts of Time 
The Stoics develop the concept of the empty form of time. Arius Didymus observes that 
Chrysippus suggests that “time is the interval of motion according to which the measure of speed 
and slowness is spoken of; or, time is the interval which accompanies the motion of the 
cosmos.”19 Strobaeus elaborates that Chrysippus conceived of time as involving four senses: (1) 
a “dimension” which “accompanies” the universe’s motion;20 (2) that which comprehends all 
that moves; (3) a time that is non-reducible to the present — i.e., not “wholly present”21 — and; 
(4) the identification of a type of time in which a past and future subsist from the present. Sean 
Bowden observes that Chrysippus’ position seems to involve a tension, in the sense that the 
stipulation that time is never wholly present seems to contradict the suggestion that the past and 
 
19 Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson(ed.), Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, Brad 
Inwood and L.P. Gerson (tr.), (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 167. 
20 A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers: Translation of the Principal 
Sources with Commentary I, Strobaeus, 1.106, 5-23 (SVF 2.509), (New York and Cambridge: 




future subsist from an existent present.22 Deleuze resolves this apparent contradiction by 
identifying two discrete temporal aspects — Chronos (i.e., the lived present) and Aion (i.e., 
eternity). Deleuze explicitly identifies Chronos as the “vast present which…is an encasement, a 
coiling up of relative presents,”23 from which the analytically discrete temporal domains (the 
limitless past and the infinite future) are excluded. Deleuze cautiously notes that both these 
domains are comprehended by a separate aspect of temporality (Aion), which is illustrated with 
the geometric image of a straight line progressing toward both the past and the future — the very 
image used by Arius Didymus to characterize Chrysippus’ elaboration of the nature of the 
infinite.24  
The complex nature of Aion (and its relation to Chronos) is reflected in the Ancient 
Greek and Hellenistic world’s representations of the deities. The difficulties involved in 
discerning the differences between Aion and Chronos involve two aspects: (1) ontological 
priority; (2) ontological role. The ancient world offers various — often competing — suggestions 
about which, if either, of Aion and Chronos is ontologically dependent on the other, and which 
sense of temporality is to be associated with each. Darby Nock observes that the oracles from 
Claros identify the “chief deity is Aion, the various gods of cults [sic.] being a small part of him 
and his angels.”25 Aion’s putative ontological priority is up-ended when we consult the Orphic 
cosmology, which casts Chronos as the “original god” and identifies Aion with Baal Shamin, a 
 
22 Sean Bowden, The Priority of Events: Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2011), 22. 
23 Gilles Deleuze. The Logic of Sense, 186. 
24 Arius Didymus writes: “And just as void as a whole is infinite in every direction, so too time 
as a whole is infinite in both directions; for both the past and the future are infinite.” (Brad 
Inwood and L.P. Gerson (eds.), Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, 167).  
25 Darby Nock, “A Vision of Mandulis Aion”, The Harvard Theological Review, 27, no. 1 (Jan., 
1934), pp. 53-104, 82. 
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subordinate deity whose name “means in the first instance ‘lord of eternity’ and in the second 
‘lord of the world’.”26 The implied confusion of which deity (or modality of time) begat the other 
is also reflected in the archaeological record. Doro Levi mentions the Column of Antonius Pius, 
which depicts Aion as a naked angel (winged-youth) who lifts the divine couple to Olympus.27 
The physical position and relative age of the represented deities suggest that Aion is 
ontologically subordinate to other gods. The suggestion that Aion is ontologically secondary is 
reversed in Mithraic depictions of the god as an old man to which all other deities are 
subordinated.28 The ambivalence of the Ancient world to Aion’s ontological priority in reference 
to other magical entities is also evidenced in the Greek magical papyri. In these, Aion is 
variously addressed as “you who are master above the earth and below the earth; the ruler of the 
universe, Ra, Pan”;29 “Lord of [the] Aion, all things, only god, unutterable”;30 and the one 
“deathless god” who is the “begetter of all, and assigns[sic.] souls to all and all control, king of 
all the Aions and lord.”31 The apparent lack of coherence of the these leads Levi to suggest that 
conceptualizations of Aion in the ancient world were quite fluid.32  
The situation does not get much better when we turn to elaborations of the role of Aion 
relative to the temporal cycles involved with birth and death and other natural phenomena. The 
figure of Aion — represented as a mythical Phoenix — adorns the face of an Alexandrian coin 
(minted around 138-139 CE). The coin’s iconography suggests that Aion presides over the cycles 
 
26 Ibid., 86. 
27 Doro Levi, “Aion” Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at 
Athens,13, no. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1944), pp. 269-314, 306-307. 
28 Ibid., 307. 
29 Hans Dieter Benz (ed.), The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation: Including the Demotic 
Spells, Hans Dieter Benz (tr.), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 77. 
30 Ibid., 194. 




of and renewal of human life.33 In magical papyri from around the same historical period, Aion is 
often characterized as “the god of the four winds.”34 Other magical texts characterize Aion as 
variously the bringer of light; a daemonic spirit35 that which separates what is from what is not,36 
and “that which gives wealth.”37 The variety of Ancient accounts may support the claim that 
each entity is ontologically complete (i.e., irreducible), in the sense that a possible implication of 
the Ancient world’s vacillation about the priority and attributes of Aion and Chronos suggests 
that no dependency relation obtains between them. Indeed, Deleuze seems to assent to this claim 
when he observes that the putatively different modalities of time — past, present, and future — 
belong to a complex multiplicity involving at least two discrete sorts of temporality. It should be 
pointed out that of the plurality of attributes predicated of Aion, none of these involve 
corporeality (i.e., they are incorporeal, in the sense that they involve immaterial entities — light 
waves, daemons; abstract phenomena —cycles; and abstract values — wealth. Deleuze 
generalizes this plurality of attributes to suggest that Aion involves all incorporeal events (i.e., 
anything that is divisible into a temporally prior or temporally future state of affairs). Taken 
together, these yield a staggering vision of an empty form that is ontologically discrete from the 
entirety of the universe of physical entities, and (at the same time) comprehensive of — or 
coextensive with — all that has been or could come to be. 
 
The Empty Form of Time in Games, Literature, and Mathematics  
 
33 Ibid., 294. 
34 Ibid., 296. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid., 99. 
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Deleuze’s elaborations of Aion demand an assessment of the explanatory value of 
conceptualizing time as an empty form. Drawing on the narratives of Fitzgerald and Borges, 
Deleuze suggests that the concept of an empty from of time yields a concept of the future as 
something completely indeterminate, to which one proceeds only by virtue of experiencing a 
rupture (i.e., a “crack-up”) with one’s lived present. Fitzgerald observes that future states of 
affairs only come about through a series of “blows that come or seem to come from the 
outside”38 of one’s lived experience. Elsewhere, Fitzgerald elaborates on the nature of this 
movement toward the undisclosed future by characterizing it as a sudden “self-immolation”; a 
“jail-break…a clean break…something you cannot come back from.”39 Borges echoes these 
sentiments when he characterizes the present as a “point of departure” toward “diverse times 
which themselves also proliferate and fork.”40 The model presented here seems to involve a three 
stage inferential progression: (1) the lived present is posited to be ontologically distinct from the 
other temporal durations, which implies; (2) progression to a new duration involves a radical 
break from the content of the lived present, and; (3) this break suggests the emergence of 
divergent temporal series that enjoy none of a necessary tether to each other or temporally prior 
states. Deleuze cautiously notes that such a model of discrete temporalities yields a sort of 
idealized concept of an empty form of time, which embraces “all possible combinations”41 while 
not prioritizing the emergence of any particular state of affairs. The substantive implication here 
 
38 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Crack-up. With other Uncollected Pieces, Notebooks and Unpublished 
Letters. Edmund Wilson (ed.), (New York: New Directions, 1945), 69; quoted, Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 198. 
39 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Crack-up. With other Uncollected Pieces, Notebooks and Unpublished 
Letters, 81. 
40 Jorge Luis Borges, “The Garden of Forking Paths”, Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other 
Writings, 40. 
41Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 116.  
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is that time is characterized as an infinite, expanding entity that has the characteristics of (1) 
being able to comprehend any emergent particular, and; (2) not being wholly actualized at any 
given temporal instant or temporal continuum.  
Deleuze elucidates the complex nature of Aion by proposing a complex analogy among 
Aion and the concept of an ideal game. An ideal game is stipulated as one which tends toward 
the multiplication of chance. Deleuze illustrates this concept through reference to a few concepts 
from Borges — the Babylonian lottery and the labyrinth of a Chinese philosopher’s (Ts’ui Pên’s) 
book. Each of these must be elucidated. The terrible thing about the lottery is that chance 
intervenes at all stages of the game — in the drawing of lots; in the assigning of values to that 
which is drawn; in deciding the outcomes of each drawing, etc. — all of which amounts to a 
horrific game in which “the number of drawings is infinite. No decision is final, each moment of 
putative choice merges into others.”42 The non-deterministic aspects of the ideal game are also 
illustrated in “The Garden of Forking Paths.”43 In both these illustrations, chance — far from 
being attenuated — is amplified. In this sense, Deleuze’s concept of an ideal game is analytically 
distinct from the games with which we are all familiar — Monopoly, chess, Russian roulette, etc. 
Though Deleuze cautiously notes the limit of his game metaphor when he observes that “in the 
games in which we are familiar, chance is fixed at certain points” — i.e., a roulette ball landing 
 
42 Jorge Luis Borges, “The Lottery in Babylon”, Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other 
Writings, 46. 
43 Borges writes: “In all fiction, when a man is faced with alternatives, he chooses one at the 
expense of others. In the almost unfathomable Ts’ui Pên, he chooses—simultaneously— all of 
them . . . Fang, let us say, has a secret. A stranger knocks at the door. Naturally there are various 
outcomes. Fang can kill the intruder, the intruder can kill Fang, both can be saved, both can die, 
etc. In Ts’ui Pên’s work, all the possible solutions occur, each one being the point of departure 
for other bifurcations . . . You have come to my house, but in one of our possible pasts you are 
my enemy, in another, my friend.” (Jorge Luis Borges, “The Garden of Forking Paths,” 
Ficciones [New York: Grove, 1962], 98). 
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on a certain colour and no other — he sharply notes that ideal games enjoy none of this 
limitation of chance. This amplification of diversity is also evident in Fang’s tragic tale. Perhaps 
one might observe the plurality of possible outcomes explicitly mentioned in Borges’s story: 
Fang committing murder; Fang being the one who is slayed; both Fang and his victim being 
saved; both perishing. What is perhaps more astounding is that Borges suggests all these 
outcomes enjoy simultaneous actualization as contemporaneous, non-identical durations. Each 
possible outcome, in this sense, enjoys no temporal sequence in relation to another. The temporal 
simultaneity is the second property that strengthens the analogy among Aion and ideal games. 
The claim here is that the ideal game and Aion are analogues of one another, in the sense that 
they; (1) both multiply chance; (2) both involve a timeless quality — i.e., lack of identity among 
discrete durations. That both Aion and the ideal game involve temporally simultaneous — yet 
analytically discrete — events (that multiple things happen in them at the same time), and that 
these multiply chance are adduced to validate the analogy.  
Deleuze further elaborates on these aspects of Aion (and the ideal game) in an essay 
published three years after The Logic of Sense. The implicit claim is that Aion characterizes that 
which differentiates itself. Deleuze suggests that this can be expressed through reference to 
mathematical relations. In “How do we Recognize Structuralism?” Deleuze identifies three types 
of relations: (1) real; (2) imaginary; and (3) differential.44 In a real relation (e.g., 3+2 or 2/3), the 
elements of the relation (i.e., the integers) have a fixed numeric value; their values are 
“autonomous,” in the sense that the values are not dependent on the relation. In an imaginary 
relation (e.g., x2 + y2 – r2 = 0), it is the case that the values of none of the relata are specified, 
 




and also that each of the relata must have a determinate value (i.e., any solution of the equation 






 ), the elements of the relation are undetermined, in the senses that (1) they have no real 
numeric value that is autonomous of — independent of — the relation, and; (2) a determinate 
value is not demanded to “solve” the relation. (I.e., dy has no determinate value in relation to y; 
dx has a completely undermined value in relation to x). To borrow a phrase from Husserl, the 




 is rigorously determined (i.e., it is this relation, and no other), but the values of the 
terms in the relation are indeterminate (i.e., the values of the terms can only be determined 
reciprocally). Elucidating the nature of the values in a differential relation, Daniel W. Smith 
notes that though “they are perfectly determinable in the differential relation; the terms 
themselves do not exist apart from the differential relation into which they enter and by which 
they are reciprocally determined.”45 Here we have the substantive aspects of Aion: Aion is self-
subsistent (ontologically independent); and Aion is rigorously determinable as that which is 
productive of the unique — i.e., productive of difference. 
 
Concluding Remarks: Aion’s Identification with Difference 
Aion is fraught, but perhaps not quite as fraught as when we began. Perhaps now we can 
get an appreciation for this complex entity. It is what, then? Aion is a deity of many names and 
multiple representations; it is a form of the cosmos itself; it is something involved with time — 
specifically with the future’s infinite capacities to differentiate itself; it is a game, but a game like 
 
45 Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze, 322, fn. 16. 
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no other; it is a book which comprehends all variation; it is that which changes. While these are 
compelling illustrations of Aion that consistently emphasize its differential capacity — 
illustrations which hang together as a multiplicity — we must note that the very capacity of Aion 
to change suggests that its reality as an existent is fragile. The suggestion that Aion can 
comprehend any change — that it is pure difference — while consistent with the capacity to 
ontologically envelop any future contingency, does not imply that Aion enjoys or is able to 
maintain existence as an entity with which duration may be associated. That is, the claim that 
Aion is an empty form suggests that it may tend toward independence from time. (Potential 
involvement does not imply ontological dependency any more than it implies identity). The 
analogy of Aion and the ideal clarifies the nature of change associated in the concept. To be 
clear, the ideal game involves a type of change that is complete indeterminacy; variation most 
profound; a variation that is akin to an ontological jail-break. This form of variation can be 
illustrated by a differential equation. The differential equation, in this sense, is the empty form 
which can comprehend any value and is productive of difference. Aion then, is far more than 
mere temporal difference. In this sense, Aion participates in the formation of difference itself.
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CHAPTER 4: THE REPETITION OF DIFFERENCE —KIERKEGAARD 
AND DELEUZE ON TEMPORAL VARIATION 
Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition is complex. Walter Lowrie highlights the difficulties 
associated with the concept when he notes that of all topics of Kierkegaard’s analyses, “none is 
so baffling” as that of repetition.1 Part of the problem posed by Kierkegaard’s elucidation of 
repetition is that his analyses move between the domains of ethics, (phenomenological) 
metaphysics, and epistemology. The multiple aspects of repetition are demonstrated in 
Kierkegaard’s explicit identification of the concept with “earnestness”2 (an axiologically loaded 
term, if ever there was one), an object of understanding and belief (i.e., an intentional object),3 
and a phenomenon of “metaphysical interest.”4  
Much of the critical vexation with Kierkegaard’s text seems to focus on the ambiguity of 
repetition. This is reflected in the lack of critical consensus about the meaning of the term. 
Perhaps inspired by the explicitly religious themes present in Kierkegaard’s works — e.g., the 
 
1 Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), 630. 
2 Søren, Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (tr.), 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 133). Lowrie is hardly a voice alone in the 
wilderness without critical and textual support. Steven Crites characterizes Repetition as a 
“teasing sort of book” in which the author leads the reader on “a merry chase, bobbing, hovering, 
backtracking through colourful [sic.] meadows and dark thickets and down many blind alleys.” 
(Steven Crites, “‘The Blissful Security of the Moment’ Recollection, Repetition, and Eternal 
Recurrence”, International Kierkegaard Commentary; Fear and Trembling and Repetition, 
Robert L. Perkins [ed.], [Macon: Mercer University Press, 1993], 225). Robert L. Perkins refers 
to Repetition as “Kierkegaard’s obscure little book” (Robert L. Perkins, “Introduction” 
International Kierkegaard Commentary; Fear and Trembling and Repetition, 195). This 
judgement is echoed by Constantin Constantius, the pseudonymous author of the text, who 
characterizes his elaborations as “obscurely pertaining” to the failed love affair of an unnamed 
young man (Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 228).  
3 Ibid.,136. 
4 Kierkegaard writes: “Recollection is the ethical [ethniske] view of life, repetition the modern; 
repetition is the interest [Interesse] of metaphysics, and also the interest upon which metaphysics 
comes to grief; repetition is the watchword [Løsnet] in every ethical view; repetition is conditio 
sine qua non [the indispensable condition] for every issue of dogmatics.” (ibid., 149). 
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analysis of the Biblical story of Abraham and Isaac in Fear and Trembling; the elaboration the 
story of Job in Repetition — Brita K. Stendahl characterizes repetition as akin to “a burning bush 
that is not consumed.”5 Paul S. Minear reports the odd conclusions of a lax ontology with his 
suggestion that repetition is the synthesis of incommensurables — temporality and (non-
temporal) eternity — that yields a kind of “divine madness” in which one “gives thanks, 
always.”6 John W. Elrod suggests that the term has existential importance, in the sense that 
repetition is involved with a person’s quest to authentically exist as a psycho-social being.7 
Elaborating on this suggestion, David J. Kangas briefly considers the possibility that Kierkegaard 
regards repetition as an existential category, which is (oddly) identified as a type of 
“relation…that freedom has with itself.”8 There are at least two problems with this elaboration of 
an existential category: (1) while relation might be a category (at least in the Aristotelian sense), 
it seems oddly specific to assert that freedom’s relation of self-identity is a category; (2) there is 
some problem with the elaboration of the category as an existential category. While the claim 
that repetition is categorical enjoys textual support, it is also observed that were this category to 
exist, it would be “absolutely transcendent.”9 That a category might enjoy the status of a 
transcendent entity is not outside the realm of ontological possibility. (Any of the categories that 
apply to ideal entities — i.e., mathematical objects, Husserlian ideal-meaning units, etc. — 
 
5 Brita K. Stendahl, Søren Kierkegaard (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1976), 210.  
6 Paul S. Minear, “Thanksgiving as a Synthesis of the Temporal and the Eternal,” A Kierkegaard 
Critique; An International Selection of Essays Interpreting Kierkegaard, Howard A. Johnson 
and Niels Thulstrup (ed.), (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), 306. 
7 Elrod writes: “The existing individual, in the act of repetition, becomes what he is, i.e., 
becomes himself.” (John W. Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Works 
[Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975] 229). 
8 David J. Elrod, Kierkegaard’s Instant; On Beginnings, (Indianapolis and Bloomington; 
University of Indiana Press, 2007), 103. 
9 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 210. 
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would be strictly transcendent, in the sense that they might not apply to materially instantiated 
entities). That an absolutely transcendent category still might be said to be an existential category 
is an ontological bridge too far, in the sense that (at minimum) existential categories must 
involve the immanent conditions — the lived experiences — of psycho-social entities. These 
various critical suggestions have been adduced to support the claim that there is little critical 
consensus on the nature of Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition. One of the implications of this 
lack of critical consensus is that the only clarity enjoyed by Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition 
is that it is clearly vague.  
The aim of the present chapter is to elaborate on the mercurial nature of repetition. I 
suggest that Kierkegaard conceives of repetition as a particular ontological entity (i.e., process; 
phenomenon) that involves axiological aspects. I claim that the temporal process of repetition 
involves axiological value, in an essential sense. This is demonstrated with the observation that 
were one to try to excise value from repetition, the concept would be unfairly restricted. With 
Deleuze’s elaboration of Kierkegaard, I identify repetition as the sort of phenomenon that tends 
to resist generalization. Taken together, these analyses yield the conclusion that repetition is an 
axiologically valent entity that enjoys the ontological status of a particular.  
First, I identify a similarity between Kierkegaard’s characterizations of repetition and 
those specified by Marx in the first chapter The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.10 I 
observe that Kierkegaard tends to emphasize the axiological aspects of repetition in the report of 
pseudonymous Constantin Constantius. Here, repetition is elaborated in explicitly axiological 
terms — a worthwhile trip to Berlin, an upheaval, a comedic farce, etc. For both Kierkegaard and 
 




Marx, repetition is axiologically valent, in the sense that values (like good bad, tragic, comic, 
etc.) are involved with the recurrence of circumstances. A return trip to a city, the re-emergence 
of the revolutionary conditions of 1789 in the political situation of France in 1848-1852 — these 
temporal repetitions have axiological significance. 
Second, I suggest that Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition pre-figures that which is 
elaborated by Gilles Deleuze. For both Kierkegaard and Deleuze, temporal repetition involves 
the emergence of difference — that which is repeated is the circumstance which yields the 
creation of non-identical entities. Though Deleuze explicitly cites Kierkegaard in his elaboration 
of the nature of repetition, Deleuze’s indebtedness to Kierkegaard on the subject of temporality 
has — for the most part — been ignored, in the sense that the critical literature addressing 
Kierkegaard’s influence on Deleuze tends to focus on other aspects of Deleuze’s thought.11 In an 
admirable recent article, Arjen Kleinherenbrink identifies Kierkegaard as influential to Deleuze’s 
ethics of immanence, through reference to the knight of faith and Deleuze’s critique of normative 
ethical systems in both volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia.12 Marc Katz has written a 
recent piece that eelucidates Kierkegaard’s influence on Deleuze’s and Guattari’s thought on the 
nature of a conceptual limit, but does not analyse what the implications of this has for temporal 
repetition.13 This is a missed opportunity, in the sense that both Kierkegaard and Deleuze 
sometimes refer to repetition as a limit (i.e., caesura) to the progression of linear time. Though 
Lisa Trahair has recently written a detailed elaboration of the nature of Kierkegaard’s knight of 
 
11 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Paul Patton (tr.), (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2001). 
12 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, “Art as Authentic Life—Deleuze after Kierkegaard”, Kritike 8, no. 2, 
[December 2014] 98-118. 
13 Marc Katz, “Rendezvous in Berlin: Benjamin and Kierkegaard on the Architecture of 
Repetition” The German Quarterly 71, no. 1 [Winter, 1998], 1-13). 
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faith through reference to what Deleuze refers to as the “belief in this world,”14 afforded by the 
filmic art form, the temporal aspects of cinema — in particular, the detailed analyses of the 
recurrence of duration in Cinema 2: The Time-Image — are quickly passed over.15 Sophie 
Wennerscheid follows a similar track in her elaboration of the Deleuze’s and Kierkegaard’s 
similar thoughts on artistic creation.16 Though temporal repetitions certainly involve a type of 
ontological creation, it is overly restrictive to characterize these merely in terms of artistic 
creation. I suggest that the creation of a unique circumstance (i.e., a temporal moment that is 
discrete from all other temporal moments) is reflected in Kierkegaard’s and Deleuze’s 
identification of repetition as a phenomenon which tends to resist generalization, in multiple 
senses of the term.  
Taken together, these analyses yield the conclusion that repetition is properly conceived 
of an axiologically valent entity that tends to obtain as an ontologically unique (i.e., particular) 
entity. 
 
Two Elaborations of the Axiological Aspect of Temporal Repetition 
For Kierkegaard, time is experienced as though it progresses linearly through a unified 
continuum of temporal instances (t1, t2… tn). Perhaps what is most interesting is the supposition 
that from the temporal moment of the present, one can either move forward through time (toward 
the future), or backward through time to the remembered past. Kierkegaard explicitly identifies 
recollection and repetition as similar temporal movements, though in obverse temporal 
 
14 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (tr.), 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 172). 
15 Lisa Trahair, “Belief in this World: The Dardenne brothers’ The Son and Søren Kierkegaard’s 
Fear and Trembling”, SubStance 45, no. 3 (2016), pp. 98-119. 
16 Sophie Wennerscheid, “Poetics of Repetition: Nonlinearity and Queer Futurity in Philosophy 
and Literature of Memory” Orbis Litterarum 73 (2018), 383–394. 
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directions.17 The claim here is that recollections are just like repetitions, save for the fact that 
repetitions actualize an undisclosed future, while recollections actualize a previously actualized 
temporal event. Though Roger Poole starkly dismisses Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition (i.e., 
recollection forward) as incoherent, with his summary remark that “one cannot, of course, 
recollect forward,”18 this seems altogether too quick, in the sense that it does not adequately 
reflect the psychological reality of one who attempts to discern the meaning of present temporal 
events or future contingencies through reference to the past. Kierkegaard carefully notes that his 
concept of recollection is borrowed from the Greeks. The Kierkegaardian concept of recollection 
is informed by Plato’s claim that the way to make sense of the present events —like the 
impending execution of Socrates (in Phaedo) — involves a recollection of events which had 
occurred on a previous day (i.e., the day the Athenians had put garlands on the ship that had set 
sail to Delos).19 That Phaedo’s remarks are of a temporally prior event is adduced to specify that 
they are the content of memory. That Phaedo’s recollections are used to convey the diegetic 
meaning of the dialogue from the present of its telling until its future conclusion (which, at least 
for the dialogue’s participants, is many hours later) demonstrates how a retelling (i.e., repetition) 
of remembered events may be characterized as recollections forward — toward a narrative 
future.20  
 
17 Kierkegaard writes: “Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in opposite 
directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, whereas genuine repetition is 
recollected forward.” (Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 210). 
18 Roger Poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication, (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 1993), 63. 
19 Plato, Phaedo, 58b, Plato: The Complete Works, John M Cooper (ed.). (Indianapolis and 
Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 50. 
20 Edward F. Moony makes a similar point against Poole with his suggestion that “forward facing 
recollections” (in Plato and Kierkegaard) involve a “reception of meaning that is radiating not 
from one's past but from one's future.” The crucial difference here is that Mooney seems to imply 
that the future is already existent — as that from which meanings can radiate. This claim seems 
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Kierkegaard hints at the axiological aspects of repetition when he elucidates comedy as 
involving temporality.21 The suggestion here is that comedy is an aspect of temporal progression. 
Stated in more stark terms, were there no such thing as temporal progression (i.e., repetition of 
discrete temporal instants), then comedy would be non-existent.22 Kierkegaard’s inferential 
progression is quite subtle: (1) it is stipulated that comic phenomena are dependent on 
contradictory situations (i.e., situations in which the expected outcomes are not realized); (2) the 
enthymematic observation is that temporal progression is the necessary ontological pre-condition 
for the emergence of contradiction — in the Kierkegaardian sense; (3) Kierkegaard observes that 
comedy would not obtain in any non-temporal (i.e., eternal) circumstance. The ontological 
dependency relation of comedy to temporality is established as the positive correlate of the third 
claim. Perhaps it should be noted that Kierkegaard tends to use the term “contradiction” in a 
slightly different sense than that demanded by Aristotelian logic — i.e., a contradiction obtains 
when a property (or attribute) is asserted to both belong and not belong to an existent.23 
Kierkegaard tends to use refer to the opposition of social forces, or the tendency of existents to 
be contrary to one another (i.e., dialectical contradiction) as contradictories. It could be objected 
that — even with this modified notion of contradiction — there is something a bit off about 
 
to be without textual support in either Plato or Kierkegaard. (Edward F. Mooney, Edward F. 
“Repetition: Getting the World Back” The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, Alastaire 
Hannay and Gordon G. Marino [ed.]. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 288). 
21 Kierkegaard writes: “The comic is a category that belongs specifically to the 
temporal. “(Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 327). 
22 Kierkegaard elaborates on dependency relation the through reference to the possibility of 
contradiction: “The comic always lies in contradiction (Wiederspruch). But in eternity all 
contradictions are canceled, and the comic is consequently excluded.” (ibid.). 
23 Aristotle identifies contradiction: “It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong 
and not belong to the same subject in the same respect.” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 100b518-20, 
The Complete Works of Aristotle II, Jonathan Barns [ed.], [Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1991] 489). 
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Kierkegaard’s suggestion that (dialectical) contradiction yields comedy. It seems that the 
expression of a dialectical contradiction could yield any number of different outcomes, to which 
any number of value predicates could apply. (I.e., one could imagine that a tension of contraries 
— like those elaborated in the Biblical story of Job; those evident the harrowing tales of children 
taken from their families at the southern United States border, etc. — might not prove to be a 
source of comic amusement). In this sense, Kierkegaard’s concept of comedy seems more akin to 
Aristotle’s concept of a reversal of fortune (περιπέτεια) in which a person’s fate is dramatically 
reversed.24 Kierkegaard alleviates this critical concern by cautiously noting that the dialectical 
contradictions made possible by temporal progression could yield tragic or comic outcomes.25 
Kierkegaard generalizes the observation that repetition produces contradictions, which yield 
tragic or comic outcomes to a claim about repetition’s nature: repetition involves an axiological 
aspect. 
 The axiological aspects of Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition are demonstrated in 
similarities among thematic content of Constantius’s narrative and that of Kierkegaard’s essay 
“The Unhappiest One.”26 In the essay, Kierkegaard identifies unhappiness as involving a sense 
of temporal dislocation from the present. Constantius suggests that temporal repetition partially 
 
24 Aristotle, Poetics, 1452a22, The Complete Works of Aristotle II, 1460. 
25 Kierkegaard notes this ambiguity with his elaboration of the development of a human 
personality over time: “As yet the personality is not discerned, and its energy is betokened only 
in the passion of possibility, for the same thing happens in the spiritual life as with many 
plants—the main shoot conies last. But this shadow-existence also demands satisfaction, and it is 
never beneficial to a person if this does not have time to live out its life, whereas on the other 
hand it is tragic or comic if the individual makes the mistake of living out his life in it.” (Søren 
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 327) 
26 Steven Crites elaborates this comparison when he notes that “Repetition appears to be an 
extended illustration of a predicament sketched in a little essay in volume 1 of Either/Or, ‘The 
Unhappiest.’” (Steven Crites, “‘The Blissful Security of the Moment’ Recollection, Repetition, 
and Eternal Recurrence”, 229). 
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alleviates this sense of unhappiness. A brief exegesis of the salient points of the essay illustrates 
the nature of the peculiar type of unhappiness that Kierkegaard has in mind. The essay has been 
written from the perspective of an immiserated individual, who has been cast out of society. The 
narrative voice of the essay explicitly identifies himself as among “we who live ἀϕοϱισμένοι and 
segregati” (i.e., cut off, removed from society).27 After positing various possible causes for 
unhappiness — immortality;28 languishing in the strange state of having a bifurcated, self-
destructive ego;29 the social and religious exclusion endured by an anathematized person,30 etc. 
— Kierkegaard elucidates the most profound unhappiness as the feeling of being separated from 
the temporal domain of the present.31 In this sense, the most immiserated of individuals is one for 
whom it is impossible to find fulfilment in the temporal present. Though the kind of happiness 
brought on by the sense of being displaced from the present is devastating, Kierkegaard suggests 
that it is not comprehensive, in the sense that one may find a diminished measure of happiness in 
the experience of repetition. This is the principal outcome of Constantius’s observation that 
repetition is analytically distinct from the feeling of hope.32 The key difference between the two 
 
27 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or Part 1, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (trs.), (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), 182. The Latin term segregati is identified as a translation of 
the Greek ἀφωϱισμένοι, which is identified as meaning “social exclusion.” (ibid., 521, fn.5). 
28 Kierkegaard rejects the suggestion that the: “the unhappiest one was the person who could not 
die, who could not slip down into a grave.” (ibid., 182). 
29 Kierkegaard identifies this as the Hegelian unhappy consciousness: “The unhappy one is the 
person who in one way or another has his ideal, the substance of his life, the plenitude of his 
consciousness, his essential nature, outside himself. The unhappy one is the person who is 
always absent from himself, never present to himself.” (ibid.,184). 
30 Kierkegaard observes that the unhappiest one might be thought of as akin to a “wandering 
Jew.” (ibid., 182). 
31 Kierkegaard elaborates: “So, then, the unhappy one is absent. But one is absent when one is in 
either past or future time.” (ibid., 184) 
32 Kierkegaard illustrates a three-fold distinction among hope, recollection, and repetition 
through metaphor: “Hope is a new garment, stiff and starched and lustrous, but it has never been 
tried on, and therefore one does not know how becoming it will be or how it will fit. Recollection 
is a discarded garment that does not fit, however beautiful it is, for one has outgrown it. 
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is an analogue to the difference between actual and potential. Hope is identified as enjoying a 
potential mode of existence that never becomes realized. The claim here is that one never gets 
what one hopes for. (I.e., hope is characterized “as the maiden that slips away through one’s 
figures”).33 Repetitions, on the other hand, enjoy an actual mode of existence, in the sense that 
they are realized. (I.e., recollections are characterized as “beloved wife of whom one never 
wearies.”)34 The axiological implication of the distinction is that repetition partially alleviates the 
unhappiness of those who have lost a sense of the inhabiting the present — because it is 
actualized, repetition brings a modicum of happiness to those miserable people who feel no 
relation to their present circumstance. 
An analogue to Kierkegaard’s ambivalence to the particular axiological value of a 
repetition (an ambivalence that is based on the existence of axiological aspects of repetition in 
general) is found in Marx’s elaboration of the revolutionary tumult that swept through France 
from 1848 to 1852. A clue to the importance of axiological aspects of repetition — elaborated in 
terms of the recurrence of revolutionary conditions — is found in Marx’s observation that history 
repeats itself, first as tragedy, then as farce.35 Derrida elaborates on the connection of value and 
repetition with his observation that Marx derives joy from “taking the pulse” of the rhythmic 
 
Repetition is an indestructible garment that fits closely and tenderly, neither binds nor sags.” 
(Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 132). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Marx writes: “Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in 
world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: The first time as tragedy, the second as 
farce.” (Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 15). Marx seems to be 
referring to Hegel’s remarks on the numerous political revolutions of Ancient Rome: “By 
repetition that which at first appeared merely a matter of chance and contingency becomes a real 
and ratified existence.” (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, J. Sibree 
[tr.], [Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001], 342). 
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repetitions of history.36 This is not to say that Marx saw the revolutionary tumult of his age 
through rose-coloured lenses. Marx explicitly notes the negative axiological values of the 
recollections of the past glories of the 1789 revolt in his characterization of these as the “tradition 
of all the dead generations that weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.”37 In a 
particularly rhetorically loaded passage, Marx cautiously warns against the dangers of 
celebrating the memory of an overly-romanticized vision of the “defunct epoch” of a 
revolutionary past.38 Marx identifies two problems involved with the recollection past 
revolutionary glories: (1) the tendency to give rise to an unwarranted sense of revolutionary hope 
(i.e., an “imagined acceleration of motion”)39, and; (2) the tendency to give rise to a mass sense 
of confused of temporal dis-location (i.e., the lived experience of the population of a “nation 
[which] feels like that mad Englishman in Bedlam who fancies that he lives in the times of the 
ancient Pharaohs”).40 Marx’s ambivalence to the revolutionary potential heralded by temporal 
 
36 Derrida writes: “Marx then accumulates the examples of this rhythmic anachrony. He analyses 
its pulses and impulsions. He takes pleasure in it, the pleasure of repetition; on seeing him so 
sensitive to these compulsive waves, one gets the impression that he is not just pointing his 
finger: he is taking the pulse of history.” (Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx; The State of the 
Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International, Peggy Kaumf [tr.], [New York and 
London: Routledge, 1994], 139-140). 
37 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 10. 
38 Marx writes, “An entire people, which had imagined that by means of a revolution it had 
imparted to itself an accelerated power of motion, suddenly finds itself set back into a defunct 
epoch and, in order that no doubt as to the relapse may be possible, the old dates arise again, the 
old chronology, the old names, the old edicts, which had long become a subject of antiquarian 
erudition, and the old minions of the law, who had seemed long decayed. The nation feels like 
that mad Englishman in Bedlam who fancies that he lives in the times of the ancient Pharaohs 
and daily bemoans the hard labour that he must perform in the Ethiopian mines as a gold digger, 
immured in this subterranean prison, a dimly burning lamp fastened to his head, the overseer of 
the slaves behind him with a long whip, and at the exits a confused welter of barbarian 
mercenaries, who understand neither the forced labourers in the mines nor one another, since 





revolution are implied in the enticing observation that repetitions can be temporal re-
instantiations of the “poetry of the past.”41 Despite the failures of past revolutions — dangers that 
Marx elaborates in sometimes excruciating detail — Marx cautiously observes that revolutionary 
failures are the dialectical preconditions necessary to liberate the French peasantry from their 
immiserating social conditions.42 This is the expression of a revolutionary hope. William Lyon 
McBride identifies Marx’s expression of feeling of the immanent possibility of positive social 
and political change as one of the most substantive indicators of Marx’s optimistic comportment 
to the future of Europe.43 This is further observed in Engels’ characterization of Marx as a 
“revolutionist” who — well aware of the immanent possibility of the repetition of negative 
values — was always firmly on the side of the poor made miserable by capitalism.44 This is the 
expression of a revolutionary hope for the possibility of a successful revolution. Such a hope can 
only operate when one grants that repetitions involve axiological aspects. 
 
An Ontological Aspect of Temporal Repetition 
 
41 Ibid. 
42 Marx writes: “But the parody of the empire…was necessary to free the mass of the French 
nation from the weight of tradition and to work out in pure form the opposition between the state 
power and society. With the progressive undermining of smallholding property, the state 
structure erected upon it collapses.” (ibid., 112) 
43 William Lyon McBride, The Philosophy of Marx (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), 116. 
44 Engels writes: “For Marx was before all else a revolutionist. His real mission in life was to 
contribute, in one way or another, to the overthrow of capitalist society and of the state 
institutions which it had brought into being, to contribute to the liberation of the modern 
proletariat, which he was first to make conscious of its own position and needs, conscious of the 
conditions of its emancipation. Fighting was his element. And he fought with a passion few 
could rival.” (Friedrich Engels, Speech at the Graveside of Marx, in The Marx-Engels Reader, 
Robert C. Tucker [ed.], [New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978], 682). 
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“Repetition is not generality”; with this enticing first line to Difference and Repetition, 
Deleuze hints at the kinship of his concept of repetition with that elaborated by Kierkegaard.45 
Though the connection between Kierkegaard and Deleuze enjoys demonstrable textual support 
with Kierkegaard’s explicit claim that repetition is not “ideality” (i.e., generality), the content of 
the claim invites question.46 While the logical operation of negation is easily understandable, the 
suggestion that repetition is not generality demands clarification, in the sense that Deleuze’s 
characterization of the term “generality” is quite nuanced.  
 Deleuze tends to elucidate “generality” as involving an appeal to various transcendent 
criteria. (E.g., the generality of a natural law which is comprehensible to any psycho-social 
entity; the generality of a moral law that could serve as normative constraint; the generality of a 
habit evidenced by a group of people). Repetition involves oppositions to all of these. The claim 
is that repetition involves none of an appeal to a natural law, an appeal to a moral law, or an 
appeal to habit. Deleuze specifies that repetition is analytically discrete from generality if it 
fulfils three conditions: (1) the phenomenon of repetition must involve a “selective test” (i.e., an 
instant in which a selective determination is made);47 (2) repetition is characterized as non-
identifiable with any of the “laws of nature” or “moral laws”;48 (3) repetition is non-reducible to 
the generality of habit.49 The mercurial nature of each of these conditions invites clarification. 
 
45 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 1.  
46 Kierkegaard writes: “In ideality alone there is no repetition, for the idea is and remains the 
same and as such cannot be repeated. When ideality and reality touch each other, then repetition 
occurs. When, for example, I see something in the moment, ideality enters in and will explain 
that it is a repetition.” (Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 275).  
47Deleuze writes: “Make something new of repetition itself: connect it with a test, with a 
selection or selective test; make it the supreme object of the will and of freedom.” (Gilles 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 6) 
48 Deleuze writes: “In consequence, oppose repetition to the laws of nature.” (ibid.) 
49 Deleuze writes: “Oppose repetition not only to the generalities of habit but also to the 
particularities of memory “(ibid.). 
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For Deleuze, a selective test is the selection of the new (i.e., the unique; that which is 
without ontological precedent or correlate). Kierkegaard illustrates the selective nature of 
repetition at key moments in Repetition and Fear and Trembling. The selective nature of 
repetition is hinted at in the subtitle of Repetition, which identifies the text as a type of 
“psychological experiment” of a young man to determine whether (or not) repetition is possible. 
The young man discovers that his attempts to create a temporal repetition are for naught, in the 
sense that — despite his best efforts — an exact recreation of his previous trip (to Berlin) is 
impossible.50 Ultimately, the young man’s investigations yield the observation that the details of 
his most recent trip to Berlin differ considerably from those of his previous trip — the 
experiment produces a unique trip, not a repetition of a previous journey. Perhaps the most 
dramatic illustration of a selective test is found in Kierkegaard’s elucidation of the Biblical story 
of Abraham and Isaac. Kierkegaard cautiously notes that the story is illustrative of two distinct 
conceptual “movements”: the resignation illustrated by Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac; 
the acceptance of the “absurd” hypothesis that God will give him a new Isaac.51 Taken together, 
these two movements constitute a selective test that aims at the (perhaps false) belief in the 
creation of an ontologically unique entity (i.e., the new, unsacrificed son). Both the young man’s 
psychological experiment and Abraham’s choice to attempt to murder his son illustrate the claim 
 
50 Kierkegaard’s unnamed young man arrives at this conclusion after discovering that the 
landlord of his lodging house had got married: “But here, alas, again no repetition was possible. 
My landlord, the druggist…had married.” (Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 
152). 
51 Kierkegaard writes: “Abraham makes two movements. He makes the infinite movement of 
resignation and gives up Isaac, which no one can understand because it is a private venture; but 
next, at every moment, he makes the movement of faith. This is his consolation. In other words, 
he is saying: But it will not happen, or if it does, the Lord will give me a new Isaac, that is, by 
virtue of the absurd.” (Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 115). 
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that repetition resists generality, in the sense that the selective test involved in each functions as 
the ontic pre-condition of the emergence of a non-generalizable entity (i.e., a singularity).  
In his elaboration of Deleuze’s analysis of Kierkegaard’s discussion of the tribulations of 
Job, Henry Somers-Hall observes that natural and moral laws must fulfil a minimal condition of 
intelligibility.52 The claim here is that for an entity to be considered a law, it must be 
comprehended by the category of the thinkable. (I.e., a natural law must figure in the domain of 
scientific discourse as a subject of analysis, an object to be analysed, a regulative principle, a 
limit condition, etc.; a moral law must figure in a normative discourse in analogous ways). 
Kierkegaard suggests that repetition does not meet this condition, in the narrow sense that 
repetition seems to involve an ineffable relation with the Divine. Kierkegaard hints at the 
necessarily vague quality of repetition with the observation that Job’s repeated immiserations are 
“hard to say in any human language.”53 Though Kierkegaard cautiously notes that repetition —
characterized as the recurring “rebuke of God”54 — is an existent phenomena, he also observes 
that repetitions only occur “when every thinkable human certainty and probability were 
impossible.”55 The ontological implication is staggering: repetition involves an ineffable aspect 
that resists generalization into natural or moral law.  
The identification of the ineffable aspects of repetition has important implications for 
Deleuze’s observation that repetition need not be generalized as habit. In his elaboration of the 
misadventures of Job, Kierkegaard tends to characterize repetition in apocalyptic terms —i.e., as 
involving any of spiritual, psychological, or physical destruction. John D. Caputo observes that 
 
52 Henry Somers-Hall, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition; An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 12. 





Job may be classified as the “teacher of repetition,”56 in the sense that his repeated immiserations 
serve as an ominous warning of the negative affect of the repetitive succession of temporal 
instants. Kierkegaard elaborates on the calamitous nature of repetition through reference to the 
metaphor of thunderstorm that leaves one shattered, in multiple senses.57 The characterizations of 
repetition as involving a radical break imply that habit — typically identified as a type of 
repetition (i.e., habitual action; any of the unconscious ticks, twitches, spasms, etc. that tend to 
recurrently affect material entities) — is in fact analytically distinct from repetition. Kierkegaard 
explicitly draws this distinction when he specifies that repetition (identified with the character 
trait of earnestness) is ontologically primary to habit.58 The implication here is that repetition 
enjoys a relative autonomy, in the sense that it is independent of habit — i.e., habit is dependent 
on repetition, not the other way around. 
When we take the above observations about the nature of repetition together, a striking 
ontological picture emerges. Repetition is identified as an ontologically primordial process of 
selection (i.e., test) that seems to resist formalization into general moral or natural law, in the 
sense that there is an ineffable (i.e., non-linguistic, non-conceptualizable) aspect to the 
repetitions. In this sense, repetition is a break in the strictly linear concept of temporal flow 
expressed in the habitual actions of material entities. In every instance, the phenomenon of 
 
56 John D. Caputo, “Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Foundering of Metaphysics” International 
Kierkegaard Commentary, 217. 
57 Kierkegaard elaborates on the profoundly negative effects associated with the repetition: “I am 
waiting for the thunderstorm — and for repetition. And yet I would be happy and indescribably 
blessed if the thunderstorm would only come, even if my sentence were that no repetition is 
possible… What will be the effect of this thunderstorm? … It will shatter my whole 
personality— I am prepared. It will render me almost unrecognizable to myself.” (Søren 
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 214) 
58 Kierkegaard writes: “Earnestness is acquired originality. Different from habit —which is the 




repetition tends be characterized as the ontologically particular process that is analytically 
distinct from generality.  
 
Concluding Remarks: Repetition as Actualization of a New Circumstance 
In his final letter to Constantias, the nameless young man elaborates on the nature of 
repetition through reference to Ilithyia (the Greek goddess of childbirth). The reference is apt, in 
the sense that the text of the metaphorically rich passage illustrates the axiological and 
ontological significance of repetition. The axiological aspects of repetition are highlighted when 
the narrative voice characterizes his experience of repetition as akin to that of a skiff adrift on 
tumultuous seas that “spume with elemental fury.”59 The ontological particularity of the process 
of repetition — i.e., its capacities to produce the new; the object without precedent — is 
elaborated in the identification of repetition as a liberation of temporally prior circumstances.  
I adduced the existence of the axiological aspect of repetition through reference to 
Kierkegaard and Marx. Value — comedy, tragedy, etc. — is involved with the repetition of 
temporal moments. Any attempt to excise axiological qualities from temporal repetition, i.e., to 
treat it as something discrete, implies a diminishment of the concept. The intimate relation of 
repetition and value is illustrated by Marx’s explicit characterizations of the repetition of 
revolutionary circumstances as involving value.  
The ontological particularity of repetition is adduced with Deleuze’s observation that 
repetition tends to enjoy a non-general ontological status. Deleuze carefully identifies a series of 
conditions that an existent must meet in order be considered as non-generalizable — the existent 
must involve a selective test; it tends to be resistant to formalization as a moral or natural law; it 
 
59 Ibid., 221. 
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enjoys an ontological status that is different from the generality of habit. Kierkegaard’s nuanced 
elaboration of repetition demonstrates that it tends to satisfy these. The substantive claim is that 
repetition enjoys an ontological status as a radically particular process that involves the value-
laden creation of the new.
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CHAPTER 5: THE MEMORY OF CINEMA 
Deleuze’s concept of temporality undergoes radical revision with his elaborations of 
time’s expressions in cinema. In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image1 and Cinema 2: The Time-
Image,2 Deleuze elucidates aspects of Bergson’s thought to present a concept of time that is no 
longer tethered to the movements of entities. Deleuze — in what is perhaps one of the most odd 
definitions in the history of Western philosophy — characterizes cinema as attempting to move 
beyond the representation of the movements of existents to give viewers a “direct presentation of 
time.”3 In the present chapter, I elucidate Deleuze’s tantalizing suggestion that cinema, the art 
form that has moving images as one of its ontic bases, involves a direct representation of a sort 
of temporality that is conceptually discrete from the movement of existents. I further suggest that 
filmic expressions of time reveal it to be a singularity that enjoys the attribute of radical 
indeterminacy. Deleuze further suggests that time — as it is presented in film — obtains as that 
ongoing continuum of variation.  
My argument progresses through four stages: (1) I will critically assess the 
suggestion of various commentators that the Cinema texts offer a fraught addition to 
Deleuze’s philosophy of time; (2) I suggest that Deleuze’s innovative reading of 
Bergson’s concept of duration is key to understanding how time is expressed in cinema; 
(3) I observe — through reference to Alain Robbe-Grillet’s theory of artistic descriptions 
— that a direct image of time enjoys nascent expression in the form of “pure optical and 
 
1 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(tr.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
2 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (tr.), 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
3 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 38. 
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acoustic situations” (i.e., moments of profound change in any of the diegetic elements of a film 
story); (4) finally — through reference to Deleuze’s nuanced reading of Bergson’s ontology of 
virtual and actual modes of existence — I suggest that time gains direct cinematic expression in 
the peculiar “crystal-images” that proliferate in post-World War II cinema. I observe that time’s 
expression in cinema involves all of diminishment of the relative importance of the relation of 
temporal succession, prioritization of time’s involvement with fundamental ontological change, 
and specification of the strictly simultaneous emergence of past and present. Further, I suggest 
that this temporality forms a continuum of variation without end. Taken together, these yield the 
claim that the direct presentation of time in cinema involves characterizing temporality as a 
singularity that is intrinsic to the cinematic mode of artistic expression. Perhaps the most magical 
of all art forms, cinema continues to delight us in no small measure due to its capacity to express 
a little morsel of time as pure, unceasing variation.  
 
Deleuze’s Phenomenology of Cinema? 
The nuanced nature of Deleuze’s identification of cinema as a presentation of time that is 
somehow removed from the movements of photographically represented objectivities (i.e., all of 
the characters, elements of setting, material entities, etc.) has produced some critical 
befuddlement, in the sense that analyses of Deleuze’s claims on the nature of cinema and its 
expression of temporality tend to be divided. Commentators seem oddly flummoxed when it 
comes to Deleuze’s analyses of film. This consternation is evidenced variously as hesitancy in 
addressing the substantive philosophical claims about the nature of temporality elaborated in 
Cinema 2, mischaracterization of the relative importance of Deleuze’s re-evaluation of time 
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through reference to cinema, and a strange ambivalence evident in competing identifications of 
what Deleuze is up to with his striking analyses of film.  
In an otherwise superlative elaboration of Deleuze’s philosophy of time, James Williams 
suggests that though the Cinema texts stand as remarkable contributions to the philosophy of 
film, one should be wary of approaching the texts as though they develop a substantive 
contribution to Deleuze’s thought on the nature of temporality.4 Williams identifies three reasons 
for being wary of both Cinema 1 and Cinema 2: (1) he observes an apparent ambiguity in 
Deleuze’s use of the term “image”;5 (2) he suggests that the analyses of all of artists, works of 
art, and the ontological concepts expressed by these tend to be inadequate, in the sense that these 
are “descriptive and restricted”6 in comparison to more lengthy treatments offered in other of 
Deleuze’s works —particularly Logic of Sense and Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, 
though one also might mention Coldness and Cruelty, Proust and Signs, as well as Kafka: 
Toward a Minor Literature; (3) his claims that the mode of exposition and the development of 
substantive claims tends to be rather disjointed in comparison to that evidenced in other texts.7 
Here I should point out that Williams’ reasons for his hesitancy to elaborate on — let alone 
endorse — the conceptualizations of time developed in the Cinema texts are sketchy. Deleuze’s 
use of the term “image,” as I develop (through particular reference to the “crystalline image of 
time”) in the penultimate section of this chapter, is consistent with that of Bergson. In the 
 
4 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011).  
5 Ibid., 160. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Referring to Deleuze’s Essays Critical and Clinical and The Logic of Sense, Williams observes 
that in these “concepts and artwork grow inwards and explode outwards together, in a style with 
more rhythm, texture, complexity of pace, and linguistic invention” than is evident in either of 
Deleuze’s books on Cinema. (ibid., 161).  
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absence of a clearly stated set of criteria and means of evaluating the merits of one mode of 
philosophical exegesis relative to another — neither of which Williams gives — one must reject 
the second and third putative reasons for wariness as akin to an ill-defined axiological complaint.  
Though András Bálint Kovács characterizes Deleuze’s as “by far the deepest and most 
developed theory of modern cinema [that] has been formulated,” he also observes that it “does 
not fit in with any previous theoretical frameworks.”8 Paul Schrader, on the other hand, starkly 
identifies Deleuze’s elucidation of the nature and function of cinema as “the phenomenology of 
perception through time.”9 Vivian Sobchack echoes Schrader’s sentiment with her suggestion 
 
8 András Bálint Kovács, Screening Modernism: European Art Cinema, 1950-1980, (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 40-41. 
9 Paul Schrader, Transcendental Style in Film: Ozu, Bresson, and Dreyer, (Oakland: University 
of California Press, 2018), 3. With his suggestion that Deleuze seems to bear an affinity to 
various phenomenologists and explicitly phenomenological claims, Schrader is hardly a voice in 
the wilderness. Particularly interesting recent studies advancing similar theses include: Henry 
Somers-Hall, “Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Difference: Difference and Repetition, 
Chapter One” Deleuze and Guattari Studies 13, no. 3 (2019), pp. 401-415; Judith Wambacq, 
Thinking Between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, (Athens: University of Ohio Press, 2017); Jay 
Lampert, “Deleuze’s ‘Power of Decision,’ in Kant’s =X and Husserl’s Noema”, At the Edges of 
Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy, Craig Lundy and Daniela Voss (ed.), 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 272-292); Levi R. Bryant, “Transcendental 
Empiricism: The Image of Thought and the ‘Phenomenology’ of the Encounter”, Difference and 
Givenness: Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism, and the Ontology of Difference, (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2008) 73-92; Corry Shores “In the Still of the Moment: 
Deleuze's Phenomena of Motionless Time” Deleuze Studies 8, no. 2 (2014), pp. 199-229. It 
should be pointed out that most of these tend to focus on Deleuze’s early work — primarily 
Difference and Repetition — while leaving aside Deleuze’s critiques of Husserl (and the 
Husserlian concept of “natural perception”) in The Logic of Sense, Cinema 1: The-Movement 
Image, and Cinema 2: The Time-Image. François Zourabichvili suggests that when one takes 
Deleuze’s characterization of “becoming” — particularly, the various cinematic becomings that 
are evidenced by the changes in the way films are made, as well as the ways cinematic narrative 
style has altered with the French New Wave — Deleuze’s conceptual distance “from 
phenomenology and its heirs” becomes apparent. (François Zourabichvili, Deleuze: A 
Philosophy of the Event together with The Vocabulary of Deleuze, Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. 
Smith [ed.], Kieran Aarons [tr.], [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012], 173).  




that Deleuze’s philosophy of film parallels phenomenology in the sense that Deleuze’s key 
claims about the nature of cinematic movement and image seem to correlate with insights of 
Merleau-Ponty’s later work.10 Julien Guillemet suggests pretty much the exact opposite with his 
stark claim that “Deleuze’s relation to phenomenology appears as a strict refusal of the 
traditional phenomenological model.”11 As is the case with most stringent interpretive claims, 
this reading is dubious, in the sense that Deleuze’s relation with phenomenology in the Cinema 
texts tends to be decidedly more nuanced than partisan readings would care to admit. David 
Rodowick observes that Deleuze tends to characterize phenomenology as an “ambiguous ally” to 
the Deleuzian conceptualization of cinema.12 Deleuze’s nuanced critique of the suggestion that 
cinematic expression involves aspects that are akin to substantive claims of various 
phenomenologists (primarily Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty) involves two observations: (1) 
it seems that phenomenologists tend to disregard cinematic art as something worthy of analysis; 
(2) Husserlian phenomenology tends to prioritize a mode of (natural) perception of spatio-
temporally extended entities, which is ill-fitting with the experience of viewing a film. Each of 
these invites elaboration.  
Deleuze’s suggestion that phenomenology has an “embarrassed attitude” with respect to 
cinema has some merit, in the sense that there seems to be a paucity phenomenological analysis 
of cinematic art relative to the analyses of other art forms.13 (Here, one cannot help but think of 
 
10 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), 31. 
11 Julien Guillemet, “‘The “New Wave’ of French Phenomenology and Cinema: New Concepts 
for the Cinematic Experience” New Review of Film and Television Studies 8 (1) (2010): pp. 94–
114, 94. 
12 David Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 1997), 214. 
13 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(trs.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 57. 
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the numerous phenomenological analyses of paintings and literary works by Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and their followers.) Deleuze’s provocative observation that Husserl 
“never mentions cinema at all,” though technically true, is not quite as scandalous as one might 
think.14 Though Husserl doesn’t specifically mention the moving images of film (i.e., 
cinematographic images), this shouldn’t come as a terrible shock, if for no other reason than 
cinematic art was in its infancy when Husserl was writing. The Lumière Brothers are credited 
with presenting the first series of documentary shorts to a paying audience on 28 December 1895 
—L’arrivée d’un train en gare de La Ciotat, Déjeuner de Bébé, and L’arroseur arrosé. Georges 
Méliès founded the first film studio and in-house film theatre in 1896. Méliès is also credited 
with producing and showing the first single reel narrative film — Le Voyage dans la Lune — in 
1902.15 During this period, Husserl was busy starting his philosophical career at the University of 
Halle before being uprooted to take residence in Göttingen. Husserl published the first edition of 
the Logical Investigations one year before Méliès entertained audiences with the images of 
magical aliens dancing on the moon. In all likelihood, Husserl was unaware of the evolution of 
the magic lantern in France when he published his first major phenomenological text. It should 
also be noted that Husserl does discuss the moving image (albeit briefly) during this time.16 
Unfortunately, the situation does not improve much with Sartre, who — though he mentions 
going to the movies with his mother in The Words and briefly elaborates on the nature of slow 
 
14 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(trs.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 56. 
15 Cook offers a lovely, condensed history of the art form, including its genesis from the 
zorotrope (David A. Cook, A History of Narrative Cinema, [London and New York, WW and 
Norton Company, 2016], 7-14). 
16 Edmund Husserl, Edmund Husserl Collected Works XI: Phantasy, Image, Consciousness, and 
Memory (1898-1925), Rudolf Bernet (ed.), John B. Brough (tr.), (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 66, 
584n3, 645, and 646. 
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motion cinema in The Imaginary — refrains from offering a systematic analysis of the art form.17 
Deleuze also suggests that cinema suffers from a cursory treatment by Merleau-Ponty.18 Perhaps 
it is worth noting that Roman Ingarden discusses film in a slightly more substantive way than 
Merleau-Ponty. Unfortunately, Ingarden’s brief analyses of film have — until quite recently — 
been unduly neglected by North American and French phenomenologists.19 Deleuze’s 
observation that phenomenologists tend to treat the filmic art form in a manner analogous to how 
a family might be inclined to treat a bastard cousin is borne out (with some modification) by 
history. 
Deleuze offers a further clue to the fraught relation between phenomenology and 
cinematic representation with his explicit suggestion that cinema offers an alternative to the 
model of natural perception offered by Husserlian phenomenology. In a lecture on the topic 
given during the fall of 1981, Deleuze starkly notes that “cinematic perception is not natural 
perception. Not at all.”20 The difference among cinematic perception and natural perception 
 
17 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Words, Bernard Frechtman (tr.), (New York: George Braziller, 1964), 
119; Jean-Paul Sartre, Jonathan Webber (tr.), Arlette Elkaïm-Sartre (ed.), (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2004), 130. Perhaps due to their brevity, Sartre’s observations have only 
generated scant critical analysis. Dana Polan is one of the few who have elaborated on Sartre’s 
“occasional” thought on cinema. (Dana Polan, "Sartre and Cinema," Post-script 7, no. 1 [1987]: 
pp. 66-88, 86).  
18 (Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
[tr.], [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997], 57). Here, Deleuze mentions Merleau-
Ponty’s remarks in Phenomenology of Perception (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception, Colin Smith [tr.], London and New York: Routledge, 1962, 68). Wambaq notes that 
Merleau-Ponty, also makes passing reference to cinema in a few other texts. (Judith Wambacq, 
Thinking Between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, [Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017], 233 fn.3). 
19 Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, George G. Grabowicz (tr.) (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973); Roman Ingarden, Ontology of the Work of Art: The 
Musical Work, The Picture, The Architectural Work, The Film, Raymond Meyer (tr.), (Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 1989). 
20 Gilles Deleuze, “Lecture 1, 10 November 1981” Seminar on Cinema: The Movement-Image, 
Transcription: La voix de Deleuze, Fanny Douarche, Lise Renaux and transcription augmented, 
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involves the ontic bases of perceived objects. Deleuze suggests that natural perception presents 
objects in motion — e.g., the object of natural perception might be a bird fluttering its wings, 
pecking at a worm, prancing along a branch. The object of cinematic perception is explicitly the 
photographic representation of an entity isolated from motion. Deleuze’s analytic point is based 
on the observation that we typically perceive physical entities in motion and cinematic 
perception only affords us the perception of entities for which motion is a second-order property. 
The claim is that the smallest building block of our natural perception — the ontologically 
primary base of naturally perceived moments — is composed of entities enjoying inter-related 
motions. Writing a few scant years after the birth of cinema in 1895, Henri Bergson observed 
that cinematic perception involves (as its ontic base) “snapshots of a passing reality.”21 Bergson 
goes on to suggest that cinematic images are frozen in time, in the sense that they are bereft of 
any movement. (I.e., the cinematic image involves a negation of the motion of the naturally 
perceived object). Though it is the case that (when watching a film) we perceive entities that 
have the semblance of motion — e.g., the grotesque image of the razorblade slicing an eyeball in 
Luis Buñuel’s Un Chien Andalou;22 the horrific image of the blood gushing out of the elevator 
doors in Stanley Kubrick’s The Shining 23— this is the product of the serial organization and 
projection of static photographic images. While natural perception involves entities in motion, 
cinematic perception involves the mere illusion of entities in motion. In this sense, the perceived 
 
Charles J. Stivale, Charles J. Stivale (tr.) https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/cinema-
movement-image/lecture-01 [Date Accessed: 20 August 2020]. 
21 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, Arthur Mitchell (tr.), (Mineola: Dover, 1998), 307. 
22 Luis Buñuel (dir.), Un Chien Andalou, (Les Grands Films, 1929). 
23 Stanley Kubrick (dir.), The Shining (The Producer Circle Company, 1980). 
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motion of cinematic entities is ontologically secondary event; a cinematographic illusion 
conjured the projection of still images at very specific temporal rates.24 
In addition to Deleuze’s observations about the ontic base of the cinematographic illusion 
of movement, one may observe a further difference among natural perception and cinematic 
perception. Deleuze seems to suggest that cinematic perception differs in kind from natural 
perception. Here, Deleuze’s critique is directed as much against André Bazin as it is against 
Husserl. One of the fundamental observations of Husserlian phenomenology is that “all 
consciousness is consciousness of”.25 Natural perception suggests that objects (in the real world) 
are presented to consciousness as composites of various schematized aspects. Intentional 
consciousness then sets about performing the complex task of fulfilling these aspects through 
reference to all of transcendent structures of reality, structures of consciousness, and social 
conditions evidenced in the life world (most of which are presented in a schematized fashion), in 
the ongoing creation of real objects of consciousness.26 Bazin suggests that perception of cinema 
 
24 Typically, the illusion of perceived motion is achieved by projecting still images at a rate of 
rate of twenty-four frames per second. Settling on this frame rate was the result of a fraught 
history of technological evolution that spanned almost two-thirds of the Nineteenth century: 
beginning with the invention of Plateau’s Phenakistoscope (1832), progressing through Horner’s 
Zoetrope (1832), Muybridge’s Zoopraxiscope (1879), and Edison’s Kinetograph (1891), to 
finally be perfected with the Lumière brothers’ Cinématographe (1895).  
25 Edmund Husserl quoted by Deleuze. (Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Hugh 
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam [tr.], [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997], 
56).  
26 Spiegelberg observes that Husserlian intentional directedness at an object involves four 
discrete characteristics: (1) objectivation; (2) identification; (3) connection; (4) constitution. The 
intentional act of fulfilling schematized aspects occurs in the intuitive fulfilment of an entity 
which appears as an incomplete — not yet fully determined — form. This tends to be associated 
with the intentional process of connection. (Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological 
Movement: A Historical Introduction I, 108–111). Mitscherling presents an excellent elaboration 
of the complex process of fulfilling schematized aspects that are presented in literary works of 
art. The model presented here is analogous to the process of natural perception. Mitscherling 
writes: “When consciousness attends to (or ‘intends’) a particular object, it is usually the case 
that only some of the ‘aspects’ of that object are presented immediately to consciousness, and 
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seems to involve a similar process with his observation that the cinematic image reveals the 
“natural image of a world ”;27 a flow of image which is “uncompromisingly realistic,” in the 
sense that it perfectly conveys the aspects of “the natural world.”28 Bazin’s claim here is that the 
camera functions as a prosthesis to the human eye, which assists in the process of perception 
(presenting aspects of entities in the empirically sensed world and fomenting their fulfillment by 
intentional consciousness) that is fundamentally analogous to that originally specified by 
Husserl. Deleuze explicitly denies this analogy when he observes that “the cinema can, with 
impunity, bring us close to things or take us away from them and revolve around them, it 
suppresses both the anchoring of the subject and horizon of the world.”29 The substantive 
observation here is that the camera does things which the eye human eye cannot do, in ways that 
are liberated from the direction of the perceiver’s intentional consciousness. With these analyses, 
Deleuze appears to be making a complex deduction from premises specified by Walter 
 
these aspects are said to be either fulfilled or unfulfilled. For example, when we look to a table 
from above, the table presents us with the aspect of ‘table-top’ and ‘table-bottom’, and the 
former is fulfilled while the latter remains unfulfilled. When we look at the table from beneath, 
the former (table-top) aspect is unfulfilled, and the latter (table-bottom) is fulfilled. A similar 
situation obtains in the case of the literary work of art, but here the reader is often forced to fulfil 
for herself many of those aspects that are presented by the author as unfulfilled, and she does so 
with regard to those aspects that are presented more fully, i.e., as fulfilled. The latter provide the 
reader with a direction to follow in her intentional activity of fulfilling these unfulfilled aspects, 
which are said to have been presented as ‘schematized’. This intentional activity of the fulfilment 
of schematized aspects is a central component of the general activity of ‘concretization’. As no 
character, for example, can ever be exhaustively presented by an author — no character, that is 
to say, can ever be portrayed as fully and completely determined — the manner in which this 
concretization is to proceed can only be schematically determined by the literary work through 
its stratum of these schematized aspects” (Jeff Mitscherling, Aesthetic Genesis: The Origin of 
Consciousness in the Intentional Being of Nature. [Toronto: University of America Press, 2010] 
143–144, fn.10). 
27 André Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image”, What is Cinema? 1, Hugh Gray (tr.), 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2005), 14. 
28 André Bazin, “The Myth of Total Cinema.” What is Cinema? 1, Hugh Gray (tr.), (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2005) 27. 
29 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 57. 
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Benjamin, Dziga Vertov, and Robert Bresson. Benjamin makes the astute observation that the 
camera “can bring out those aspects of the original that are unattainable to the naked eye yet 
accessible to the lens, which is adjustable and chooses its angle at will”;30 Vertov observes that 
cinema’s “kino-eye lives and moves in time and space; it gathers and records impressions in a 
manner wholly different from that of the human eye”;31 Bresson elaborates on the camera’s 
capacities to record “what no human eye is capable of catching, no pencil, brush, pen of pinning 
down…without knowing what it is, and pins its down with a machine's scrupulous 
indifference.”32 Deleuze observes that Husserlian phenomenology asserts a privilege to the 
human eye as the means by which to perceive the world. Without hesitation, Bazin accepts this 
privilege, only to suggest that the camera augments it. Benjamin, Vertov, and Bresson each 
fundamentally deny the human eye enjoys this privileged status — the movie camera (with its 
swoops, long tracking shots, radical close-ups, and sweeping panoramas) performs functions to 
which no human eye could dare aspire. All of these imply that cinematic perception involves an 
intentionality that is decidedly not human. The profound capacities of the kino-eye are illustrated 
in the — nearly sublime — opening sequence of Berlin: Die Sinfonie der Großstadt (1927): the 
film begins with the image of the languid ebb of calm waters, only to give way (through an 
abstract dissolve consisting of the multi-section white planes and a descending circle) to the 
metallic arms of a railway crossing; then, there is a rapid cut to a speeding train, which dissolves 
 
30 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, Illuminations, 
Harry Zohn (tr.), (New York: Schocken, 2007), 220. 
31 Dziga Vertov, Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov, Annette Michelson (ed.), Kevin 
O’Brien (tr.), (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984), 15. 




into a shot of the pistons of an engine.33 Here we have the an atypical conjunction of typical 
geometric forms (the abstract dissolve), as well as images of nature viewed in unnatural ways; 
things are viewed from angles that are seemingly unattainable by the human eye — i.e., hovering 
over the unblemished surface of water, which is not disturbed by the ripple caused by the 
immersion of a physical body. These are illustrative of a mode of perception of that is quite 
removed from any that we would identify as directed by human intentionality. These 
observations of poets, filmmakers, and philosophers suggest that cinema affords a mode of 
perception which is radically distinct from that so rigorously specified in Husserlian 
phenomenology. 
When taken together, these two complex claims — that there is scant substantive 
discussion of film in the works of Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, and that cinema affords a 
modality of perception that is distinct from (Husserlian) natural perception — imply that there is 
a conceptual distance among phenomenological accounts of the cinematic art form and that 
suggested by Deleuze. One might add to these a further observation, which obliquely challenges 
the notion that Deleuze’s account of temporal expression in cinema is akin to aspects of 
Husserlian phenomenology. In an interview with Raymond Bellour, Deleuze starkly observes 
that “there is no dualism at all” involved in his account of the nature of cinema.34 It has been 
observed that there is a sort of dualism hard baked into Husserl’s phenomenology. This 
 
33 Deleuze elaborates on Walter Ruttmann’s masterful sequence during a lecture on the 
movement-image. (Gilles Deleuze, “Lecture 7: 19 January 1982”, Seminar on Cinema: The 
Movement- Image, Transcribed by Céline Romagnoli, Pierre Gribling, and Binak Kalludra, 
https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/cinema-movement-image/lecture-07 [Date Accessed: 20 
August 2020]. 
34 Gilles Deleuze, “Interview on Anti-Oedipus with Raymond Bellour”, Gilles Deleuze: Letters 
and Other Texts, David Lapoujade (ed.), Ames Hodges (tr.), (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 
2020), pp. 195-240, 226. 
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suggestion enjoys ample textual support, in the sense that Husserl explicitly claims that there is a 
methodological dualism involved in his phenomenology. Husserl stipulates —in Ideas I —that 
the res cogitans is separated from the world of physical, material, spatio-temporally extended 
entities “by a veritable abyss.”35 Husserl tries to diminish dualism by prescribing the application 
of the phenomenological method, but by limiting the scope of his phenomenology to 
epistemology, avoids really contradicting ontological dualism. In Phenomenology and the Crisis 
of Philosophy, Husserl suggests that the function of intentional consciousness is to intertwine 
with the external (physical and ideal) world through various acts of clarification achieved by 
intentionality fulfilling the schematized aspects of entities presented through perception — i.e., 
by becoming conscious of entities.36 Were this intertwining achieved (i.e., were the process of 
fulfillment of schematized aspects ever completely actualized) this would diminish any concerns 
about an abiding dualism. Unfortunately, the success of Husserl’s efforts is a matter of dispute. 
Françoise Dastur observes that Husserl’s phenomenology seems to be plagued by an intractable 
dualism.37 Merleau-Ponty echoes this suggestion with his observation that at “the end of 
 
35 Edmund Husserl, Ideas, W. R. Boyce Gibson (tr.), (London: Allen and Unwin, 1931), 153. 
36 Husserl writes: “to the extent, however, that every-consciousness is ‘consciousness-of,’ the 
essential study of consciousness also includes that of consciousness-meaning and consciousness-
objectivity as such. To study any kind of objectivity whatever according to its general essence (a 
study that can pursue interests far removed from those of knowledge theory and the investigation 
of consciousness) means to concern oneself with objectivity’s modes of givenness and to exhaust 
its essential content with the process of ‘clarification’ proper to it.” (Edmund Husserl, 
Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, Quentin Lauer [tr.], [New York: Harper and Row, 
1965], 90-91). 
37 Dastur writes: “because, even if transcendental phenomenology remains dualistic in spite of 
Husserl's efforts toward monism, its purpose is not to assert dualism dogmatically, but rather to 
demonstrate, in line with the phenomenological way of thinking, that unity can only be given 
pretheoretically (vortheoretisch): the awakening of thought splits this unity irrevocably into 
pieces. That is why, for Husserl, dualism never ceases to be a problem — a problem which 
pointed to itself as the most thought deserving” (Françoise Dastur, “Husserl and the Problem of 
Dualism,”65-76, Analecta Husserliana XVI; Soul and Body in Husserlian Phenomenology, 
Anna-Teresa Tymienieka [ed.], [Dordrecht, Boston, and Lancaster: D. Reidel, 1983], 65). 
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Husserl's life there is an unthought-of element in his works which is wholly his and yet opens out 
on something else.”38 The existence of this unresolved something else to which consciousness 
opens toward fulfils the minimal condition of an unresolved species of dualism at work in 
Husserlian phenomenology. The fact that Deleuze explicitly suggests that his concept of cinema 
is bereft of dualism implies that it might have less in common with Husserlian phenomenology 
than one might expect.  
 
The Filmic Duration (of Memory and Change) 
Deleuze’s suggestion that temporality is afforded a direct presentation in film involves a 
Bergsonian concept of temporal duration that is comprehensive of the memorial past (of 
memory), the lived present, and the creation of the new. The concept of time presented in the 
Cinema texts is substantively different than that elaborated in other texts like The Logic of Sense 
— in which the putatively discrete temporal domains of past, present, and future are explicitly 
characterized as “readings” of the various types of (logical, ontological, axiological) relations 
that obtain among Aion and Chronos. Further, though Deleuze quite comfortably elaborates on 
the ontological primacy of a synthesis among discrete ontological entities as giving rise to a 
comprehensive time in Difference and Repetition, in the Cinema texts, this language of syntheses 
has fallen by the wayside, having been replaced by discussions of tensions among virtual and 
actual modes of being as they obtain in the lived present that is expressed in cinema. Though 
Deleuze had written on Bergson prior to the publication of Difference and Repetition (both 
 
38 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, R. C. McQeary (tr.), (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1964), 160. 
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“Bergson 1859-1941”39 and “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”40 are significant texts which 
hint at aspects of a robust concept of temporality), it isn’t until Bergsonism and the commentaries 
on Bergson in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 that Deleuze’s Bergsonian account of temporality enjoys 
thorough elaboration. In the Cinema texts, Deleuze modifies his prior concepts of temporality to 
offer an account of duration that involves an ontologically comprehensive nature and a radical 
capacity to modify existents. Deleuze suggests that we experience this sort of duration in the 
cinematic art form — which presents the viewing audience with a series of visible contractions 
among the photographically represented past and the present; a “well defined tension”41 among 
the living present and the memorial past that is expressed in filmic sequences, series, and 
framings of photographically represented events. What this implies about the nature of 
temporality and the nature of the cinematic expression of time is staggering, if for no other 
reason than that it involves: (1) a reconceptualization of temporality that establishes an identity 
relation — i.e., the identity enjoyed by the elements of a multiplicity — among putatively 
distinct temporal domains; (2) a diminishment of the claim that temporality is reducible to a 
succession relation of temporal moments — t1,t2…tn — ; (3) a suggestion that cinema can 
represent these.  
 
39 Gilles Deleuze, “Bergson, 1859-1941” Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953-1974, David 
Lapoujade (ed.), Michael Taormina (tr.), (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2002), 22-32.  
40 Gilles Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”, Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953-
1974, David Lapoujade (ed.), Michael Taormina (tr.), (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2002), 32-
52.  
41 Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind, Mabelle L. Andison (tr.), (New York: The Philosophical 
Library, 1946), 217; quoted Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam (tr.), (New York: Zone Books, 1981), 76.  
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Bergson seems never to tire of modifying his concept of duration. In a few remarkable 
pages in the second chapter of Time and Free Will,42 the concept (of duration) is variously 
characterized as a “multiplicity” of temporal moments, which (strangely) don’t enjoy any 
correlation with measurable points distributed in physical space — i.e., a multiplicity of “pure 
number”;43 the form assumed by the “succession of our conscious states” in moments of 
recollection;44 an intensive magnitude;45 a mercurial ontological process which seems to be like 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the flesh, in the narrow sense that it is primary to substance.46 In 
Matter and Memory47 the over-determined concept undergoes further revision. Here, duration is 
characterized as the continuous flow of mental-states through which psycho-social entities 
“insensibly” pass in the “really lived” experience of a continuity that strangely conditions 
experience, without revealing itself in its entirety; the dynamic “tension” that obtains among 
various putatively discrete mental states.48 This characterization in particular becomes slightly 
more fraught when taken in conjunction with Bergson’s careful observation that any supposed 
division among mental states is “artificial,” in the sense that these are comprehended as inter-
related aspects of a unified — non-divisible; non-reducible — lived experience.49 The situation 
doesn’t get much better when we come to Creative Evolution. Here, Bergson characterizes 
duration variously as the flow of unceasing change;50 a flux of putatively discrete mental states 
 
42 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, F.L 
Pogson (tr.), (Mineola: Dover, 2001). 
43 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will, 78; 89. 
44 Ibid.,100. 
45 Ibid., 106. 
46 Ibid., 111. 
47 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (tr.), (New 
York: Zone, 1991). 
48 Ibid., 186. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, 1-3. 
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merging into one another;51 the past (characterized as an oddly active and expanding process) 
which “gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.”52 Taken together, this dizzying 
array of sometimes competing definitions suggest an over-determined concept that threatens to 
lose any sense of unity.  
The plurality of aspects associated with the concept of duration seems to have led to 
some confusion about the nature of the concept. Rebecca Hill starkly observes that Bergson’s 
duration may be identified as a dualistic relation that obtains among tendencies (i.e., proto-
entities, transcendental conditions, disparate forces, poorly identified urges, etc. that are involved 
in multiple processes of transformation).53 Hill seems to undermine her initial identification 
when she suggests that these tendencies are sexed, in the sense that they are inherently 
expressive of masculine or feminine characteristics.54 Though it is the case that Bergson 
explicitly characterizes durations as involving pre-individuated tendencies (as opposed to clearly 
defined quantifiable states), it seems odd to identify any particular sexedness — which would be 
an individuated trait — as an attribute of these. Bergson explicitly notes that the complex 
concept of duration tends to resist identification as a metaphysical simple (i.e., a state, and entity, 
something reducible to one aspect) in numerous places. Perhaps the clearest identification of the 
involvement of tendencies and duration is found in Creative Evolution, in a remarkable passage 
where Bergson characterizes duration as a complex relation of pre-individuated tendencies.55 
Deleuze suggests that tendency and duration enjoy an ontological identity, in the sense that both 
 
51 Ibid., 3. 
52 Ibid. 4. 
53 Rebecca Hill, The Interval: Relation and Becoming in Irigary, Aristotle, and Bergson, (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 92. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, 12-13. 
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involve pure difference: “Duration or tendency is the difference of self with itself; and what 
differs from itself is, in an unmediated way, the unity of substance and subject.56 In a lecture on 
Leibniz, Deleuze further identifies duration as a process of differentiation that bears a striking 
conceptual similarity with conatus, in the sense that these involve ontogenetic forces.57 These 
two observations — that duration is similar to a tendency and that duration is akin to a pre-
individuated force (i.e., conatus) — are sufficient to demonstrate a confusion involved in the 
suggestion that duration involves individuated traits. Hill attempts to support her argument by 
pointing to a “hierarchical sexuation” implicit in Bergson’s use of metaphor in elaborating on the 
nature of duration. This is unfortunate for at least two reasons. Hill does very little to clarify 
what a “sexuated” hierarchy would look like. Confronted with such a linguistic monstrosity, in 
the absence of any clear definiens, one is just as apt to produce an accurate identification of 
Bergsonian duration, as one is to conjure a profound ontological confusion. It might also be 
observed that a dualistic relation among any of existents or tendencies would tend to be 
expressed as parallelism — i.e., an ontological relation ill-fitting the sort of formation implied by 
reference to any sort of hierarchy, regardless of the identity of its relata. Perhaps it should also 
 
56 Gilles Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” 32-52, Desert Islands and Other Texts, 
1953-1974, Michael Taormina [tr.], David Lapoujade [ed.], [South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 
2002], 38. 
57 Deleuze observes: “In other words, if I want to speak in more scholarly terms, mathematical or 
physical terms borrowed from Leibniz’s terminology, movement in the process of occurring 
implies a differential, a differential of movement. The unity of movement in the process of 
occurring is, in the first place, the differential of movement, that is, the difference between the 
movement that has just occurred and the one that’s occurring, or between the one that is 
occurring and the one that is going to occur. We can call this differential effort (or urge); in 
Latin, we will call it conatus, that is, effort, or urge, or admit that Bergson is not far off when he 
calls it tendency.” (Gilles Deleuze, “Lecture 16, 5 May 1987: The Theory of Substance in 
Aristotle, Descartes and Leibniz” Charles J. Stivale [tr.], 
https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/leibniz-and-baroque/lecture-16 [Date Accessed: 6 
September 2020]).  
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be observed that Bergson tends to characterize duration in non-hierarchical terms — i.e., as a 
qualitative multiplicity; an ontological process akin to an organic unity; a psychological “flux” 
— all of which tend to be analytically, logically, and ontologically discrete to the type of 
arrangement associated with any form of hierarchy. 
Arguing from more stable conceptual ground, Jean Hyppolite suggests that Bergsonian 
duration is identical to memory, in the sense that it involves an inter-relation of non-discrete 
moments that are temporally prior to the present.58 Leonard Lawlor echoes this view, when he 
summarily characterizes Bergson’s concept of duration as akin to memory, albeit in senses that 
involve subtle modifications of all of its nature, the objects of recollection, and purposiveness 
implied by various acts of recollecting.59 Indeed, Bergson — in Creative Evolution — explicitly 
identifies memory and duration when he observes that “duration is the continuous progress of the 
past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.”60 Bergson’s choices of 
metaphor and verb tense suggest a conceptualization of memory as a process that is substantively 
different from the concept of memory as a mental repository of prior experience — i.e., a “mind 
palace,” a mental labyrinth that is accessed through the repetition of a mnemonic device (the 
calming rhythms of “the thread of a tune” that guides one to a “shelter” which contains the 
memories of their childhood)61 — that is typically used in filmic attempts to visualize memory. 
 
58 Hyppolite observes: “This [Bergsonian] duration — which is pure succession, the extension of 
the past into the present, and therefore already memory — is not a series of distinct terms outside 
of one another, nor a coexistence of past with present.” (Jean Hyppolite, “Various Aspects of 
Memory in Bergson”, Athena V. Colman [tr.], Appendix II in The Challenge of Bergson: 
Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics, pp., 112-127, [London and New York: Continuum, 1993], 
112). 
59 Leonard Lawlor, The Challenge of Bergson, 80. 
60 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, Arthur Mitchell (tr.), (Mineola: Dover, 1998), 4. 
61 Gilles Deleuze and Fèlix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Brian 
Massumi (tr.), (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 310. 
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(This concept of memory as a repository has been referenced so often that it has become a filmic 
trope. Recent filmic examples include: the “mental map” used by Sherlock Holmes in the 
television episode The Hounds of Baskerville;62 the mesmerizing sequence of Ridley Scott’s 
Blade Runner, in which Deckard uses the sepia-coloured photographs on his piano to unlock the 
memories of his childhood — memories which resist washing away into to the oblivion “like 
tears in the rain”;63 the hellish industrial furnace where K retreats to the memories of childhood 
in Denis Villeneuve’s Blade Runner 2049).64 The primary difference among Bergson’s concept 
of duration and the type of memory illustrated in these filmic representations is that though 
memory palaces tend to be illustrated as domains of relative stasis, duration is dynamic. In 
Matter and Memory, Bergson elucidates on memory’s activity of “gnawing” into the future 
through reference to the mental activity of “recording” occurrences in the temporal present, for 
the purpose of forming habits (which might become involved in shaping a psycho-social entity’s 
behaviours at a future moment).65 The dynamic aspect of memory is further illustrated by 
Bergson’s careful observation that habit (i.e., all of what is remembered; the constantly 
expanding content of memory) participates in the formation of moral obligation.66 Bergson 
further elaborates on the aims of memory (i.e., its functional goal or end) when he notes that each 
of the moments of our lives, “is a kind of creation.”67 When taken in conjunction with the 
stipulation that each temporal moment of existence involves both the content of memory and the 
ongoing organization of this content, Bergson’s observation yields the implication that memory 
 
62 Paul McGuigan (dir.), The Hounds of Baskerville, BBC: 8 January 2012. 
63 Ridley Scott (dir.), Blade Runner, (The Ladd Company: 1992). 
64 Denis Villeneuve (dir.), Blade Runner 2049, (Columbia Pictures: 2017). 
65 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 83. 
66 Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, R. Ashley Audra, Cloudesley Brereton, 
W. Horsfall Carter (tr.), (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1935), 29. 
67 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, 7. 
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is involved in the dynamic creation of the utterly unique. No longer identified as merely the 
repository of now past, slowly fading moments, Bergson suggests that memory is identical to 
duration, in the sense that all of its nature, processes, and purpose are involved with the creation 
of something without ontological correlate or precedent.  
Deleuze clarifies the role of duration in the production of difference with his elucidation 
of Bergson’s “third thesis” (of movement and change) in Cinema 1. Though there is no explicit 
mention of the identity relation among duration and memory in these densely argued passages, 
one might forgive this apparent oversight, if for no other reason than the identity of these had 
already been stipulated in Bergsonism.68 Deleuze formulates Bergson’s third thesis as the 
complex claim that suggests, “not only is the instant an immobile section of movement, but 
movement is a mobile section of duration, that is of the Whole, or of a whole.”69 Bergson 
explicitly notes —in Creative Evolution — that a movement of entities in space involves a 
transformation of that space.70 Bergson’s complex ontological argument involves: (1) the 
stipulation of a distinction among the processes of transformation and translation; (2) positing an 
uncontentious distinction in kind — i.e., a categorical distinction — among qualities and 
quantities; (3) the observation that the process of translation involves quantitative change — i.e., 
it is a translation of quantitative values; (4) the inference that transformation involves 
 
68 Here Deleuze observes: “Pure duration offers us a succession that is purely internal, without 
exteriority; space, an exteriority, without succession (in effect, that is the memory of the past; the 
recollection of what has happened in space would already imply a mind that endures).” (Gilles 
Deleuze, Bergsonism, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam [tr.], [New York: Zone, 1991], 
37). 
69 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(trs.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 8. 
70 Bergson writes: “The wholly superficial displacements of masses and molecules studied in 
physics and chemistry would become by relation to that inner vital movement (which is 
transformation and not translation) what the position of a moving of a moving object is the 
movement of that object in space).” (Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, 37). 
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modification of particular qualities; (5) the observation of the corollary that movements in space 
involve qualitative changes, and finally; (6) the assertion that a transformation of a particular 
quality implies a qualitative change to the generality that comprehends the particular. Taken 
together, these yield the profound claim that the displacement of spatio-temporally extended 
entities implies a fundamental change to the nature of space itself. In this sense, the domain (or 
medium) that comprehends movements of particulars is revealed to be ontologically correlated 
with a modification of the qualities of any particular. These are the sorts of ontological 
transformations that have been illustrated to such terrifying effect in both horror literature and 
film. Robert Wise’s The Haunting71 — which is an adaptation of Shirley Jackson’s The Haunting 
of Hill House72 — chronicles the anguish of Eleanora as she resides in a gothic mansion that 
alters all of its physical dimensions, lighting, and interior temperature in response to her 
memories of childhood trauma. A similar sort of physical change to space brought about by 
qualitative change is also illustrated in the fiery end of the Overlook Hotel in Steven King’s 
novel,73 though the hotel remains standing at the end Stanley Kubrick’s The Shining74 — a film 
that is vastly superior to King’s derivative novel, because it explicitly correlates the physical 
changes of the hotel to the mental states of Jack, Wendy, and Danny, as well as the memorial 
history of the Colorado Rocky Mountains, i.e., the qualitative elements of various domains. 
Thomas Allen Nelson elaborates on how, in Kubrick’s film, changes to the hotel’s spatiality are 
directly correlated with — i.e., responses to, expressions of, doublings of — characters’ internal 
 
71 Robert Wise (dir.), The Haunting, (Argyle Enterprises, 1963). 
72 Shirley Jackson, The Haunting of Hill House, (New York: Penguin, 1959). 
73 Steven King, The Shining, (New York: Doubleday, 1977). 
74 Stanley Kubrick (dir.), The Shining, (The Producer Circle Company: 1980). 
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states.75 One cannot help but think of spatio-temporal discontinuities evident in some of the 
film’s most memorable scenes: the elevator of blood that erupts when Jack, Wendy, or Danny 
feel rage or terror; the appearance of the bloated corpse of a nude crone that greets Jack’s 
aberrant sexual desires in room 237; the ominous appearance of an ancient scrap book next to 
Jack’s typewriter as he struggles to recall the plot of his horribly repetitive manuscript; the 
disquieting appearance of the twin girls (the Grady twins) who promise to play with a Danny 
“forever and ever”; the shifting patterns on both the hallway carpet and the Native American 
murals in the Colorado Lounge; the population and de-population of the Gold Room; the 
alteration in lighting of the hotel bar when Jack gets a glass of bourbon; the shifting spatial 
dimensions of the hedge maze; the strange appearance of a room full of skeletons as Wendy is 
confronted with the memories of Jack’s abuse to her and Danny; the deeply disturbing 
appearance of an entity dressed as a bear performing fellatio on a man in 1920’s formal attire as 
Wendy witnesses a temporally prior event in the hotel (the 1921 New Year’s Eve party). All of 
these spatio-temporal modifications (modifications to the hotel and its surrounding area) are 
reflective of qualitative variations of various character’s mental states. Each of these expresses a 
spatio-temporal translation of particulars (a quantitative translation). All involve a fundamental 
qualitative transformation of the whole. These moments of horror have been adduced to aptly 
illustrate the ontological modification suggested by Bergson’s third thesis on the nature of space 
in relation to qualitative alteration.  
Deleuze suggests that filmic duration does something more profound than merely 
presenting photographic examples of differentiation through photographic and aural means. In 
 
75 Thomas Allen Nelson, Kubrick: Inside A Film Artist’s Maze, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2000), 202-208). 
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“Bergson’s Conception of Difference,” Deleuze explicitly identifies duration as the internally 
differentiated process that involves the capacity to “englobe” (i.e., ontologically comprehend) 
ontologically distinct entities.76 This suggests that the particular filmic species of duration has the 
capacity to comprehend modifications within entities which are ontologically discrete from 
filmed persons, settings, and other photographically represented states of affairs. The implication 
here is that filmic duration involves the capacity to affect — qualitatively modify — the 
audience. Roland Barthes echoes this suggestion when he observes that some films involve 
qualitative modifications that will “bruise” the viewer. The claim is that some images, as well as 
sequences of images (due to their preternatural powers to foment change) will modify the bodily 
experience of those who behold their spectacle — this is more than the work of a mere 
example.77  
Cinema’s seemingly magical capacities to modify the physical states of those that behold 
its spectacle hint at a complex analogy between duration and Walter Benjamin’s concept of an 
aura. Rodowick observes that Benjamin’s historical reflections on the development of 
photographic art suggests a similarity among what Benjamin characterizes as the photographic 
aura and the filmic duration.78 Though Miriam Bratu Hansen cautiously observes that 
Benjamin’s identification of the concept of aura is notoriously difficult to isolate, in the sense 
that Benjamin seems to subtly modify the term throughout his “Little History of Photography,” 
 
76 Gilles Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”, 39. 
77 Barthes characterizes this capacity as the punctum of an image. Barthes elaborates: “it is this 
element which rises from the scene, shoots out of It like an arrow, and pierces me. A Latin word 
exists to designate this wound, this prick; this mark made by a pointed instrument…punctum; for 
punctum is also: sting, speck, cut, little hole — and also a cast of the dice. A photograph’s 
punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me).” (Roland 
Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, Richard Howard [tr.], [New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1981], 26-27). 
78 D.N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 8. 
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On Hashish, and the Arcades Project, one might observe that the concept seems to involve two 
discrete aspects. The strength of the analogy among duration and aura is demonstrated by shared 
aspects.79 Benjamin’s first elucidation of the nature of an aura is the consequent of his 
experimentations with hashish (on 5 March 1930). Here, Benjamin cautiously observes that 
though it is distinct in kind from the “spruced-up magical rays” that populate the fantastic visions 
of spiritualists, a “genuine aura” enjoys a similarity with “an ornamental halo [Umzirkung], in 
which the object or being is enclosed.”80 The suggestion here is that an aura is a sort of energy 
field that has the capacity to comprehend existents. The ontologically comprehensive nature of 
an aura is akin to duration’s capacity to “englobe” entities. In this sense, comprehensiveness is 
an aspect that is common to Bergsonian duration and Benjamin’s concept of an aura. Elaborating 
on the sublime nature of Eugène Atget’s surrealist photographs of Paris, Benjamin explicitly 
characterizes their aura as involving a “strange weave of space and time: the unique appearance 
or semblance of distance, no matter how close it may be.”81 Here, one may identify a parallel 
aspect in duration’s involvement with memory’s ability to qualitatively modify spatio-temporally 
extended existents and the nature of their circumstances — i.e., all of psycho-social entities and 
their circumstances; the content of the lived experience of humans and their environment, 
however broadly construed. Remarking on the sort of auras that accompany represented 
 
79 Hansen highlights the fraught nature of a hermeneutic investigation of the nature of 
Benjamin’s concept, when she observes: “Anything but a clearly delimited, stable concept, aura 
describes a cluster of meanings and relations that appear in Benjamin’s writings in various 
configurations and not always under its own name; it is this conceptual fluidity that allows aura 
to become such a productive nodal point in Benjamin’s thinking.” (Miriam Bratu Hansen, 
“Benjamin’s Aura”, Critical Inquiry 34, [Winter: 2008], pp. 336-375, 339.) 
80 Walter Benjamin, “Protocols of Drug Experiments (1-12)”, On Hashish, Howard Eiland (tr.), 
(Cambridge and London: Belknap, 2006), 58. 
81 Walter Benjamin, “Little History of Photography”, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings 2, 
1931-1934, Rodney Livingstone (tr.), Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, Gary Smith (eds.), 
(Cambridge and London: Belknap Press, 2005), 518. 
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photographic objectivities, Benjamin suggests that photographic auras have the capacity to 
involve themselves in an intentional relation with the memories of those who behold them — 
i.e., to “look back” into the minds and prior lived experiences of those who get transfixed by 
their unblinking gaze.82 This observation echoes the suggestion that duration modifies the 
qualitative aspects of the thought content of people who participate in cinematic duration 
(through the concrete act of viewing a film).  
 
Nascent Forms of Time’s Direct Expression 
Deleuze — in some of the most beautiful passages of Cinema 2 — suggests that filmic art 
enjoys the power to modify the qualitative experience of viewers, because it has the capacity to 
present direct images of time. Perhaps the most enigmatic of the concepts Deleuze develops in 
the Cinema texts, the direct time-image is as mercurial as it is essential to understanding the 
complex nature of temporality in film. Deleuze starkly identifies the direct time-image as 
presenting a “little time in its pure state,”83 only to clarify that this pure state is “the unchanging 
form in which the change is produced.”84 The suggestion here is that time is the general form of 
variation that comprehends and is expressed in any particular change. Deleuze further observes 
 
82 Benjamin elaborates on the disquieting experience one might have when viewing the haunting 
gazes of subjects in Daguerreotype images of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries — 
i.e., the sorts of images that would have most certainly been familiar to Bergson when he was 
conceptualizing the nature of duration and the effect of the “cinematographic illusion.” Benjamin 
writes:” Experience of the aura thus arises from the fact that a response characteristic of human 
relationships is transposed to the relationship between humans and inanimate or natural objects. 
The person we look at, or who feels he is being looked at, looks at us in turn. To experience the 
aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the ability to look back at us.” (Walter 
Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings 4, 1938-1940, 
Rodney Livingstone (tr.), Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, Gary Smith (eds.), (Cambridge 
and London: Belknap Press, 2006), 338.  




that this form of time is a nascent aspect of filmic motion pictures that has only recently enjoyed 
a greater tendency to filmic realization with the advancement of cinematic art. Deleuze observes 
that direct time-images involves a “Proustian dimension where people and things occupy a place 
in time which is incommensurable with the one they have in space.”85 The claim here seems to 
be that the direct time-image involves aspects of memory, in various senses of the term (i.e., the 
psychological memories of individuated psycho-social existents, as well as the non-individuated 
— ontological — memory that comprehends the entirety of the past of all existents). Deleuze 
illustrates the development of this peculiar concept of time through reference to Robbe-Grillet’s 
critical remarks about the role of mimesis in artistic representation, as well as the natures of the 
(oddly named) pure optical and sound situations.  
One might observe that the concept of a direct presentation of anything in film seems 
flummoxing, if for no other reason than that the entities of a film are explicitly visually 
accessible entities presented as elements of a filmic universe. It might further be observed that 
the entirety of the filmic universe (i.e., all its constituent elements) are represented by 
photographic means in service of director’s purposes (which usually amounts to presenting a 
narrative, but may also involve explorations of the artistic possibilities afforded cinema as an 
artistic medium).86 One could suggest that cinematically represented objects seem to be 
distinguishable from objects which enjoy direct presentations. It would seem that recognition of 
the validity of either a metaphysical distinction between original and copy, or an aesthetic 
 
85 Ibid., 37. 
86 Avant-garde films tend to be at the vanguard of these explorations of the possibilities of filmic 
representation. Though rarely enjoying critical or commercial success these films — which are 
often rich in symbolic meaning and dream sequences which confound the passive viewer — truly 
show the way for future cinematic artists. Maya Deren’s and Alexander Hammid’s Meshes in the 




distinction between object and its representation (by artistic means) would suffice to adduce a 
critique of the notion that anything is presented directly in filmic art. These would be perhaps 
even more substantive when they involve something that has non-physical aspects — i.e., any of 
a species of relation; “ideal” entity; spiritual existent; a process involving non-physical entities; a 
continuum of abstract terms or relations; in short, many of the sorts of existents we tend to 
associate or identify with temporality. One could wonder how the immaterial form of time, or 
any of its (also immaterial) constituent elements could enjoy direct presentation by cinema. 
Deleuze addresses these concerns through reference to Robbe-Grillet’s theory of artistic 
description. The solution here is complex, in the sense that Deleuze invites the reader to have 
more than a passing understanding of all of Plato’s and Aristotle’s aesthetics — because a hybrid 
of these functions as the unspecified target of Robbe-Grillet’s critique — as well as the 
mathematics involved with architectural singularities (which Robbe-Grillet references, but 
neglects to develop).87 Deleuze marshals these to suggest that temporality enjoys direct 
presentation in film as a type of intrinsic singularity that expresses a sort of variation that is non-
mimetic. Deleuze stipulates that there is a difference in kind among representations and 
expressions, in the sense that each is a different kind of aspect of cinematic art. Perhaps one of 
the most magical qualities of cinema is that it has the capacity to represent entities and processes 
that enjoy existence in a mode of reality external to that of the filmic universe, as well as the 
ability to express entities and processes wholly intrinsic to its mode of presentation (i.e., 
existents that enjoy no correlation with anything outside the film; a spectacle that is entirely new, 
in the sense that it does not represent anything in the real world). Though each may be an aspect 
of the same entity, this does not imply that either is reducible to the other. Time enjoys direct 
 
87 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 44-5. 
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presentation in film, because film expresses a change relative to the states of affairs in the film. 
In Time and Description in Fiction Today, Robbe-Grillet elucidates an account of descriptions 
that diminishes the Ancients’ suggestion that art tends to be mimetic (i.e., reducible to the 
representation of objects, objectivities, or processes). Robbe-Grillet cautiously observes that 
though it might have been the case that filmic and literary narratives seem to involve duplication 
(producing a copy or representation) of the real world, in contemporary films and literature the 
mimetic function seems to only enjoy a diminished role, in the sense that it has been supplanted 
by a creative function.88 One might balk at this suggestion, with the observation that mimesis has 
been taken to be a crucial aspect of art since Plato’s observation — in Republic, book X — that it 
is the artist’s job to produce “multicolored imitations” of various tangible and intangible aspects 
of reality.89 It might further be noted that Plato’s entire condemnation of bad artists pre-supposes 
the validity of the metaphysical claim that there exists a true reality (which good art putatively 
represents).90 Robbe-Grillet modifies this characterization of the function of art by radicalizing 
 
88 Robbe-Grillet writes: “Description once served to situate the chief contours of a setting, then 
to cast light on some of its particularly revealing elements; it no longer mentions anything except 
insignificant objects, or objects which it is concerned to make so. It once claimed to reproduce a 
pre-existing reality; it now asserts its creative function.” (Alain Robbe-Grillet, “Time and 
Description in Fiction Today”, For a New Novel: Essays in Fiction (Richard Howard [tr.], [New 
York: Grove Press, 1965]. 
89 Plato, Republic, 604e-605a, G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeve (tr.), Plato: Complete Works, 
John. M. Cooper (ed.), (Hackett: Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1997), 1209. 
90 It would be difficult to overstate either the longevity or importance of Plato’s identification of 
art as mimetic. Charles Sanders Peirce offers only a slight modification of Plato’s suggestion 
with his observation that visual art tends to represent “iconic signs” of the real (Charles S. Peirce, 
1982, The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition 2, M. Fisch, C. Kloesel, E. 
Moore, N. Houser [ed.], [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982], 53-54). John Hyman 
develops the epistemological aspects of Plato’s claim by insisting that one can only understand 
the truth of a painting — i.e., understand its sense —through reference to the immaterial or 
material objects that it represents. (John Hyman, “Realism”, A Companion to Aesthetics, 
(Stephen Davies, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Robert Hopkins, Robert Stecker, and David E. 
Cooper [ed.], [Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009], 495–498). This is not to say that that Robbe-
Grillet is a voice alone in the wilderness. Echoing John Rushkin, E.H. Gombrich observes that 
 
147 
the artist’s creative capacities. Though it must be noted that theories of imitation do involve 
aspects of artistic creation, in the sense that they tend to identify the artist as creating an adequate 
description of a reality that is extrinsic to the work of art’s reality, this is characterized as a 
secondary, dependent process. Robbe-Gillet radicalizes this creativity, when he suggests that the 
work of art is akin to an architectural “point” of invention (i.e., a singular point, a singularity, a 
point of inflection).91 Bernard Cache carefully observes that architecture involves two 
analytically discrete kinds of singularities, extrinsic singularities and “points of inflection” (or 
intrinsic singularities). An extrinsic singularity is a hypothetical point with which the tangent of 
the physical curve, were it conceived as an ideal curve, would be perpendicular (it is the point of 
a hypothetical y-axis which is involved in the specification of one part of the curve’s 
coordinates). An intrinsic singularity is identified as a point along the curve that “designates a 
pure event of curvature.”92 Intrinsic singularities are actualized (or at least illustrated) by the 
ogives that are so often instantiated in the architecture of medieval European churches. 
Architectural works, it might also be observed, are a particular species of the general class of 
artwork. Here, it seems that Robbe-Grillet is stipulating that the property of a particular — in this 
case, the property of having intrinsic singularities as elements of the particular’s formal 
ontological content — may be generalized as the property of a class. Given that the property of a 
class may gain expression in any particular species or member that is comprehended by the class, 
 
visual art tends to involve a creation of the “innocence of the eye” (E.H. Gombrich, Art and 
Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, London: Phaidon, 1960], 296) 
One implication of Gombrich’s suggestion is that such innocence might not pre-exist the 
viewer’s participation with the work of art. This further suggests art is non-mimetic, in the sense 
that it cannot resemble (or copy) that which does not exist. 
91 Alain Robbe-Grillet, For a New Novel: Essays in Fiction, 148.  
92 Bernard Cache, Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories, Anne Boyman (tr.), Michael 
Sparks (ed.), (USA: MIT, 1995), 16.  
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this yields the substantive observation that films and novels (because they are also works of art) 
involve intrinsic singularities. Robbe-Grillet further observes that intrinsic singularities tend to 
gain artistic expression as diegetic moments of radical upheaval, profound correction, or 
bifurcation into non-compossible series of events. Robbe-Grillet explicitly notes that his 
conceptualization of artistic description is distinct from the mimetic relation through direct 
reference to temporality, when he observes that the types of temporal changes expressed in films 
need not correlate with the temporality evidenced by the quantitative measurement of physical 
(as opposed to artistically presented) clocks and calendars.93  
It should be observed that Robbe-Grillet’s suggestion implies a subtle reformulation of 
Aristotle’s observation that art tends to involve moments of great dramatic reversal. In Poetics, 
Aristotle suggests that lyric poems tend to represent reality adequately, in the sense that they 
involve περιπέτεια (reversals). Robbe-Grillet seems to suggest that these moments of great 
reversal in the lives, fates, and fortunes of the characters evidence a rupture from the mimetic 
order, in the sense that none of these needs to be representative of any circumstance in the world. 
These profound shifts involve an element of temporality, in the senses that they occur within 
time, evidence a temporal duration, and express a moment in temporal continuum. This suggests 
that a direct expression of time involves illustration of these sorts of changes, characterized as 
any of the properties (or attributes) of the relation that obtains among entities in the artwork; thus 
it is discrete from the sorts of modification that obtain as a property of the mimetic relation that 
might or might not obtain between these and entities in the physical world; stated again, the 
direct expression of temporally saturated change is immanent to the relation among fictive 
relata, which is different in kind and content from the sort of changes that are involved (as 
 
93 Ibid. 151. 
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attributes, immanent conditions, or emergent properties) in the relation that obtains among 
artistically presented objects and their correlates in the universe populated by physical entities 
and psycho-social entities with physical attributes. 
Deleuze observes that analogous disjunctions may be found in pure optical and acoustic 
situations, which are constituted by “opsigns” and “sonsigns.” In Cinema 1, Deleuze carefully 
observes that these situations (and their correlated signs) are filmic precursors to the direct 
presentation of time.94 Properly speaking, each of opsigns and sonsigns are indicative of a 
breakdown of the sensory motor order (i.e., the sequence of shots, montage) that tends to be 
identified with realist cinema. Each of these discrete types of sign — though they may be, and 
often are present in the same shot, sequence, or film — indicates a disjunction among any of the 
photographically expressed entities relative to one another, as well as any of the narrative, 
implied character arc, or thematic content attributed to a film or its aspects. In these senses, 
opsigns and sonsigns are intrinsic singularities that stand apart from (i.e., enjoy a disjunctive 
relation with) other aspects of the film.95 Deleuze elucidates the natures of these peculiar 
 
94 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 210.  
95 Deleuze continually modifies his concept of singularity. It seems each of the books following 
The Logic of Sense — in which Deleuze first uses the term — witnesses a further evolution to 
nuanced nature of singularities. Though Manuel DeLanda suggests that singularities may be 
characterized as “spaciotemporal dynamisms” and “passive selves,” these attempts at definition 
seem inadequate, in the senses of both these are profoundly opaque, and perhaps even involve 
definitional aspects that would confound any assertion of identity (Manuel DeLanda, Intensive 
Science and Virtual Philosophy, [London and New York: Continuum, 2002], 206-207). Steven 
Shaviro observes that Deleuze tends to identify singularities as “acategorical” entities, in the 
sense “that they cannot be categorized in any terms broader than their own…they cannot be 
fitted into a hierarchy of species and genera, of the particular and the general: just as they cannot 
be derived as instances of any larger, more overarching and predetermining structure” (Steven 
Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics, [USA: MIT Press, 2012], 
89, n.11). Daniel W. Smith traces Deleuze’s concept of singularities to a modification of Albert 
Lautman’s suggestion — in Essay on the Notions of Structure and Existence in Mathematics — 
that points on a geometric curve may be distinguished from one another in terms of whether or 
not they are involved in a change of direction in the curve: ordinary points do not radically alter 
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moments of filmic upheaval when he observes that these sorts of purely optical and acoustic 
situations force any of the characters or spectators of the film to encounter “something 
intolerable and unbearable…a matter of something too powerful, or too unjust, but sometimes 
also too beautiful , and which henceforth outstrips our sensory-motor capacities.”96 Deleuze 
further observes that a character immersed in such situations behaves as though they don’t know 
how to respond to their circumstance, as though they are wandering through a terrain that — for 
whatever reason or confluence of causes — has diminished their capacities to navigate its 
labyrinthine contours.97 Though Deleuze suggests opsigns and sonsigns emerged with striking 
prominence in Italian Neo-realist films, it would be a mistake to associate them only with the 
films of a particular historical period. These signs are evident in films from as diverse a set of 
 
the direction of the curve; singular points (or singularities) are moments on the curve at which 
the trajectory of the trajectory of the curve alters. (Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze, 
[Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012], 302). Smith further observes that Deleuze 
generalizes the variability implied in Lautman’s strictly mathematical definition, to suggest 
qualitative and affective components. It should be noted that not all of these need be temporal, in 
the sense that some have suggested that mathematical entities enjoy a-temporal existence. Taken 
together, these suggest that a singularity may by rigorously characterized as any of a temporal or 
non-temporal moment of variation or difference (i.e., change). It is conceivable that such 
moments could be visually or aurally represented in film. This is plainly the case in films 
involving profound crisis, if it is granted that these are not —and perhaps never aspired to be — 
copies, imitations, or duplications of a world marked by the striking appearance of continuity, 
banality, putative normalcy; all of which might be characteristics of a circumstance bereft of 
profound variation. It might be further observed that all of these apparent traits of normalcy 
could obtain as representations in film — the typical, even quotidian has often been the subject 
matter of some of the more fascinating films of the last hundred years of cinema; e.g., the films 
of Antonioni, but this would not negate (or otherwise diminish) the possibility of singularities 
being present in these, as long as one acknowledges that the seemingly banal may involve 
understated crises, which are — for all their subtlety — just as profound as those expressed in 
the most bombastic Hollywood blockbuster. 
96 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 18.  
97 Deleuze elaborates: “These are pure optical and sound situations. In which the character does 
not know how to respond, abandoned spaces, in which he ceases to experience and act so that he 
enters into flight, goes on a trip, comes and goes, vaguely indifferent to what happens to him, 
undecided as to what must be done.” (Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The-Time Image, 272). 
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directors as Roberto Rossellini, Michelangelo Antonioni, Andrei Tarkovsky, and Wim Wenders. 
To think of a clear expression of a purely optical and acoustic situation, one need only recall any 
of: the profound alienation (from all her dead son, her overly judgmental mother, her utterly 
oblivious husband, and the seductive charms of socio-economic privilege) evidenced on Ingrid 
Bergman’s face as she wanders through monolithic factory in Europe ’51;98 Harry Dean 
Stanton’s desperate wandering through the nameless — and seemingly limitless — desert during 
the mesmerizing opening sequence of Paris, Texas;99 the strange industrial wasteland 
surrounding of the petrol-chemical plant, which causes an existential crisis for Monica Viti’s 
character in Red Desert;100 Alexander Kaidanovsky’s wandering though the strange wasteland 
after an accidental alien visitation illustrated in Tarkovsky’s masterpiece.101 Taken together, 
these filmic expressions illustrate something more significant than the mere psychological or 
physical displacement of a character; the travails of each can be adduced as evidence of a 
comprehensive alienation. It is a profound indeterminacy that is reflected in these cinematic 
moments of profound upheaval. Here, the claim is that the pure optical and sound situation 
presents a filmic representation of the crisis of indeterminacy; its purity is a perfection of a world 
without answer — a perpetual vagueness without temporal cessation; a comprehensive lostness 
in which characters are separated from the world of which they are putative inhabitants.  
 
A Direct Presentation of Temporality: Crystals of Time 
 
98 Roberto Rossellini (dir.), Europe ‘51, (Roberto Rossellini, Carlo Ponti, Dino De Laurentiis, 
1952). 
99 Wim Wenders (dir.), Paris, Texas, (Road Movies, Filmproduktion GmbH, Argos Films S.A, 
1984). 
100 Michelangelo Antonioni (dir.), Red Desert, (Rizolli,1964). 
101 Andrei Tarkovsky (dir.), Stalker, (Mosfilm, 1979). 
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If the pure optical and acoustic situations presented in film offer a disquieting glimpse 
into the nature of time characterized as a singularity — a moment of change — then film’s 
various hyalosigns (a linguistic play on the Attic Greek ὕαλος) further develop the claim that 
time’s direct expression in film amounts to a direct expression of variation. Deleuze carefully 
elaborates time’s direct expression through identification of the natures of time and its relation to 
filmic expressions of change through reference to filmic “crystal-images.” It is perhaps important 
to note that crystal-images are unities of analytically discrete processes. The ontological 
implication here is that the time crystal (which is a representation of the nature of time itself) is 
constituted by a series of mutually implicated processes: (1) the continual exchange among the 
couple of the virtual and actual; (2) the relation among “the limpid and the opaque,”102 and; (3) 
the generative relation of “seed and the environment.”103 Deleuze further identifies a close 
conceptual proximity among the exchange of virtual and actual, and the relation of limpid and 
opaque, in the sense that the terms seem to enjoy transposability: virtuality is akin to opacity; 
that which is actual (in film) tends to enjoy visibility.104 It will be further observed that these 
imply a diminishment of relevance of temporal succession to the nature of time. The third 
process — involving seed and environment — suggests a temporal continuum of ceaseless 
variation. Each invites elucidation.  
Deleuze elaborates on the nature of each of these processes through reference to Bergson 
and Proust. The suggestions that film has the capacity to express time directly is hinted at in 
Matter and Memory and “Memory of the Present and False Recognition.”105 Bergson — in 
 
102 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 71. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Henri Bergson, “Memory of the Present and False Recognition” H. Wildon Carr (tr.), Mind-
Energy, Lectures and Essays (London: Forgotten Books, 2012), 134-185. 
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Matter and Memory — explicitly characterizes the act of recollection as akin to the mechanism 
of a camera focusing on a vaguely determined intentional object.106 The metaphoric allusion to 
filmic (or perhaps, theatrical) art is continued with Bergson’s observation that the process of 
recollection tends to yield the psychological sensation of neurotic depersonalization — i.e., the 
disquieting feeling that one is standing apart from oneself; a participant in the life of another; as 
though they were merely an actor, a sentient simulacra reciting the lines and performing the 
actions associated with someone else's lived experience.107 Bergson further alludes to a relation 
among film and the virtual when he observes that the recollected past appears to consciousness 
as the changing image reflected in “a moving-mirror.”108 In addition, Bergson observes that the 
recollected content of the past gradually appears to one as the ill-defined content of dream-states, 
deliriums, and hallucinations — i.e., as though “they were phantoms superadded to solid 
perceptions and conceptions of our waking life, will-o-wisps which hover above it.”109 Perhaps it 
is worth observing that the visual image of mirrors as well as the content of their optical 
reflections have been used throughout the history of cinema to fulfil the diegetic function of 
revealing something essential about the nature of particular characters. In some of the most 
 
106 Bergson writes: “Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some period of 
our history, we become conscious of an act sui generis by which we detach ourselves from the 
present in order to replace ourselves, first, in the past — a work of adjustment, something like 
the framing of a camera.” (Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 133-134).  
107 Bergson writes: “The more he analyses his experience, the more he will split into two 
personages, one of which moves about on the stage while the other sits and looks. On the one 
hand, he knows that he continues to be what he was, a self who thinks and acts comfortably to 
what the situation requires, a self-inserted into real life, and adapting itself to it by a free effort of 
the will; this is what his perception of the present assures him. But the memory of this present, 
which is equally there, makes him believe that he is repeating what has been said already, seeing 
again what has been seen already, and so transforms him into an actor reciting his part.” (Henri 
Bergson, “Memory of the Present and False Recognition”, 169). 
108 Ibid., 165. 
109 Ibid., 154. 
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profound uses of this visual metaphor of the mirror, these revelations involve a character coming 
to terms with their past. In film, it tends to be the case that when there is a mirror present, 
someone is going is going undergo profound modification. The presence of mirrors is illustrated 
in the history of Western cinema, as is evidenced by the prevalence of mirrors in the films of 
Orson Welles, Robert Clouse, Martin Scorsese, and Wim Wenders. Here, one cannot help but 
think of Rita Hayward’s riveting elaboration of her past as she stumbles blindly through a hall of 
mirrors in The Lady from Shanghai;110 Bruce Lee’s recollection that “the enemy is only images 
and illusions” as he battles infinitely recurring images of a phantasmal foe in Enter the 
Dragon;111 Robert De Niro’s psychotic self-examination in Taxi Driver;112 Harry Dean Stanton’s 
heartbreaking elaboration of his past to his ex-wife through a two-way mirror in the penultimate 
sequence of Paris, Texas.113 In each, there is a visual linkage among the mirror, hallucination, 
and moments of profound modification of at least one character. Though it might be observed 
that these instances of mirrors in film prioritize visual expressions of change, it should be pointed 
out that both Bergson and Deleuze explicitly stipulate change is an aspect of temporality. When 
coupled with the observation that the filmic representation of mirrors tends to be concomitant 
with change in some sense of the term (any of a modification of a character’s sense of self, a 
variation of the identities or motives of other characters, or a change to other elements of the 
filmic universe), this implies an involvement of aspects of temporality, and (thus) is a cinematic 
representation of time. Bergson’s textual allusions to mirrors and the mercurial elements of the 
 
110 Orson Welles (dir.), The Lady from Shanghai, (Mercury Productions, 1947). 
111 Robert Clouse (dir.), Enter the Dragon, (Warner Brothers and Concord Productions Inc., 
1973). 
112 Martin Scorsese (dir.), Taxi Driver, (Bill/Phillips Productions and Italo/Judeo Productions, 
1976).  




past expressed in their reflected contents, when coupled with the plurality of filmic 
representations of mirrors, suggest a conceptual foundation for Deleuze’s elaboration of the 
nature of time through reference to filmic expression.  
Ronald Bogue observes that Deleuze identifies filmic sequences involving mirrors as the 
most basic expression of virtual and actual exchange involved in crystal-images.114 Deleuze 
explicitly notes that crystal-images afford a direct presentation of time. What does it mean to 
suggest that time may be the sort of metaphysical entity that may be presented directly? Deleuze 
explicitly observes that crystal-images express two claims about the nature of temporality (which 
he formulates negatively): (1) that temporal ordering is “not made up of succession”;115 (2) time 
is non-reducible to an isolated temporal instant (i.e., a static moment isolated from a temporal 
continuum or temporal flow). The suggestion that it would be inaccurate to artificially isolate the 
object presented as a temporally extended element of a duration is uncontentious on ontological 
grounds — parts are non-identical to wholes. Deleuze’s suggestion that crystal-images diminish 
the importance of linear temporal succession (i.e., t1, t2 …tn) invites explanation. The claim is that 
temporality is non-reducible to succession. It is important to point out that Deleuze is not 
denying that linear temporal ordering appears to obtain in film (as it does in the non-filmic 
world). In this sense, Deleuze’s distinction is analogous to Aristotle’s identification — in Physics 
IV116 — that time may be characterized as something other than either what is measured (i.e., the 
 
114 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Cinema, (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 121. 
115 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2, 274. 
116 Aristotle, Physics IV, 219b2-219b9. It is important to observe the limited scope of this 
analogy. The conceptual differences among Deleuze’s and Aristotle’s respective philosophies of 
time are substantive, as are the differences in their metaphysics. Daniel W. Smith elaborates on 
differences between Deleuze’s and Aristotle’s metaphysics. (Daniel W. Smith, “The Doctrine of 
Univocity: Deleuze's Ontology of Immanence”, Deleuze and Religion, Mary Bryden [ed.], 
[London: Routledge, 2001], 163-179). 
 
156 
motion of existents) or the linear succession of numbers that one uses when they measure the 
motion of existents. Deleuze modifies Aristotle’s distinction to suggest that the measure of the 
movement of existents is ontologically secondary to the form of temporality. Deleuze’s claim 
here is that linear temporal succession is ontologically dependent on a more fundamental 
ontological relation. It is this fundamental relation that is directly expressed by the crystal-image. 
Deleuze is suggesting that there is an ontological process more fundamental to temporality than 
the succession of temporal moments; though there still may be the succession of scenes in a film 
(just as the succession of minutes, hours, and years seem to obtain as adequate measures of the 
moments of the durations enjoyed by the real entities that may or may not be represented in 
film), there is some ontological process primary to these; it is this process that is presented in the 
crystal-image; the direct-image of time is a filmic representation of the ontologically primary 
process of time. 
Deleuze’s elaboration of the direct presentation of time through filmic hyalosigns is a 
Bergsonian film philosophy that Bergson never got around to writing. This philosophical lineage 
is evidenced by Deleuze’s observation that crystal-images illustrate an ontologically primary 
“indivisible unity of an actual image and ‘its’ virtual image.”117 Each of these terms and the 
relation between them cries out for clarification. Bergson elucidates the complex nature of the 
relation through reference to the metaphor of an object and its reflection in a mirror.118 Bergson 
makes two stipulations about the natures of the relata: the objects reflected by the mirror enjoy 
 
117 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 79. 
118 Bergson writes: “The memory seems to be the perception of what the object in the mirror is to 
the object in front of it. The object can be touched as well as seen; acts upon us as well as we on 
it; it is pregnant with possible actions; it is actual. The image is virtual, and though it resembles 
the object, it is incapable of doing what the object does.” (Henri Bergson, “Memory of the 
Present and False Recognition” Mind-Energy, Lectures and Essays, H. Wildon Carr (tr.), (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920), 165. 
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an actual mode of existence; the reflected images are virtual. These two modes of being may be 
distinguished from one another by their respective properties (or predicates). Bergson explicitly 
identifies materiality and (by implication) material causal efficacy as the relevant predicates. The 
claim is that both causal efficacy and materiality may be predicated of actual objects. Virtual 
entities enjoy none of the capacities to be influenced by entities that enjoy physical material 
existence; virtual entities are immaterial and neutral with respect to material causation. In 
contradistinction, an entity is actual if it is causally relevant in a material circumstance. If one 
were to characterize materiality and causal efficacy as ontological conditions which must be met 
for an object to enjoy actuality, then one must observe that virtual entities do not obtain as actual, 
because they fail to fulfil these. Bergson positively identifies the virtual as the ontological 
domain which most closely resembles “the plane of a dream”119 (i.e., the domain populated by 
phantasmal entities that — for all their reality — lack the capacity to affect actualized entities). 
The specification that virtual entities enjoy the predication of immateriality seems to invite a 
comparison of virtual entities to either of any of the species of abstract entities (i.e., abstracta) or 
possibilities. Virtual entities are none of these. Citing Proust’s formulation, Deleuze cautiously 
observes that virtuality is “real without being actual, ideal without being abstract.”120 Deleuze 
observes that the possible may be conceptualized as that which subsists in opposition to the real, 
in the sense that what is possible is not yet realized — the possible does not obtain as something 
realized, in the sense it obtains as either that which is ontologically prior to that which is realized 
or that which is a potential result of a deduction that has not yet been made. The suggestion here 
 
119 Ibid. 
120 Quoted by Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, 96; Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past 3: 
Time Regained, C.K. Moncreiff, Terence Kilmartin, and Andreas Mayor (trs.), (New York: 
Vintage, 1982), 906.  
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is that possibility enjoys a modality that is categorically distinct from that enjoyed by real entities 
— i.e., “the possible has no reality.”121 Deleuze further specifies that the virtual may be 
identified as a species of ideality, in the sense that it enjoys the property of immateriality — a 
property that tends to be associated with ideal objects. Here, it is essential to note that the 
property of immateriality does not imply indeterminacy. (The quality of immateriality implies 
only that an entity is not subject to quantitative determination; if Ingarden has demonstrated 
anything, it is that immaterial entities — like reflections in mirrors, literary characters, 
photographically represented objectivities — are subject to rigorous qualitative determination. A 
viewer of Cool Hand Luke122 knows the exact nature of the protagonist, right down to how many 
hard-boiled eggs he can eat. Because virtual entities may be qualitatively determined, they enjoy 
none of the ontological ambiguity that tends to be associated with abstract entities. It is perhaps 
worth noting that the metaphysical conditions implied by the distinction between virtuality and 
actuality are adequate, in the sense that were they denied, the result would be an existential terror 
of the kind evoked by certain horror movies. Here one cannot help but think of the virtual image 
clawing its way out of a television screen in David Cronenberg’s Videodrome123 and the 
terrifying moments of monsters materializing out of the reflective surfaces in the trilogy of 
Japanese Ring films.124 The terror elicited by these scenes of the virtual being actualized as 
material is sufficient to demonstrate the metaphysical truth of the complex distinction between 
the virtual and actual. 
 
121 Ibid.  
122 Stuart Rosenberg (dir.), Cool Hand Luke, (Jalem Productions, 1967). 
123 David Cronenberg (dir.), Videodrome, (Universal, 1983). 
124 Hideo Nakata (dir.), Ring, (Ringu/Rasen Production Committee, 1998); Hideo Nakata (dir.), 
Ring 2, (Asmik Ace Entertainment, 1999); Norio Tsuruta (dr.), Ring 0: Birthday, (Ring 0 
Production Group Production, 2000). 
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The crystal-image involves a relation of the virtual memory and the actual present. The 
tension of these is the content of time’s direct expression in cinema. Bergson suggests that the 
past emerges as a moment of temporal bifurcation; a relation among the virtual and actual that 
yields a division of the instant into “two jets exactly symmetrical, one of which falls back toward 
the past, whilst the other springs forward to the future.”125 Deleuze explicitly characterizes this 
relation as the simultaneous creation of two discrete temporal modalities (the memorial past and 
the fleeting present).126 The staggering implication is that the past does not follow after the lived 
present — one’s memory of an object obtains simultaneously with one’s perception of the object. 
Proust beautifully illustrates this through reference to the lingering scent of madeleines: 
But let a noise or scent, once heard or once smelt, be heard or smelt again in the  present 
and at the same time in the past, real without being actual, ideal without  being abstract, and 
immediately the permanent and habitually concealed essence  of  things is liberated and 
our true self which seemed — perhaps for long years seemed  — to be dead but was not 
altogether dead, is awakened and reanimated as it receives  the celestial nourishment that is 
brought to it. A minute freed from the order of time  has re-created in us, to feel it, the man freed 
from the order of time. And one can  understand that this man should have confidence, in his joy, 
even if the simple taste of  a madeleine does not seem logically to contain within it the 
reasons for this joy, one  can understand the word ‘death’ should have no meaning for him; 
situated outside  time, why should he fear the future? 
 
125 Henri Bergson, Mind-Energy, Lectures and Essays, 160. 
126 Deleuze observes: “What constitutes the crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of 
time: since past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, it has to split 
itself in two at each movement as present and past, which differ from each other in nature, or, 
what amounts to the same thing, it has to split the present in two heterogeneous directions, one of 
which is launched toward the future while the other falls into the past.” (Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 
2: The Time-Image, 81).  
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 But this species of optical illusion, which placed beside me a moment of  the 
 past that was incompatible with the present, could not last for long. The images 
 presented to us by the voluntary memory can, it is true, be prolonged at will, for the 
 voluntary memory require no more exertion on our part than the turning over of the 
 pages in a picture book.127 
Perhaps what is most remarkable about this eloquent elaboration of the function of a time-crystal 
is that it seems to involve a denial of the hypothesis that a dependency relation obtains among 
the present and the past; the past does not subsist from the present; the two (characterized as any 
of past and present, virtual and actual, perceived object and content of recollection) emerge in 
immanent relation to one another as ontological correlates, each designating a discrete temporal 
modality. Perceptual moments of quantifiable existents are co-created as virtual entities that 
obtain as qualitative existents. Further, Deleuze carefully notes a crystalline-image never reaches 
a state of completion — it never obtains as “altogether dead” — in the sense that its process of 
producing the virtual and actual never ceases. That is, the crystal involves an “indiscernible 
exchange [that] is always renewed and reproduced.”128 The suggestion here is that time is 
continually regained in the ongoing process of generating the past and the present 
simultaneously. This is a regeneration of discrete modes of time, in which each enjoys a 
temporal difference from what was immediately prior as well as an ontological difference from 
the other. In this sense, the attribute of finitude cannot be predicated of time. Though the relation 
among the virtual and the actual is stabilized in the form of a relation, this stability does not 
imply any of temporal, logical, or ontological cessation. In the most general sense, one cannot 
 
127 Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past 3: Time Regained, C.K. Moncreiff, Terence 
Kilmartin, and Andreas Mayor (tr.), (New York: Vintage, 1982), 906.  
128 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 274 
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predicate an end to time — i.e., temporality is an ongoing relation, a continuum of 
differentiation. Taken together, these elucidations reveal that the direct-image of time involves 
four non-competing aspects: (1) the fundamental indeterminacy of a singularity; (2) virtuality 
and actuality, which enjoy a categorical distinction (as is demonstrated by their non-reducible 
properties); (3) a simultaneous creation of the past and present, each of which is characterized as 
a non-reducible — non-subsistent, relatively autonomous — way of time’s being; (4) its 
expression as an ongoing stable relation (i.e., a continuum) that is akin to the process of a seed 
involved in a germination, in the sense that it produces difference, in multiple senses. 
 
Concluding Remarks: The Time of Cinema 
Perhaps there has been no greater change to the visual arts than the tectonic shift of the 
camera recording the movements of the workers leaving the Lumière Brothers’ Factory. No more 
are we condemned to simply viewing the arrested movements of entities in repose. No more was 
all visual art a still life. No more was the realism of art forced to capture entities arrested in time. 
The birth of cinema changed everything for those who were able to apprehend entities expressing 
themselves as singular moments of time.  
Deleuze — in his Cinema texts — suggests that the changes heralded by cinema involved 
a change to our conceptions of time. Film reveals temporality to be a singularity. The cinema is a 
temporal art form, in the sense that it conveys the action of entities over a temporal duration, and 
these effect qualitative changes on the lives of the audience for an extended duration of moments 
in time. Deleuze observes that some of cinema’s most sublime moments — the pure optical and 
acoustic situations — suggest a deeper involvement with temporality and cinema. In these, the 
viewer is treated to a glimpse of time’s radical indeterminacy. When a character looks into a 
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mirror or catches a reflection of themselves in the window of a passing streetcar, this reveals a 
further aspect of the nature of temporal change. With the proliferation of crystal-images, cinema 
reveals time to be something other than mere succession of temporal instants. The image in the 
mirror illustrates an exchange of the virtual and the actual — an occurrence that is ontologically 
primary to a succession of existents. Further, it is observed that this relation of virtual and actual 
involves the strictly simultaneous and continual creation of past and present as correlated 





CHAPTER 6: TIME AND THE STATE — STOCHASTIC EVOLUTION, 
CO-EXISTENCE, AND INSTANTANEOUS VARIATION 
The two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia (which were co-written with Félix 
Guattari) should be counted among Deleuze’s great books on time.1 Though explicit reference to 
temporality is scarcely present in these texts, it is in these that Deleuze’s philosophy of time 
gains expression through reference to the changes brought about by variations in the economic 
modes of production in the social world. It should be observed that the analysis of time contained 
in the Cinema volumes has little in common with the claims about the nature of time developed 
in Capitalism and Schizophrenia. In the Cinema texts, Deleuze used film as a means of 
expressing the profound nature of time’s direct image as a singularity involving the ontological 
co-generation of the temporal past and present in a manner that is utterly unique to the filmic 
universe; a singular time of film that is discrete from any of the calendar time, clock ticks, or 
other temporal series which putatively obtain in the universe populated by material entities. In 
the two Capitalism and Schizophrenia volumes, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that temporality 
involves the immanent variation of co-existing entities — time is characterized as involving the 
instantaneous change of spatio-temporally compresent social formations. They present their 
argument through reference to all of Marx, Jane Jacobs’s elucidation of the nature of the 
evolution of urban modes of socio-economic organization, the ethnological investigations of 
Clastres, as well as Spinoza’s concept of immanent causality. Deleuze’s and Guattari’s analyses 
yield the claim that temporality gains expression as variation within a single unified duration. 
 
1 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seem, Helen R. Lane (tr.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Brian 
Massumi (tr.), (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2014). 
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This amounts to a substantial modification to Marxian claims about the origins of the State. 
Deleuze and Guattari borrow from Jacobs’s critical reassessment of Marxian evolutionism to 
suggest that the relation among social formations be radically re-conceptualized. I observe that 
Deleuze and Guattari echo Clastres’ revolutionary thesis that the State and primitive forms of 
social organization obtain as temporally co-existing, mutually implicated entities that participate 
relations of immanent modification. Here, Deleuze an Guattari apply Spinoza’s notion of 
immanent causality — i.e., the sort of causal relation in which both cause and effect are 
implicated as expressive aspects of the same ontologically unified substance — to yield the 
suggestion that temporally co-existing social formations are involved in immanent variation. The 
claim is that analytically discrete aspects of the same social substance modify one another within 
the same non-decomposable temporal instant. Taken together, these suggest that evolution — 
characterized as the serial progression of durations expressed as grand movements along the ever 
more nuanced arch of history — does not obtain in a linear fashion. This further implies that the 
relation of temporal succession (t1, t2…tn) is not adequate to represent variation of temporally co-
existing social forms. Society changes in an instant.  
Shortly after the English language publication of A Thousand Plateaus, Gilles Deleuze 
was given the occasion to reflect upon his and Félix Guattari’s enduring commitments to 
Marxian political thought.2 While it is heartening that Deleuze’s expression of this sentiment has 
given rise to a wealth of critical literature that elaborates on the nuances of Deleuze’s and 
Guattari’s Marxism, much of this commentary appears to have neglected the temporal 
implications of their modification of Marxian thought. Simon Choat elucidates the hermeneutic 
 
2 Deleuze writes: “I think Félix Guattari and I have remained Marxists” (Gilles Deleuze, 




strategies marshalled in support of the suggestion that Deleuze’s remarks on Nietzsche can find 
their philosophical “touchstone” in the theorizations of Marx.3 Aldo Pardi engages in a 
complementary exercise in exegesis with his identification of socio-political philosophy as akin 
to a “battlefield of antagonistic productions” in which Deleuze, Spinoza, and Marx are 
characterized as philosophical brothers-in-arms.4 In an otherwise admirable text, Eduardo 
Pelejaro makes the counter-intuitive (and perhaps counter-Marxian) claim that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conceptualization of revolutionary capacities of the nomadic war-machine flummoxes 
any sense of a revolutionary struggle being expressed in a particular historical situation.5 The 
claim here seems to involve the dubious interpretative claim that Deleuze and Guattari elaborate 
the nomadic war-machine as a strictly transcendent entity which enjoys no tether to existent 
spatio-temporally localized entities, processes, or circumstances—i.e., the very entities and 
contexts which are involved in the continual temporal variation that is identified with reality. 
Arguing from more coherent critical ground, Nicholas Thoburn suggests that Deleuze’s and 
Guattari’s conceptualization of “the minor” is an analogue of Marx’s concept of the 
lumpenproletariat.6 While enjoying some textual support, in the sense that (in their book on 
Kafka) Deleuze and Guattari cautiously observe that “minor literature” involves a political 
aspect, Thoburn’s thesis seems vexed, if for no other reason than Deleuze and Guattari consider 
change as an immanent variation of entities which participate in the same temporal duration. 
 
3 Simon Choat, “Deleuze, Marx and the Politicisation of Philosophy.” Deleuze Studies 3. 
Supplement (2009), pp. 8-27, 9. 
4Aldo Pardi, “Marx as Ally: Deleuze outside Marxism, Adjacent Marx.” Deleuze Studies 3. 
Supplement  
(2009): 53-77, 70.  
5 Eduardo Pellejaro, “Minor Marxism: An Approach to a New Political Practice”, Deleuze 
Studies 3. Supplement (2009), pp. 102-118. 104 
6 Nicholas Thoburn, Deleuze, Marx, and Politics, (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 49. 
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Because transcendence is non-identical to immanence, a more adequate account of social 
evolution might involve an analysis of (the explicitly political) economic modes of production 
and their mutual implication.7 I suggest that Deleuze’s modification of Marx’s modes of 
production reveals them to be co-existing entities, which enjoy immanent causal relation to one 
another. I further suggest that the mutual involvement of the modes of production implies a 
denial of the explanatory relevance of the relation of temporal succession.  
 Perhaps one of Deleuze’s most subtle observations about the nature of temporal 
modification of putatively distinct modes of production is hinted at — in Difference and 
Repetition — with the (Spinozistic) observation that the univocity of substance is implicated 
with a plurality of individuated modes.8 Deleuze carefully observes that a numeric distinction 
 
7 Deleuze and Guattari specify the political aspects of the minor literature of Kafka in 
contradistinction with the putatively less revolutionary aspects of “major” literatures. They 
observe: “the second characteristic of minor literature is that everything in them is political. In 
major literatures, the individual concern (the familial, marital, and so on) joins with other no less 
individual concerns, the social milieu serving as a mere environment or a background… Minor 
literature is completely different; its cramped space forces each individual intrigue to collect 
immediately to politics. The individual concern thus becomes all the more necessary, 
indispensable, magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating within it.” (Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Dana Polan (tr.), [Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986], 17). 
8 Deleuze makes this observation in his complex elaboration formal and modal distinctions in 
reference to the concept of univocity of substance. The essential claim is that an ontologically 
unified substance enjoys expression among a plurality of implicated modes. Elaborating on 
Spinoza’s metaphysics, Deleuze writes: “Nevertheless, he was able to define two types of 
distinction which relate that indifferent, neutral being to difference. Formal distinction is, in 
effect, a real distinction, since it is grounded in being or in the object; but it is not necessarily a 
numerical distinction because it is established between essences or senses, between 'formal 
reasons' which may allow the persistence of the unity of the subject to which they are attributed. 
In this manner, not only is the univocity of being (in relation to God and to creatures) extended 
in the univocity of its 'attributes', but, given his infinity, God can possess his formally distinct 
univocal attributes without losing anything of his unity. The other type of distinction, modal 
distinction, is established between being or the attributes on the one hand, and the intensive 
variations of which these are capable on the other. These variations, like degrees of whiteness, 
are individuating modalities of which the finite and the infinite constitute precisely singular 
intensities. From the point of view of its own neutrality, univocal being therefore does not only 
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need not obtain among aspects of the same form. The ontological point here is that different 
individuated modes (different aspects) may enjoy numerical identity. Given that temporal 
succession is a type of quantitative distinction (i.e., a series numeric values associated with the 
successive occurrences of the term t), this implies that no temporal succession need obtain 
among discrete aspects of the same social form. The implications for the putative evolution 
among individuated modes of economic production (which are comprehended by a unified social 
substance) are staggering. Deleuze’s ontological reflections suggest that explicitly dynamic, co-
existing, implicated modes of production enjoy a type of variation which involves no temporally 
serialized evolution. The substantive claim here is that co-existing entities enjoy immanent 
variation. The negative correlate is that immanence does not involve temporal succession. These 
imply that the variation of co-existing Marxian modes of production is expressed as a temporally 
instantaneous modification of the plurality aspects of the same unified social form.  
In the present chapter, I suggest that Deleuze and Guattari echo (with substantial 
modification) Marx’s claims about the involvement of modes of economic production in the 
evolution of society. Though Deleuze and Guattari accept Marx’s suggestion that modes of 
economic production play a role in the identification of a society as belonging to a particular 
temporal period or age, they expunge temporal succession from evolutionism. The argument 
involves three complex stages: (1) a specification of Marx’s claim that social evolution is 
stochastic variation; (2) the observation that Deleuze and Guattari suggest that social variation 
involves a temporally instantaneous —non-serialized, non-successive — relation of coexisting 
 
implicate distinct attributes or qualitative forms which are themselves univocal, it also relates 
these and itself to intensive factors or individuating degrees which vary the mode of these 
attributes or forms without modifying their essence in so far as this is being.” (Gilles Deleuze, 
Difference and Repetition, Paul Patton [tr.], [London and New York: Continuum, 2001], 39). 
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modes of social organization; (3) the suggestion — derived from Spinoza — that immanent 
causality is an adequate mechanism to account for social change. Taken together, these yield the 
suggestion that Deleuze’s and Guattari’s analyses reveal time to comprehend the instantaneous 
— i.e., non-successive, non-serializable — variation of co-existing, contemporaneous aspects of 
society. 
 
The Stochastic Evolution of the Economic Modes of Production 
 Deleuze and Guattari specify their fidelity to the Marxist project of discerning pre-history 
of the capitalist state formation when they observe — in Anti-Oedipus — that the “rules of Marx 
are followed exactly.”9 The object of analysis here is the relationship among the modes of 
production and the (explicitly temporal) process of economic development. Unfortunately, how 
the Marxian rules apply is not readily apparent, in the sense that Marx, Engels, Stalin, and 
Plekhanov seemed to never tire of critically reassessing all of the nature, number, and 
development of the modes of production.10  
 
9 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 140. 
10 The elaboration of the history of capitalism has a long and fraught history as evidenced in all 
the places it crops up in Marx’s published works, the works Marx co-authored with Engels, and 
Marx’s personal correspondence. It should be specified that Marx as well as Engels modified 
both the number and nature of modes of production involved in the development of capital. Marx 
introduced a schematic of pre-capitalist modes of production in the ultimate paragraph of his 
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy. (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Introduction 
to the Critique of Political Economy, The German Ideology, [Amherst, New York: Prometheus 
Books, 1998], 23). This schema enjoys significant development in The German Ideology, (Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, [Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 
1998]). Concerns associated with the specification of historical periods of development were the 
subject of multiple letters between Marx and Engels in 1868, to Zusulich in 1881, and (again 
between Marx and Engels in 1881-1882. (Letter from Marx to Engels, Dated 14 March 1868, 
Pre-Economic Formations, Jack Cohen [tr.], E.J. Hobsbawm [ed.], [New York: International 
Publishers, 1964]; Letter from Marx to Engels, Dated 25, March 1868, Pre-Economic 
Formations; Letter from Marx to Zasulich, Dated 8 March 1881, Pre-Economic Formations; 
Letter from Engels to Marx, 15 December 1882, Pre-Economic Formations; Letter from Engels 
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Marx — in The German Ideology — explicitly identifies four discrete modes of 
production: (1) the communal mode, in “which a people lives by hunting and fishing, by cattle-
raising or, at most, by agriculture”;11 (2) the tribal state of antiquity “which proceeds especially 
from the union of several tribes into a city by agreement or by conquest, and which is still 
accompanied by slavery”;12 (3) the feudal structure of land ownership in the form of private 
estates;13 (4) capitalist mode of production, in which the bourgeoisie “splits according to the 
division of labour into various sections and finally absorbs all propertied classes it finds in 
existence.”14 It should be observed that Marx began revising this ontology of the State shortly 
after he first conjured it. Hobsbawm observes that by the time of the Communist Manifesto 
(which was written a scant year after The German Ideology) this list had lost its primary element 
— i.e., Marx’s and Engels’s discussion in the Manifesto only “recognizes three forms of class 
society: the slave society of antiquity; feudalism, and bourgeois society.”15 The situation 
becomes slightly more confounded when — in an 1868 letter to Engels — Marx stipulates that 
 
to Marx, 16 December 1882, Pre-Economic Formations; Letter from Engels to Marx, 22 
December 1882, Pre-Economic Formations). One can clearly see a nascent formulation of a 
Marxist anthropology in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 as well as in the 
“history of class struggles” discussed in the Communist Manifesto, particularly in the discussion 
of the “various stages of development of communist views.” (Karl Marx, Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan [tr.] in Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto, [Amherst: Prometheus, 1988], 99-114; Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto, [Amherst: Prometheus Books,1988], 209). 
Perhaps the definitive discussion of the modes of production — at least the one that is taken as 
representative of Marx’s mature view, which is echoed in Capital — is found in the Grundrisse. 
(Karl Marx, Grundrisse, Foundation of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), Martin 
Nicolaus [tr.], [London: Penguin, 1993]).  
11 Karl Marx, The German Ideology, 38. 
12 Ibid., 39. 
13 Ibid., 40. 
14 Ibid., 85. 
15 E.J. Hobsbawm, “Introduction”, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, 32.  
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“Asian or Indian forms of property constitute the initial ones everywhere in Europe.”16 This 
amounts to the claim that the historical evolution of society involves four discrete stages, in 
which the primary stage bears some semblance to the economic practices found on the Indo-
Asian sub-continent. Marx seems to have further modified his position when he suggests — in a 
letter to Zasulich — that the “archaic” modes of production most closely resemble those of 
Russian villages.17 By the time of the Grundrisse, Marx seems to have settled on five modes of 
production — the archaic form of landed property (which may gain expression as “Asiatic” or 
“oriental” despotism, but is not limited to these, in the sense that it is also evident in “Slavonic 
communes,” as well as Mexico and Peru);18 a Hellenistic-Roman form of economic production, 
which involves the prioritization of individual land owners (i.e., slave holders);19 “Germanic” 
feudalism, which tended to involve the emergence of labour guilds;20 capitalism, which “stands 
on its own feet” only once “a complete separation between the workers and the ownership of the 
conditions for the realization of their labour”21 has been actualized. Marx’s nuanced (indeed, 
sometimes competing) accounts of these various modes of production and their relation to one 
another — not to mention their participation in the historical evolution of discrete societies, as 
well as the evolution of social and economic aspects of human society treated as a unified whole 
(i.e., humanity, in a general sense) — desperately cries out for elaboration.  
Marx’s complex identification of the differing modes of production has generated 
substantial critical reassessment. Engels — writing in Socialism, Utopian, and Scientific — 
 
16 Karl Marx, Letter to Engels dated 14 March 1868, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, 139.  
17 Karl Marx, Letter to Zasulich, dated 8 March 1881, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, 143.  
18 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, Notebook, IV, 472-474. 
19 Ibid., 474-475.  
20 Ibid., 476-479.  




explicitly characterizes the various modes of production as historical stages in the evolution of 
human society.22 It is perhaps worth observing that the three historical stages that Engels 
identifies are quite different in terms of geographical location from those identified by Marx. 
Perhaps foremost (in terms of historical significance, at least to Soviets) is Joseph Stalin’s 
complex modification of Marx’s claims about the nature of the modes of productions. Though 
Stalin eschews any appeal to geographical criteria, he does seem to share Engels’s sentiment that 
the Marxian modes of production correlate to specific temporal periods.23 Here, the suggestion is 
that while any particular mode of production need not correlate with any particular locale, it does 
correlate with a specific historical period — i.e., feudal modes of production might not have been 
evident in England, but they did obtain somewhere during the Medieval period. The claim is that 
though there might have been a feudal order of the Germanic sort during the time period 
extending from the formation of the Carolingian Empire (800 CE) until the first fires of the 
Germanic iron works (in the 1780s), and though this might have involved lands in Frank 
territory, this last aspect is immaterial in the identification of Germanic feudalism. The 
inferential progression here is subtle: (1) Stalin echoes Marx’s suggestion that modes of 
production “embrace” both the concrete material forces of production existent in society and the 
 
22 Admittedly, Engels does not offer a not a detailed account in this text. In his “brief sketch of 
historical evolution,” Engels specifies three periods that would putatively produce the collapse of 
capitalism —the mediaeval, capitalist, and proletarian revolution. (Friedrich Engels, Socialism, 
Utopian, and Scientific, in Essential Writings of Friedrich Engels, [St. Petersburg FL: Red and 
Black Publishers, 2011], 60).  
23 Stalin explicitly intertwines all of social development, material conditions, the values 
associated with labour and commodities, the means of producing profits and goods, and temporal 
progress, when he stipulates: “Hence, the history of social development is at the same time the 
history of the producers of material values themselves, the history of the labouring masses, who 
are the chief force in the process of production and who carry on the production of material 
values necessary for the existence of society.” (Joseph Stalin, Dialectical and Historical 
Materialism, [Calcutta: Mass Publications, 1975], 25).  
 
172 
relations of psycho-social individuals to these;24 (2) the stipulation that this unity of general 
tendencies and concrete particulars yields an axiological production — i.e., the production of 
“material values”;25 (3) the stipulation that material values are subject to quantitative 
determination, in the sense that they are measurable, and; (4) Stalin’s identification of 
technological change as the proximate cause of modifications to various modes of production.26 
Taken together, Stalin’s observations yield the suggestion that variations in the concrete modes 
of production — i.e., the physical tools and machines used in all manner of economic 
production; the scythe, the loom, the harrow, and Ford assembly line alike — drive the 
transitions from one temporal age to another.27 The stipulation that modes of production yield 
quantitative values implies that historical evolution is expressed in terms of number (the 
 
24 Stalin writes: “the mode of production, embraces both the productive forces of society and 
men’s relations of production, and is thus the embodiment of their unity in the process of 
production of material values.” (ibid., 23-24). 
25 Ibid., 25. 
26 Stalin identifies the production of material values as the second feature of variations in modes 
of production. (The primary feature is a modification of the relation of workers to different ways 
of producing economic value). Oddly, Stalin suggests that the second feature enjoys the status of 
an efficient cause. Stalin writes: “The second feature of production is that its changes and 
development always begin with changes and development of the productive forces, and in the 
first place, with changes and development of the instruments of production. Productive forces are 
therefore the most mobile and revolutionary element of production. First the productive forces of 
society change and develop, and then, depending on these changes and in conformity with them, 
men’s relations of production, their economic relations, change.” (ibid., 26). 
27 Stalin writes: “The transition from crude stone tools to the bow and arrow, and the 
accompanying transition from the life of hunters to the domestication of animals and primitive 
pasturage; the transition from stone tools to metal tools (the iron axe, the wooden plough fitted 
with an iron colter, etc.), with a corresponding transition to tillage and agriculture; a further 
improvement in metal tools for the working up of materials, the introduction of the blacksmith’s 
bellows, the introduction of pottery, with a corresponding development of handicrafts, the 
separation of handicrafts from agriculture, the development of an independent handicraft 
industry and, subsequently, of manufacture; the transition from handicraft tools to machines and 
the transformation of handicraft and manufacture into machine industry; the transition to the 
machine system and the rise of modern large-scale machine industry—such is a general and far 
from complete picture of the development of the productive forces of society in the course of 
man’s history.” (ibid., 28-29). 
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quantitative value associated with surplus value) and in the quantitative temporal values — i.e., 
the numbering evident in calendar or clock time. This yields the staggering Stalinist hypothesis 
that modification in modes of production creates the measure of time. Were we to accept the 
suggestion that the essential aspect of time is a measure of the passing from one moment to 
another, the progression from one duration to the next, then this implies that time is the most 
profound product of the plurality of forms of industry. According to Stalin’s reading of Marx, 
work — characterized as a concrete material expression of the modes of production — creates 
time.   
Shahrokh Haghighi observes that Georgi Plekhanov seems to share Stalin’s view.28 
Plekhanov offers a complex suggestion involving all of: (1) the claim that variation among 
different historical ages is expressed as modifications to the societal superstructure; (2) the 
observation that modification of the superstructure is determined by changes in the economic 
modes of production; (3) the stipulation that the economic base (i.e., the modes of production) 
and the superstructure enjoy a linear causal relation. Here, an ideological “superstructure” is 
identified as involving all of civil and cultural circumstances and states of affairs that are 
analytically discrete from economic processes and the products these yield. The veracity of this 
distinction may be adduced from the observation that the superstructure involves immaterial or 
ideal aspects, and the economic base tends to involve concrete material entities and material 
processes. In this sense, a society’s superstructure comprehends all of the multitude of what 
Husserl and Ingarden categorize as “ideal meaning-units” that participate as the epistemic or 
axiological content of all manner of artistic expression; civil affairs, ceremony, ritual, social 
 
28 Shahrokh Haghighi, The Role of Historical Determinism in Marx’s Philosophy, (Ann Arbor: 
UMI, 1990), 128-164. 
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practice; the entirety of the State characterized as an abstract entity or immaterial force; indeed, 
the vast plurality of generalities associated with human social existence as members of a polis.29 
An evolution from one historical age to another would most certainly gain expression as a 
variation in a society’s superstructure — or, perhaps as evolution from one form of 
superstructure to another (e.g., Antiquity to Mediaeval; the Renaissance to the Post-colonial, 
etc.). Plekhanov seems to hold that economic modes of production — the physical making of 
things — and the ideological superstructure enjoy a relation of ontological dependence. 
Commenting on the formation of an ideological superstructure, Plekhanov explicitly states that 
the modes of manufacturing “correspond” to the superstructure in a manner that is entirely 
“natural” and “essentially obligatory.”30 Perhaps even more forcefully, Plekhanov claims that 
particular modes of production “invariably” lead to — are the proximate and direct causes of; the 
necessary ontic condition which must be realized for there to emerge — a particular 
superstructural form.31 Taken together, these imply that a linear progression of time, expressed as 
a temporal succession of ages, is determined by the modes of production. 
 
29 Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, 
Logic, and Theory of Literature, George G. Grabowicz (tr.), (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1973), 62-181. 
30 Plekhanov writes: “The process by which the ideological superstructure [sic.] arises takes 
place unnoticed by men. They regard that superstructure, not as the temporary product of 
temporary relations, but as something natural and essentially obligatory.” (G.V. Plekhanov, In 
Defiance of Materialism: The Monist View of History, Andrew Rothstein [tr.], [London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1947], 197.  
31 Elaborating on Marx’s account of “emergence of “ideological categories,” Plekhanov surmises 
that these seem to be strictly determined by, indeed ontologically dependent on, the modes of 
production. Plekhanov writes: “Once you recognize that men's own relations in production, 
existing independently of their will, acting behind their back, are reflected in their heads in the 
shape of various categories of political economy: in the shape of value, in the shape of money, in 
the shape of capital, and so forth, you thereby admit that on a certain economic basis there 
invariably arise certain ideological superstructures which correspond to its character. In that 
event the cause of your conversion is already three parts won, for all you have to do is to apply 
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Marx’s account of the relations that obtain among the modes of production and the 
superstructure (as well as what these imply about the nature of temporal progression) is more 
nuanced than what Plekhanov seems willing to acknowledge. Though Marx —in the preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy — observes that “forms of the state” have 
their “roots in the material conditions of life,” in the sense that modes of production obtain as the 
“real foundation” to the superstructure, this is far from the unambiguous specification of a linear 
causal (i.e., ontological dependency) relation among material processes and the generalized 
modality of social relations.32 In a footnote to the first volume of Capital, Marx cautiously notes 
that though economic conditions participate in the formation of the superstructure, it is 
misguided to suggest — as an unnamed German-American publication does — that these are the 
only or even the primary factors involved in the determination of the nature of a society.33 Here, 
the argument is that the mere fact that particular economic conditions are realized in a given 
historical age does not imply that these are the only relevant conditions involved in shaping that 
age. The claim that feudal Europe and Ancient Athens alike had systems that involved the 
production and exchange of goods and commodities does not imply that these particular 
economic modalities — which were relative to particular spatio-temporal locales — were the 
only aspects involved in the formation of the superstructures associated with these periods. (I.e., 
as much as there was most certainly an economy present in Medieval Europe, there was also the 
belief system associated with the Catholic church, as well as the ubiquitous fear of death from 
 
your ‘own’ view (i.e., borrowed from Marx) to the analysis of ideological categories of the 
higher order: law, justice, morality, equality and so forth.” (ibid., 226) 
32 Karl Marx, “Marx on the History of His Opinions (Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy)”, The Marx-Engels Reader 2nd Ed., Robert C. Tucker (ed.), (New York and 
London: W.W. Norton, 1978), 4. 
33 Karl Marx, Capital 1, 175-176, fn. 35.  
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the Bubonic Plague; Marx implies that these factors might have played a role in the identification 
of the historical period). At least, this is the suggestion of Engels, who — in a letter to Bloch, 
dated 21-22 September 1890 — strongly cautions against ascribing a strict dependency relation 
to the complex association of modes of production and societal superstructure.34 Though it is 
certainly the case that the various processes of production of economically valuable entities, as 
well as the existence of these manufactured or refined entities do participate in the formation of 
the State, and while it may be observed that — in some cases— these entities and processes have 
some influence on form of governance (parliamentarian, republican, despotic, theocratic, etc.), it 
is falsely reductive to suggest that these rigorously determine the superstructure. Stated again, 
while it is apt to attribute to Marx the claim that some modality of production must obtain as an 
ontic condition in order for there to emerge a society, it is a mischaracterization of Marx’s 
position to surmise that the realization of a particular type of production will yield the formation 
of a certain type of social form; the mode of production is one among many of the ontic 
conditions involved in the formation of the superstructure.  
 
34 Engels observes that though economic modes of production are involved in the formation of 
the superstructure, it would be falsely reductive to privilege these with ontological primacy or 
efficient causal powers. Engels writes: “According to the materialist conception of history, the 
ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Other 
than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that 
the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a 
meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various 
elements of the superstructure — political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: 
constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and 
even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, 
philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas — 
also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases 
preponderate in determining their form.” (Friedrich Engels, Letter Dated 21-22 September 1890, 
K. Marx, F. Engels, V. Lenin On Historical Materialism; A Collection, [Moscow, Progress 
Publishers, 1978], 294).  
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Marx further complicates matters by observing — in the Grundrisse — that in the 
Ancient Greek world, the arts flowered “out of all proportion to the general development of 
society, hence also to the material foundation, the skeletal structure as it were, of its 
organization.”35 Here, the claim seems to be that the Ancient Greeks were more accomplished as 
poets and vase painters than they were as merchants and manufacturers. We now have two 
claims — there are a plurality of processes involved in the formation of a societal superstructure, 
any one of which might enjoy relative priority to any other; these processes express different 
temporal development relative to one another, in the sense that each enjoys a developmental rate 
that is relatively autonomous — which, when taken together, imply that a non-linear temporality 
obtains within the formation of any given historical period. Though this does not imply the non-
existence of a relation of temporal succession or sequence within a given historical age, it does 
suggest that the relation among any temporal moments — i.e., the duration of the interval 
between t1 and t2 — is variable; an irregular temporal rhythm tends to characterize the 
development of different aspects of society. Though Deleuze explicitly identities this sort of 
temporal relation through reference to the “barbarian despotic machine” (i.e., the Asiatic mode of 
production), this does not imply that this form of non-linear succession only obtains within this 
mode of production. Indeed, it might be observed that such a mode of progression can be 
associated with the internal development of various aspects of the superstructure of any society.36 
 
35 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, 110. 
36 Deleuze and Guattari make this observation though reference to Nietzsche: “the evolution of a 
thing is ‘a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of 
subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, the attempts at transformation for the purpose of 
defense and reaction, and the results of successful counteractions.’” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 197). 
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When generalized, these observations yield the suggestion that (in terms of their development) 
societies may not share the same time.  
The claim that the world involves multiple discrete temporalities suggests difficulties for 
the thesis that linear evolution among historical periods obtains, if for no other reason than that 
the process of linear evolutionary development seems to involve various elements of a unified 
temporal continuum — the sort of temporal formation that tends to be characterized by a regular 
duration among the occurrence of events. (I.e., the particular year that is identified as the end of 
an age co-exists in a unified temporal continuum of years having the same number of days). 
Marx — in the Grundrisse — is ambivalent about whether social evolutionary processes obtain 
over the course of history, in the sense that in addition to the difficulties suggested by differential 
temporalities, he seems to deny the possibility of evolution, only to smuggle it in by formal 
ontological means. Marx explicitly notes that economic and social production is “always 
production at a definite stage of social development — production by social individuals.”37 The 
implicit claim is that it is apt to identify society as the sort of thing that involves discrete 
developmental stages, each of which differs in kind — each of the modes of production is a 
different kind of way of producing surplus value. The suggestion here is that there are different 
types of economically productive activity, none of which enjoy a relation of formal identity to 
any other. In this sense, a comparison of the modes of production that aspires to discern unity 
among them is an exercise in intellectual folly that is no more successful than Theaetetus’s 
endeavour to find a common aspect among the five great kinds.38 Perhaps it should be observed 
that a process of social evolution is essentially a means of relating discrete historical periods. 
 
37 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, 85.  
38 Plato, Sophist 257b-259a, Nicholas P. White (tr.), Plato: Complete Works, John M. Cooper 
(ed.), (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 280-282.  
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Evolution is a comprehensive relation among putatively disparate historical periods. The general 
observation is that evolution is a complex relation that obtains as the comparison of similar 
things arrayed along a historical continuum. In this sense, one of the minimal conditions of 
evolution is that there is at least one attribute that is shared among the relata. If one is to 
characterize evolution as a process which yields unity (i.e., the continuum of historical moments; 
the trajectory of social development which tends toward all of expansion of markets, increased 
productivity, greater efficiency, an increase of appropriated surplus values, and further 
immiseration of workers; continuum; the evolutionary history of socio-economic development), 
then one would need to demonstrate the existence of shared attributes among the various stages 
of development. Marx specifies two attributes common to any mode of production; (1) the 
existence of private property or commodities within a society;39 (2) a legal system which 
determines the nature of property, commodity, and regulates exchange.40 Marx further stipulates 
that satisfaction of all of these is the minimal precondition for any mode of production — i.e., 
they are the “divine” presuppositions of any form of production.41 Étienne Balibar observes that 
by the time Marx wrote Capital, this list had become more refined, in the sense that any given 
mode of production requires the involvement of three primary elements, as well as four 
subordinate elements. The primary elements are: (1) the labourer whose efforts are treated as a 
 
39 Marx characterizes the existence of either private or communal property in a society as one the 
“general preconditions of all production.” (Ibid., 88). 
40 Marx observes that the “protection of acquisitions” demands the formation of a legal system 
and form of government. (ibid.) In his reading of the third volume of Capital, Étienne Balibar 
observes that the law — characterized as a principle of distribution that functions within the 
categories of human persons and non-human things — must obtain for there to be any 
determination of what may be considered a commodity. (Étienne Balibar, “The Elements of 
Structure and their History”, Reading Capital: The Complete Edition, Louis Athusser, Étienne 
Balibar, Roger Establet, Pierre Macherey, Jacques Rancière, Ben Bruster and David Fernbach 
(tr.), [London and New York: Verso, 2015], 393). 
41 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, 110. 
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commodity in the process of production; (2) “the means of production”42 — i.e., the physical 
materials utilized in the creation of surplus value; (3) the plurality of elements that indirectly 
furnish the conditions involved in the production, procurement, or distribution of commodities. 
Any of the plurality of the means of production involve the two subordinate elements of (a) a 
physical means of production, as well as (b) a material or abstract goal to be realized by 
production — a physical model to be replicated; an ideal thought object of what is to be 
produced by one’s toil. The subordinate elements involved with the conditions of production 
involve (c) a distribution of geographic space in terms of legal property; (d) some means of 
exchange, characterized as the any of the various modalities that regulate the appropriation of 
commodities by entities not concretely involved in their production. This is the identification of a 
set of criteria by which one can establish formal identity among the modes of production. The 
claim is that as long as conditions are satisfied at any moment in chronometric history, then, at 
that moment in time, a particular mode of production is realized. Here, we have a specification of 
the conditions by which — if they are realized by the economic processes of production over the 
course of a particular temporal duration — one may establish formal identity among putatively 
unrelated modes or production. Indeed, given that these conditions are the minimal necessary 
conditions for the identification of any mode of production, this suggests evolution. This 
temporal continuum comprehends a plurality of formally identical modes of production. Though 
these modes are formally identical does not demand that they are realized at the same temporal 
instant (i.e., realized as the same — or even a similar — temporal duration). Formal identity 
among modes requires only that these be realized as moments within a temporal continuum— 
 
42 Étienne Balibar, “From Periodization to the Modes of Production”, Reading Capital: The 
Complete Edition, 376. 
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i.e., as moments of an evolutionary process, as moments in a unified temporal order. Indeed, as 
soon as one grants that modes of production are realized as different temporal moments, one 
implies the existence of an evolutionary process. Here, evolution is characterized as the process 
which unifies temporally discrete entities that enjoy the same form. With his specification of the 
conditions of formal identity among the modes of production, Marx identifies the nature of the 
forms which populate evolution as various moments in time.  
The take-away from Marx’s modifications of the nature, number, and function of the 
modes of production, is the suggestion that social and economic development expresses a non-
linear evolution. The concept of non-linear evolution is derived from Arthur Iberall’s suggestion 
that a sequence of events may emerge as an arrhythmic temporal series — i.e., a temporal series 
characterized by irregular, non-symmetric intervals between the occurrence of events; a series in 
which temporal durations are non-identical with one another; a temporal series constituted of 
stochastic moments.43 There are two complex claims supporting the analytic point that the modes 
of production participate in a non-linear evolution sequence: (1) a properly Marxist account of 
the modes of production demonstrates that on a local level — i.e., internal to a society — there 
could co-exist discrete modes of production, each of which may express a temporality that is 
incommensurable to any other; (2) formal identity obtains among modes of production, even if 
these enjoy non-equivalent durations. The first claim suggests a difficulty for an account of 
evolution as a linear process by introducing the co-existence of different temporal scales. A 
 
43 Analyzing a system of sequences of electrical pulses, Iberall characterizes a linear system as 
expressing pulses which obtain at regular temporal intervals (i.e., those illustrated by a sinusoidal 
curve). Pulses in a non-linear sequence occur at intervals —which though not entirely random — 
range from the very short to the very long, and thus cannot be neatly illustrated by the repetition 
of regular oscillations (Arthur S. Iberall, Toward A General Science of Viable Systems [New 
York, McGraw-Hill, 1972], 153).  
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linear temporal ordering would suggest a neat and tidy chronometric unfolding of one mode of 
production to another. The claim that there are different durations involved with different modes 
of production suggests the absence of a unified time. In this sense, one of the minimal conditions 
of linear evolution is denied by Marx’s observation that modes of production involve temporal 
durations. The claim that different modes of production might obtain as non-identical durations 
confounds the suggestion that evolution is linear. The second claim — that the modes of 
production enjoy formal identity — preserves evolution, albeit in a modified sense. A key 
observation is that formal identity does not imply temporal identity: the same form may obtain at 
different times; the same form may enjoy different durations. A second key crucial implication is 
that identical forms may be arrayed as moments of a continuum of irregular intervals. When 
these moments are identified as temporal moments — i.e., durations — and this continuum is 
identified as temporal in nature, the ordering (of the forms) yields a series of temporal 
successions that tends to characterize evolution. From the observation that these forms may 
enjoy different durations, we may adduce that this evolution enjoys stochastic succession — a 
repetition of the same form (a mode of production) at irregular intervals. Marx’s nuanced 
elaboration of the modes of production yields a tepid defense of evolution, in the sense that 
evolution is preserved as a substantially modified model of variable temporal progression. The 
evolution of society proceeds by fits and starts. Though it is still apt to characterize the temporal 
progression of societal change — from one type of production to another — as evolution, it is 
inadequate to characterize this as linear evolution. From one mode of production to another, 
society proceeds in a stochastic fashion. 
 
Deleuze’s and Guattari’s Denial of Temporally Serialized Social Evolution 
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 Deleuze and Guattari begin their modification of Marxian accounts of evolution by 
questioning — in the eleventh proposition of their nomadology — which of the State or 
primitive social groupings (i.e., tribes of nomads) enjoy temporal priority.44 Ultimately, Deleuze 
and Guattari suggest that “economic evolutionism is an impossibility; even a ramified evolution, 
‘gatherers —hunters—animal breeders—farmer-industrialists’ is hardly believable.”45 The claim 
here could hardly be less ambiguous: evolution does not obtain as an expression of temporal 
progression; the relation of temporal succession — which is implicit in both linear and stochastic 
evolutionary models — does not obtain as an aspect of an adequate account of the development 
of human societies; the State and primitive (i.e., non-State), social formations are temporally co-
existent entities; no ontological dependency relation exists among the State and other forms of 
social organization. It would be difficult to overstate the significance of this claim. Deleuze’s and 
Guattari’s denial of evolutionism involves a complex inferential progression that draws premises 
from of Jane Jacobs’s analyses of economies of urban and rural environments46 and Pierre 
Clastres’s incisive claims about the nature of the State in primitive society.47 Jacobs suggests that 
the State formation enjoys concrete expression as the urban centre — i.e., the State is identified 
as the city. She further observes that primitive cities gave rise to the rural modes of economic 
production. The substantive claim here is that though the evolutionary model of economic 
development obtains, it only does so in a modified manner. Jacobs argues that the developmental 
line from country to State has been reversed. Clastres radically challenges all of Marxian, linear, 
and Jacobs’s views of the relation among the State and non-state economic modes of 
 
44 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 427. 
45 Ibid., 430. 
46 Jane Jacobs, The Economy of Cities, (New York and Toronto, 1969).  
47 Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, (New York: Zone Books, 2013).  
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evolutionary development with his suggestion that primitive rural tribes actively resist evolving 
into States. Clastres further observes that the leader of a tribe is non-identical to a head of State, 
in the sense that tribal chiefs (or clan leaders) tend to be generous to such an extreme degree that 
this diminishes any accumulation of surplus wealth. Taken together, these discrete claims 
suggest it is inaccurate to identify the relation of tribal social organization and the State (or 
urban) organization as involving any sort of evolution. It would be a misstatement to suggest that 
any one of these is entirely intuitive or self-evident. Indeed, if each inferential step involved in 
Deleuze’s and Guattari’s argument is compelling, then their conclusion — that evolution does 
not obtain — is staggering. Deleuze and Guattari’s complex inference cries out for elaboration, if 
for no other reason than it seems to deny that the relation of temporal succession obtains, while 
affirming the contemporaneous actualization of modes of social organization that are typically 
thought of as temporally discrete.  
Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc observes that Deleuze’s and Guattari’s claims about the origins 
of social organization involve a modification of Jacobs’s denial of the suggestion that primitive 
agrarian social collectives antedate the State.48 Jacobs observes that the “dogma of agricultural 
primacy”49 is fallacious, in the sense that it is misguided to suggest that “cities are built upon a 
rural economic base.”50 Jacobs presents her argument in economic terms. She observes that 
“rural production is literally the creation of city consumption.”51 This is a reversal of the 
economic progression elaborated in Marxian evolutionary theory. No longer is the rural society 
thought of as the cradle of the city. Jacobs suggests “that agriculture itself may have originated in 
 
48 Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc, State and Politics: Deleuze and Guattari on Marx, Ames Hodges 
(tr.), (South Pasadena: Semiotext[e], 2016), 30. 
49 Jane Jacobs, The Economy of Cities, 4. 
50 Ibid., 3.  
51 Ibid., 41. 
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the cities.”52 Deleuze and Guattari develop Jacob’s claim with the observation the archaeological 
record demonstrates that the primitive city-state involved “a stock of uncultivated seeds and 
relatively tame animals from different territories that performs, and makes possible to perform, at 
first by chance, hybridizations and selections from which agricultural and small-scale animal 
raising arise.”53 The State is the temporally primary social experience, from which agrarian 
economy is produced; large, communal, organized human society, surplus, and affluence — the 
very features which tend to characterize the State — furnish the conditions for the creation of the 
farm; primitive urban industry produces the biface, the harrow, and hybrid seeds alike; hunters 
and gatherers go forth from their urban dwellings to first harvest the crops of the garden in the 
city, and only when the productive capacities of these urban oases have been maximized, do they 
go forth to reap the surplus of the wilds; the surfeit of commodities and skills progresses along a 
complex cycle of accumulation that begins with the city-state, progresses to the country, only to 
return (as imported wealth) to contribute to the overflowing coffers of the city. From the 
discovery of seeds and the skeletons of domesticated animals in in the ruins of Çatal Hüyük, one 
can adduce that the city-state (not rural community; not the farm) is the cradle of human 
civilization. This implies a reversal of the developmental order suggested by Marxian 
evolutionism.54 Given that this order is explicitly temporal — i.e., the order of temporal 
 
52 Ibid., 17.  
53 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 428. 
54 James Mellaart came across the ruins of Çatal Hüyük during an excavation of the Konya Plain 
during November of 1958. Subsequent investigations revealed that agriculture was practiced 
throughout the Neolithic urban center. Mellaart observes that of “the animal bones found in the 
settlements of Çatal Hüyük, the following notes may give some idea of the Early Neolithic 
economy. Agriculture was practiced, as is clear from the numerous mortars, querns…, ovens and 
deposits of carbonized wheat…, field peas…and seeds.” (James Mellaart, “Excavations at Çatal 
Hüyük: First Preliminary Report, 1961” Anatolian Studies 12, (1962), pp. 41-65, 56). 
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succession — this implies that chronometric evolutionist models of social development should 
be inverted.  
Deleuze and Guattari radically modify this reversal of evolution with their analyses of 
Pierre Clastres’s ethnological investigations. Clastres suggests that it is misguided to think that 
social groups of antiquity will evolve into State formations, as though an analogue of the 
contemporary political arrangement enjoyed by so-called civilized nations may be 
retrogressively predicated of primitive tribes like some sort of “omega point”55 toward which 
their development naturally tends. Clastres starkly observes that “primitive societies are societies 
without a State, because for them the State is impossible.”56 Clastres marshals three claims to 
support the suggestion that evolution (from primitive to society to States) does not obtain: (1) he 
observes that evolutionist arguments tend to involve (as a presupposition) a wholly unjustified 
negative axiological judgment about the nature of primitive social groups; (2) he points out that 
technological evolutionist arguments tend to falsely suggest a comparison of disparate technical 
objects; (3) he observes that evolutionist arguments tend to involve a confusion about the role of 
the primitive chief, in the sense that they tend to assign false predicates to the leader of a 
primitive clan. Clastres observes that evolutionist models tend to involve a mistaken bias that 
primitive societies — i.e., those portions of the human family which Morgan disparagingly 
 
55 The term “omega point” is borrowed from Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, albeit with 
modification. Teilhard tends to conceive of an omega point as the maximal level of complexity 
of any instantiated form; divine perfection made manifest in lived experience. Deleuze and 
Guattari de-mystify the term when they use it to refer to the temporal endpoint of an evolutionary 
process (i.e., a “year omega”). Here I adopt Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of the term (Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959], 257-272; 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 212). 
56 Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, Robert Hurley and Abe Stein (tr.), (New York: Zone 
Books, 1989), 205. 
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identifies as “savages” and “barbarians,” 57 the same social groups that were putatively locked in 
the desperate multi-millennia struggle to acquire a sufficient surplus of goods in order to claw 
themselves into civilization, all those which existed prior to the Neolithic revolution — were 
incomplete, in the sense that they lack a State.58 The suggestion here is that those who advance 
an evolutionist account of human development tend to conceive of “the State as the destiny of 
every society.”59 The negative axiological judgement involved in this claim is that pre-capitalist 
societies were worse off than those which enjoy political formations like those evidenced in a 
State, because their members lacked (any or all of mental, physical, or moral) wherewithal to 
accrue sufficient recourses to create an organized governmental structure.60 The second claim — 
 
57 Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from 
Savage Through Barbarism to Civilization, (Bolton: Pantianos Classics, 2021), 12. Perhaps it is 
worth noting that Morgan’s categorization of pre-capitalist humans is substantially more nuanced 
than is typically acknowledged. Morgan’s distinction among savage society, barbarian proto-
civilization, and civilization, involves the distribution of six subcategories: both the savage and 
barbarian periods are divided into lower, middle, and upper stages of development. Morgan 
stipulates that transition from one level to another is identified with an advance in technology or 
acquisition of a new mode of production; society attained middle savagery when they began to 
cook fish over fires; the bow and arrow — and presumably other types of primitive projectile 
weapons — came to characterize upper savage social groups; pottery and brick are characterized 
as inventions of lower barbarians; the domestication of animals and animal husbandry were the 
distinguishing features of middle barbarism; the primitive iron smelter heralded the birth of 
upper barbarism (ibid., 16-18).  
58 Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, Robert Hurley and Abe Stein (tr.), (New York: Zone 
Books, 1989), 189.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Clastres observes that there is a normative approbation implicit the “common idea that the 
Savage is lazy.” (ibid., 193). Unfortunately, the meritless condemnation of so-called primitive 
people is not confined to poorly conceived anthropology. Philosophy and literature also express 
dubious claims about the moral and intellectual capacities of peoples who did not participate in 
the State. Here, one cannot help but be reminded of Kant’s ignominious observation that “south 
seas islanders” are immoral, because they let their “natural talents rust” by devoting their efforts 
to anything other than the actualization of a Eurocentric concept of reason. (Immanuel Kant, 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor [tr.], [New York and Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006], 4:423, 32). It should be also observed that though Marx’s 
mature work seems to direct its moral outrage toward capitalists, in their early work Marx and 
Engels seem to have been guilty of a dubious judgement about the nature of “non-historic 
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that there is no teleology or intentional directionality associated with technological development 
among different technological forms within a given society — implies that discrete technological 
artifacts do not enjoy an evolutionary relation with one another. Clastres observes that an 
assertion of teleological development among different technological artefacts would involve the 
conjuring of an “abstract standard, in terms of which technological ‘intensities’ can be 
measured.”61 Unfortunately, no such general standard exists. The absence of the criteria of 
comparison suggests that different forms of technology are utterly discrete, in the strict sense that 
no relation — evolutionary, or otherwise — obtains among them. This yields the tantalizing 
suggestion that “there is no justification for contrasting the rifle with the bow” in terms of the 
values associated with all of effectiveness, complexity, or function.62 When viewed from the 
perspective of the culture in which the form is instantiated (as a particular technological object), 
these values are absolute. In concrete terms, an object is seen as being optimally effective, as 
complex as it can be, and ideally suited to fulfil its function — e.g., the compound bow, arrow, 
rider, and horse conjoined to create the formal unity of a super-weapon for the nomads of the 
steppes; the biface was the ideal instrument for Acheulean society during the Lower Paleolithic 
period.63 Clastres’s third claim — about the nature of the authority of tribal chiefs — suggests 
 
peoples.” For instance, they explicitly categorize Slavonic people as lacking in moral and 
intellectual capacities, in the sense that they are identified as “nothing more than the national 
refuse of a thousand years of immensely confused development.” (Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels, “The Magyar Struggle”, The Revolutions of 1848, David Fernbach [ed.], 
[Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973], 220-221). One would be remiss if one did not also note 
the presence of this moral condemnation supposedly savage peoples in the ill-conceived verse of 
Kipling. Taken together, these examples — which are by no means uncommon or confined to the 
literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries — demonstrate the ubiquity of the bias 
against what Deleuze and Guattari categorize as nomadic peoples.  
61 Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, 192. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Gary Tomlinson, A Million Years of Music, (New York: Zone Books, 2015), 51-55. 
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that there is no mechanism within primitive society that would result in a chief assuming the role 
of political leader. Here, the claim is that a leader of primitive society never becomes the head of 
a primitive political State. Clastres observes that leaders of tribes tend to enjoy their rank only to 
the extent that they demonstrate adeptness in a technical skill (i.e., oration, hunting, fishing, 
honing a biface) of perceived societal importance.64 The implication is that no chief participates 
 
64 Clastres writes: “In the estimation of the tribe, what qualifies such a man to be chief? In the 
end, it is his ‘technical’ competence alone: his oratorical talent, his expertise as a hunter, his 
ability to coordinate martial activities, both offensive and defensive. And in no circumstance 
does the tribe allow the chief to go beyond that technical limit: it never allows a technical 
superiority to change into a political authority. The chief is there to serve society; it is society as 
such —the real locus of power — that exercises its authority over the chief. That is why it is 
impossible for the chief to reverse that relationship for his own ends, to put a society in his 
service, to exercise what is termed power over the tribe: primitive society would never tolerate 
having a chief transform himself into a despot…In a sense, the tribe keeps the chief under close 
watch; he is a kind of prisoner in a space that the tribe does not let him leave” (Pierre Clastres, 
Society Against the State, 207). It is perhaps worth noting that Claude Lévi-Strauss observes that 
Chiefs of the Nambikwara tribe tend to languish under similar social privations. Lévi-Strauss 
writes: “Although the chief does not seem to be in a privileged position, from the material point 
of view, he must have under his control surplus quantities of food, tools, weapons, and 
ornaments which, however trifling in themselves, are nonetheless considerable in relation to the 
prevailing poverty. When an individual, a family, or the band as a whole, wishes or needs 
something, it is to the chief that this appeal must be made. Generosity is, therefore, the first 
attribute to be expected of a new chief…The chiefs were my best informers; and as I knew the 
difficulties of their position I liked to reward them liberally. Rarely, however did my presents 
remain in their hands for more than a day or two. And when I moved on, after sharing for several 
weeks the life of any particular band, its members rejoiced in the acquisition of axes, knives, 
pearls, and so forth from my stores. The chief, by contrast, was generally as poor, in material 
terms, as he had been when I arrived. His share, which was very much larger than the average 
allowance, had all been extorted from him” (Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, John 
Russell [tr.], [New York: Criterion Books, 1961], 304). Ian Hogbin observes that a similar 
circumstance is evident in the New Guinea Busama. Here, the local clubhouse leader — whose 
role correlates with the rank of a tribal chief — seemed to “work harder than anyone else to keep 
up his stocks of food. The aspirant for honours cannot rest of his laurels but must go on holding 
large feasts and piling up credits. It is acknowledged that he has to toil early and late — ‘His 
hands are never free from earth, and his forehead continually drips with sweat’” (Ian Hogbin, 
Transformation Scene: The Changing Culture of a New Guinea Village [London and New York, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951], 131). The implication of these ethnological investigations is 
that there are a variety of social mechanisms in place, which function to prevent chiefs from 
becoming wealthy — all that they so arduously acquire seems to be immediately expended in 
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in (or facilitates) a putative progression from privative society to form the societal organization 
that tends to be associated with the political State. The limitations that tribal societies place on 
their chiefs — the plurality of mechanisms of control, which though perhaps not formalized, are 
nonetheless present as any of immanent censures, micro-aggressions, ritualized humiliations, or 
explicit diminishment of social status; any of the aspects of the fabric of society that may be 
brought to bear against an aspirant to the cult of narcissistic (sometimes deluded, often 
mendacious) political authority — function to ward off the formation of the political State. The 
existence of these mechanisms of control, in conjunction with the diminishment of the 
axiological judgment about the nature of primitive life and the observation that technological 
forms tend to be non-relational, have been adduced to demonstrate that primitive societies 
actively resist evolving into political State formations. 
The implication of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s analysis of Clastres can be expressed as the 
satisfaction of a conditional: if primitive societies do not evolve into States, but States exist — 
which indeed they do — then this implies that the State has always existed. Deleuze and Guattari 
identify the omnipresent State as the Urstaat. Deleuze and Guattari elucidate their complex 
views on socio-economic evolutionism and temporal succession through two separate arguments. 
The suggestion that there is variable evolution within a given society does nothing to diminish 
the suggestion that an evolutionary pattern might obtain in the historical movement from one age 
to the next. Were this sort of evolution to obtain (as a hypothesis about the nature of historical 
progress), it could be expressed as a relation of temporal succession on the grand scale of a 
temporal movement among historical ages or epochs. Alternatively, this evolutionary hypothesis 
 
service of the tribe. In this sense, the tribal chief seems to be little more than a pauper in a palace; 
bereft of wealth, real power, or the means of advancing their own interests.  
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could be identified as the sequential prioritization of one mode of production over another, with 
the stipulation that this is correlated with the putative progression of historical temporal moments 
culminating in the formation of unified urban civilization (i.e., a polis). Deleuze and Guattari 
seem to be suggesting something more radical than the implied non-linear evolution of the 
society with their observation — in A Thousand Plateaus — that “a State comes into the world 
fully formed and rises up in a single stroke, [as the] unconditioned Urstaat.”65 This amounts to a 
denial of there being any evolutionary process that leads to the formation of the State. In 
concrete terms, Deleuze’s and Guattari’s Urstaat thesis suggests that the polis arises 
spontaneously as an ontologically autonomous circumstance that is discrete from both rural life 
and temporally graduated evolutionary process of συνοικισμóς (synoecism, the incorporation of 
discrete rural settlements into a unified cooperative). One might think that the Urstaat thesis 
involves an inversion of an ontological dependency relation that seems to obtain among all of 
villages, farms, geographical domains that enjoy the agrarian condition in relation to a primordial 
urban civilization. Were this the claim, then the process of evolution still would obtain. Perhaps 
more precisely, evolution would still be realized in the form of temporal succession (t1, t2...tn), in 
which the formation of the Urstaat is correlated with t1 and the ontologically secondary creation 
of rural domains is correlated with a temporal moment denoted by any value in the series t2 
through tn. Perhaps it is worth pointing out that this would involve a transposition of the values 
of the terms to schematize an evolutionary process, which is the inverse of that specified by 
anthropological models that suggest primacy of rural existence. (I.e., models which suggest that 
cities came from farms; illustrations of the claim that rural circumstances involve the primitive 
accumulation of goods, which ultimately yields the formation of urban environments). This 
 
65 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 427. 
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would be the inverse of the schema that illustrates how — over the course of arduous millennia 
plagued by drought, flood, inclement weather, earthquakes, infestation by vermin, the seemingly 
ubiquitous threat of packs of roving predators, blight, and all other manner of difficulty found in 
the natural world — rural dirt farmers were (finally) able to cobble together a primitive city like 
Çatal Hüyük. Deleuze’s and Guattari’s claim is more confounding than this. Theirs is the 
suggestion that it is false to attribute an ontological dependency relation to the development of 
urban and rural modes of existence; the city and the country emerge at the same moment; these 
are ontologically co-given. The temporal implication is that historical evolutionary processes 
(from farm to village, village to town, town to city, etc.) are not realized. This amounts to denial 
of the claim that a temporal succession relation obtains among the Urstaat and that which it is 
not. Stated again, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the ontological difference among the urban 
and the rural does not imply temporal difference. The city and the country — characterized as 
different modes of existence involving different concrete material entities and physical processes 
of the creation of goods — are realized as temporally co-existent entities, i.e., as existents with 
no temporal duration separating them. With their stipulation of the fundamental existence of the 
Urstaat, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the history of human social development is bereft of 
temporal succession. 
 
Social Change as an Expression of Immanent Causality 
 Deleuze’s and Guattari’s identification of the temporally primary actualization of the 
Urstaat may be characterized as putting the final nail in the lid of a philosophical coffin 
containing a plurality of related concepts — social evolutionism, linear causality, and temporal 
succession. Evolutionist accounts of societal change tend to involve at least one of linear 
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causality or temporal succession.66 In addition to denying that social evolution obtains in a 
serialized fashion, the Urstaat thesis implies that if linear causality or temporal succession obtain 
at all, these are inadequate to account for societal change. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that an 
adequate account of social variation relies on neither of (1) a regular progression from one mode 
of social existence to another — i.e., linear causality; (2) a succession of discrete temporal 
moments. Their positive claim is that multiple analytically discrete modes co-exist in a single 
duration (i.e., they are realized as different aspects of the same temporal moment; as non-
identical modes of the same temporally unified social substance; as contemporaneous, implicated 
modes). These suggest that the internal variations of the Urstaat involve ontological univocity 
and immanent causality. Here — in a modification of Spinoza — Deleuze and Guattari suggest 
that co-existing modes of economic production (i.e., modes of being; social modes of existence) 
affect each other in the same temporal duration. Deleuze’s careful identification of univocity as 
the suggestion that being “is said in a single and same sense of all its individuating differences or 
intrinsic modalities”67 informs an of the account of causal relations that obtain among the 
 
66 Perhaps it should be observed that though linear causality and the relation temporal succession 
tend to be conflated, in the sense that they are often put forward as aspects of an adequate 
account of the mechanism of change, they are different types of relation. Each of temporal 
succession and linear causality tends to involve different content and explain different aspects of 
variation. A relation of temporal succession involves temporal moments as its content — the 
entity which “succeeds” in a relation of temporal succession is any of a moment of time, an 
interval, a duration, or a quantitative value associated with the variable t. Linear causal relations 
tend to comprehend a wider array of entities, in the sense that linear causal relations may have as 
their relata all manner of existents — material entities, ideal objects, actualities, potentialities, 
processes, particulars, generalities of various types; gods and demons, and many other sorts of 
metaphysical entities or pre-individuated forces that might not involve any aspect of temporality, 
or which might only enjoy an analogous relation to temporality. It should be further observed 
that though linear causality and temporal succession tend to be associated with the same event, 
this is not necessarily the case. For instance, one can imagine a linear causal relation obtaining 
among two (or more) eternities or a-temporal entities.  
67 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 36.  
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different modes of society. The stipulation that social formations are differently individuated 
aspects which obtain in the same duration (i.e., aspects of the same form of time) implies that 
modification of these aspects does not involve a relation of temporal succession. This is a unique 
sort of change indeed: change of an irreducible, non-quantitatively divisible temporal moment; 
modification which occurs in the midst of a non-denumerable duration; innovation or invention 
in an instant which defies more fine-tuned numeric division; creation involved in the smallest 
morsel of time; individuation as an expression of temporal immanence. This plurality of 
formulations implies that immanent causal relations obtain among mutually implicated social 
modes. Social change is expressed as temporally instantaneous (i.e., non-successive) 
modification of co-existing elements. 
If variation is explained by temporal succession or linear causality, then what 
accounts for change among discrete social entities and processes which are localized to 
the same duration? Craig Lundy suggests that temporally co-existent social forms — i.e., 
the Urstaat and other forms of social organization — enjoy an immanent causal 
relation.68 Deleuze, in Foucault, explicitly identifies an immanent cause as the mercurial 
sort of force “which is realized, integrated, and distinguished in its effect. Or rather, the 
immanent cause is realized, integrated, and distinguished by its effect.”69 Deleuze 
explicitly notes that his concept of immanent causality is derived from Spinoza.70 At 
 
68 Craig Lundy, “The Necessity and Contingency of Universal History: Deleuze and Guattari 
contra Hegel”, The Journal of the Philosophy of History 10, no. 1 (2016), pp. 51-75. 
69 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, Sean Hand (tr.), (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1986), 37.  
70 Deleuze’s concept of immanent causality is involved in his shockingly brief, profoundly dense 
elaboration of the univocity of difference — i.e., the claim that difference is ontologically 
primary; the specification of substance as difference in the processes of continual actualization. 
(Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 35-40). Deleuze specifies that this complex notion of 
univocity is developed by along a trajectory that extends from Aristotle’s analyses of the relation 
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E1p18, Spinoza identifies God as the immanent cause of all existent entities.71 Spinoza’s 
demonstration involves two conditions: (1) the stipulation that all existents participate in 
Divine substance — i.e., “everything that is, is in God”;72 (2) the claim that Divine substance is 
the cause of all that it comprehends — i.e., “God is the cause of all things which are in him.”73 
At Ethics E1P15d, Spinoza clarifies the first condition when he notes that every aspect of reality 
(i.e., all the modes) are involved with ontologically primary substance.74 This ontological 
involvement seems to admit of the possibility that divine substance is the transitive cause of the 
 
of genus to individual difference, through Duns Scotus’s claim that Divine substance is infinite 
individuation (i.e., a singular difference that obtains on both the levels of species and genus), to 
Spinoza’s suggestion that the modes and substance are mutually implicated (i.e., substance can 
only be elaborated through the modes), only to realize its final articulation Nietzsche’s thesis of 
eternal return (i.e., the repetition of difference). Nathan Widder does a wonderful job elaborating 
how Deleuze modifies both Aristotle and Duns Scotus to characterize difference as “an excess 
that is common to all beings” (Nathan Widder, John Duns Scotus, in Deleuze’s Philosophical 
Lineage, Graham Jones and Jon Roffe [eds.], [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009], 
28; Nathan Widder, “The Rights of the Simulacra: Deleuze and the Univocity of Being” 
Continental Philosophy Review 34, no. 4 [2001], pp. 437–453). Daniel W. Smith observes that 
“for Spinoza, we only know two of God’s infinite attributes, (thought and extension), and 
attributes are common forms, predictable of univocally of both God and his creatures. Though 
formally discrete, the attributes are ontologically univocal.” (Daniel W. Smith, Essays on 
Deleuze [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012], 31). Charles Olney observes that 
Deleuze’s interpretation of the eternal return (as the re-actualization of difference) involves 
univocity, in the sense that the return yields the emergence of that “which was always already 
contained within the original, but which can never be expressed in the same way again” (Charles 
Olney, “A New Metaphysics: Eternal Recurrence and the Univocity of Difference”, The Journal 
of Speculative Philosophy 34, no. 2, [2020], pp. 179-200, 195). The concept of immanent 
causality comes to the fore in Spinoza’s elaboration of univocity. For this reason, here I focus on 
the temporal implications of Deleuze’s Spinozistic identification of immanent causality. 
71 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, E1p18, The Collected Works of Spinoza I, Edwin Curley (tr.), 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 428. 
72 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, E1P18d, The Collected Works of Spinoza I, 428. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Spinoza writes: “Except for God, there neither is, nor can be conceived, any substance…,i.e., 
thing that is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes…can neither be nor be 
conceived without substance. So they can be in the divine nature alone, and can be conceived 
through it alone. But except for substances and modes there is nothing. Therefore, nothing can be 
or be conceived without God, q.e.d.” (Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, E1P15d, The Collected Works of 
Spinoza I, 420). 
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plurality of existents. Were this the claim, then it would be the case the modes subsist 
from substance, as though these were the outcomes of a relation of strict ontological 
dependency. Spinoza explicitly denies this possibility with his stark observation — at 
E1p18 — that Divine substance “is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all 
things.”75 Deleuze observes — in Expressionism and Philosophy — that in Spinoza’s 
metaphysics, “attributes are conditions common to substance which possesses them 
collectively and to modes which imply them distributively.”76 When coupled with the 
observation that both causes and effects are types of attributes which enjoy discrete 
distribution as modes, this lays the conceptual foundation for immanent causality. Taken 
together, these suggest that (in an immanent causal relation) the analytically discrete 
moments of “cause” and “effect” are inexorably bound together at the level of substance 
— i.e., they are common to substance — and expressed as analytically discrete modes of 
the same unified whole.  
In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze explicitly observes that this fundamental unity 
(i.e., interiority) of cause and effect is what separates an immanent cause from both a transitive 
cause and causation involving emanation.77 The claim here seems to be that it is inaccurate to 
characterize divine substance as a remote causal agent which influences modal variation from a 
 
75 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, E1P18, The Collected Works of Spinoza I, 428. 
76 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, Martin Joughin (tr.), (New York: Zone 
Books, 1992), 91. 
77 Deleuze writes: “Thus God is never a remote cause, but is reached from the first term of the 
regression. And only God is a cause; there is only one sense and one modality for all the figures 
of causality, although these figures are themselves various (cause of itself, efficient cause of 
infinite things, efficient cause of finite things in relation to one another). Understood in its one 
sense and its single modality, the cause is essentially immanent; that is, it remains in itself in 
order to produce (as against the transitive cause), just as the effect remains in itself (as against 
the emanative cause).” (Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Robert Hurley [tr.], [San 
Francisco: City Lights, 1988], 54).  
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privileged ontological position. Stated positively, divine substance is implicated in the modal 
expression of change. Deleuze further stipulates that this divine substance is implicated in the 
effect modal variation — in this sense, the effect is ontologically involved with the causal agent, 
and all of these enjoy temporally simultaneous expression; this amounts to modal variation at an 
instant, in which every aspect of the modification (all of substance, cause, and effect) obtain as 
compresent. It should be pointed out that both transitive and emanative causal mechanisms 
involve transcendence, though in different ontological directions. It should be further observed 
that each of these forms of causality — transitive, emanant, and immanent — explicitly involves 
temporality, if for no other reason than causal mechanisms elaborate on modifications of entities 
that exist in time. A transitive cause transcends its effect, in the sense that it is distributed as an 
attribute of a mode that is anterior to its effect. In transitive causal relations, the cause is 
temporally prior to and removed from its effect. By contrast, an emanative cause, is one in which 
the effects transcend the entity as a derivation, or something wholly distinct from the original 
entity; in this sense, the effect of an emanant cause subsists as the consequent (or product) of a 
relation of ontological dependency; the effects of an emanative causal relation tend to be 
temporally posterior to their causes — i.e., these are the results that temporally follow from an 
action or circumstance.78 The key feature of immanent causality — which separates it from 
 
78 Daniel W. Smith elaborates on the distinctions among transitive cause, emanation, and 
immanent cause through reference to Medieval concepts of substance: “Broadly speaking, 
medieval philosophy distinguished between three types of causes: a transitive cause, an 
emanative cause, and an immanent cause. A transitive cause is a cause that leaves itself in order 
to produce, and what it produces (its effect) is outside of itself. Christianity held to the idea of a 
real distinction between God and the world. If God created the world., and the world is exterior 
to God, then God must come out of himself in order to create the world; it therefore needed to 
see god as a purely transitive cause (creationism). An emanative cause, by contrast, is a cause 
whose effect is exterior to it, but which none the less remains within itself, in order to produce, 
its effect. The sun, for example, remains within itself in order to produce, but what it produces 
(light), comes out of it… An immanent cause, finally, is a cause that not only remains within 
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emanation and transitive causality — is that all aspects of the causal mechanism are interior to 
the entity undergoing modification. Here, the implication is that an adequate account of change 
among co-existent modal expressions of the same entity involves the mutual implication of each 
expressed mode as an aspect of a causal relation — i.e., each mode is implicated as a relata in 
causal relation that obtains as an aspect of temporally unified (undifferentiated) duration; no 
relation of temporal succession obtains in this causal relation, because the duration which 
comprehends their relation is fundamentally unified — i.e., non-decomposable into discrete 
instants. Those united by immanent causality cannot be torn asunder by temporal succession. 
 
Concluding Remarks: Temporality Involves Instantaneous Change 
The positive claim is that societal change occurs in an instant. The negative correlate is 
that an adequate account of social variation does not involve any appeal to the relation of 
temporal succession. If we still must characterize societal variation as evolution, then we must do 
so only with the acknowledgment that temporal succession plays no part in this evolution. In 
concrete terms, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that society changes in an instant. Time is 
instantaneous variation expressed in society. The argument in support of this claim involves four 
discrete stages. 
First, I observed that Deleuze and Guattari elaborate time’s expression in society through 
reference to the Marxist concept of history and the relation among economic modes of 
production. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that “universal history” — i.e., the 
comprehensive temporal record of all that has been — expresses a “history of contingencies, and 
 
itself in order to produce, but one whose produced effects also remain within it.” (Daniel W. 
Smith, Essays on Deleuze, 32-33).  
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not the history of necessity.”79 Here, they are developing Marx’s claim — from the Grundrisse 
— that time may be characterized as non-linear development of various modes of economic 
production. I further observed that Deleuze and Guattari modify Marx’s early claim that history 
(i.e., the objective record of humanity’s temporal past) expresses a linear progression through 
various non-contemporaneous epochs. In his early writings, Marx seems oddly conflicted about 
the nature and number of these, in the sense that the nature and number of ages Marx identifies 
varies depending on which text one consults. In The German Ideology, for example, Marx and 
Engels identify four stages of economic development; in the ultimate paragraph of his 
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx increases this number by one; by the 
time of the first volume of Capital and the Grundrisse, Marx seems to have settled on five 
discrete historical modes of production. One of the primary confusions involves Marx’s waffling 
about the nature of the Asiatic mode of production, in reference to primitive communism, and 
Ancient slavery, i.e., the two modes of production with which it seems to bear the closest 
conceptual proximity. Perhaps flummoxed by these modifications, various commentators — 
particularly Friedrich Engels, Joseph Stalin, and Georgi Plekhanov — refined Marx’s initial 
elucidations to suggest that the various modes of production express a stochastic chronometric 
succession. I observed that Marx’s concept of the prehistory of capital seems to be bereft of 
teleological progression among the economic modes of production. For Marx, society evolves in 
a stochastic fashion.  
I then elaborated on the analyses of Jacobs’s and Clastres’s anthropological 
investigations of primitive society. Both Jacobs and Clastres are critical of Marxian claims about 
social evolution. Jacobs questions the order of the occurrence of discrete social formations 
 
79 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 140. 
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implied by Marxian evolution. For Jacobs, the Neolithic city-state is temporally prior to 
primitive agrarian culture. Jacobs’s economic analyses yield the suggestion that roles of position 
of the terms in the Marxian ontological dependency relation (among primitive modes of 
accumulation and State modes of organization) be reversed. Though Jacobs cautiously grants 
that that an ontological dependency relation obtains among rural social forms and the State, she 
suggests that the State enjoys ontological primacy; in this sense, Jacobs transposes the relata of 
the Marxian dependency relation. In concrete terms, Jacobs suggests that a developmental 
evolution obtains among temporally and ontologically discrete entities, this evolution begins 
with the State (and progresses to rural modes of economic production).  
It is essential to observe that an evolutionary development of the kind suggested by 
Jacobs involves temporal succession — modifying the terms of a relation does not imply any 
modification of the form of the relation; a change of the terms organized in a series does not alter 
the fact that they are involved in a relation of succession. Appealing to the ethnographic analyses 
of Clastres, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that one can find the hints of a relation among modes 
of social organization which does not rely on temporal succession. For Clastres, the State and 
primitive society emerge at the same time, as strictly contemporaneous — albeit antagonistic — 
modes of social organization. Clastres analyses imply there is no order to the ontological 
progression from primitive society to the State, if for no other reason than no ontological 
dependency relation obtains among these. In concrete terms, the State, farming communities, 
cadres of hunters, and bands of gatherers emerge as relatively autonomous, utterly 
contemporaneous social formations. It is from Clastres that Deleuze and Guattari derive their 
thesis of the Urstaat — i.e., that the State and primitive society are born unto human history as 
fully formed, co-existing entities. The primary implication of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s remarks 
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about the Urstaat is that there is no temporally serialized evolutionary relation among the various 
modes of social organization. This further implies that no temporal disparity exists among these 
analytically discrete modes of social substance. The Urstaat involves a denial of serialized social 
evolution and temporal succession alike. 
The claim that modes of production enjoy neither ontological dependency nor temporal 
succession does not imply that the Urstaat is bereft of ontological dynamism. Hints of the causal 
mechanism involved in the internal variations of the society are found in Deleuze’s elaboration 
of Spinoza’s concept of immanent causality. I suggested that Spinoza’s concept of immanent 
causality provides the framework for an adequate account of temporally localized change among 
the aspects of a formal unity (i.e., society). Each of primitive social organization and the State 
may be characterized as mutually implicated modes of the same ontological substance. The 
observation that discrete aspects of the same substance participate in the same duration, when 
coupled with the observation that this substance enjoys variation, yields the suggestion that the 
State undergoes change at an instant. In concrete terms, the Urstaat participates in immanent 
modification — i.e., modification of aspects which enjoy co-existence in a single duration. 
Immanent causality implies temporally instantaneous variation — variation of mutually 
implicated aspects comprehended by the same duration. Society — characterized as the socio-
temporal co-existence of analytically discrete ways of economic organization; as co-existing 
modes that participate in the same geographic and temporal locale; as differing aspects of the 
same substance — evidences the capacity to change in an instant.  
Deleuze and Guattari offer perhaps their most forceful rebuke of linear social evolution in 
A Thousand Plateaus, when they observe that “to become is not to progress or regress along a 
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series.”80 The temporal implications of their suggestion can be elaborated by syllogism: given the 
facticity of the claims that society evidences modification of co-existing — physical, ideational 
— entities and processes, and that these changes are explicitly temporal (i.e., they involve 
duration, or modification of duration), the implication is that social variation is the expression of 
non-serialized temporal change. Deleuze and Guattari could hardly be less ambiguous than their 
observation that societal “becoming is not an evolution, at least not an evolution by descent and 
filiation.”81 Perhaps it is worth observing that the mercurial relation of “filiation” may be 
characterized as a provisional relation among ontologically discrete parts. In this sense, a filiative 
organization is akin to the serial organization of parts — i.e., the type of organization that obtains 
in evolutionist models that rely on a linear progression of time; the ordering expressed by the 
serial succession of temporal moments; days turn into weeks, which turn into months, which turn 
into years, as time progresses in a serial succession of durations. In their denial of a filiative 
organization, Deleuze and Guattari develop the Spinozistic ontological claim that putatively 
differing aspects participate in the expression of the same form. What this implies about the 
natures of social evolution and temporality is staggering. The suggestion is that putatively 
discrete social modes of production — the serialized content of Marxian evolutionism — are 
temporally co-existing entities; agrarian and State formations enjoy the same duration; they co-
exist as implicated elements of the same form of time. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the 
claim of formal identity does not preclude the possibility of formal variation. In this sense, 
identity does not imply that a form is monolithic. The general claim that forms may enjoy 
internal modification yields the suggestion that any particular social form (any particular 
 




duration) may vary due to the immanent causal relation of co-existing parts. In concrete terms, 




CONCLUSION: TIME IS CEASELESS CREATION 
Though it would be a misstep to suggest that all of temporality is reducible to the present, 
it is apt to observe that the gamut of temporality — including each of its analytically discrete 
dimensions of the memorial past and the present — enjoys expression as an aspect of a unified 
duration. One might also observe that future contingencies — characterized as the repetition of 
the production of diversity — become actualized in this duration. This is to say that time is a 
multiplicity consisting of mutually implicated aspects involved in the creation of variegated 
entities. Time is the production of difference.   
The argument of the first chapter demonstrates that individuated entities tend to actualize 
time through their involuntary actions — mere existence as an entity that enjoys the capacities of 
being moved or of self-directed movement; existence as a spatially extended object; all of these 
are sufficient to actualize time. It should be further observed that time tends to get actualized as 
temporal series. However, Deleuze notes that though temporal succession might be adequate to 
illustrate an aspect of time, this does not imply that time is reducible to a heuristic explanatory 
device. Time is not simply the experience of repetition. Deleuze demonstrates this in his critique 
of Hume’s psychologism. The positive implication of the rejection of psychologism is that time 
tends to be identified as involving a transcendental aspect (i.e., temporality as empty form). The 
positive implication Deleuze’s correction of Hume is that time comes to be identified as a form 
that obtains as ontologically prior to its actualizations in the minds and through the actions of 
particulars.  
The discussion of time as a form invites comparison with the Ancients — primarily Plato 
and Plotinus. Deleuze observes that temporal progress is not indexed on the invariable rate of 
movement of celestial bodies. This amounts to a correction of Plato. Plotinus fares a bit better, in 
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the sense that Deleuze observes that the Ancient Roman philosopher suggested that temporality 
may be identified with the contemplations of a universal soul. It is important to note that the 
universal soul enjoys ontological priority to — is autonomous of — the instantiation of 
measurable physical bodies. Though we still might observe that the relation of temporal 
succession obtains — as a means of quantifying the undulations of time, as a predicate assigned 
to temporal substance — this relation is secondary to time. In this sense, Deleuze’s elaboration 
of Plotinus implies that time involves an ontogenetic aspect from which all of physical bodies, 
actualized modifications, and quantified variation subsists. 
Deleuze further develops the claim that temporality is involved in the ontogenetic 
circumstance through reference to Gilbert Simondon’s pioneering work on individuation. 
Simondon suggests that time may be characterized as a pre-personal force — an element which 
participates in the formation of discrete entities. Further, Simondon identifies the inter-relation of 
ontogenetic forces as involving magic. In this sense, temporality comes to be identified as a force 
which participates in the formation (and transformation) of physically instantiated actualities. 
Though an elaboration of the nature magic invites comparison with shoddy parlour tricks or 
mystical extravagances, these comparisons are quite misplaced in reference to Simondon’s 
identification of magic and time as elements of an ontogenetic circumstance. One of the 
substantive claims that emerges from my analysis of Simondon is that temporality obtains as a 
virtual aspect involved in the creation of particulars. Simondon further observes that ontogenetic 
forces do not fully dissipate in transition from virtuality to actuality. Perhaps the most persuasive 
evidence which can be marshalled in support of this claim is that —in addition to being 
illustrated in the literature of antiquity, as well as enjoying the support of contemporary 
anthropological evidence — the capacity to change obtains as an expressive aspect of spatio-
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temporal locales. Simondon further observes that existents may be identified as nodes in a 
reticulated field. This yields the claim that temporal variation obtains as an actualized aspect of 
physical reality; the magical aspects of time obtain as particular variations in spatio-temporally 
extended network of real places. 
Deleuze develops this claim — that variation is an attribute of a reticulated field of 
actualities — with the observation that a network is a species of multiplicity (i.e., a manifold, a 
magnitude). Deleuze further observes that literary works may be characterized as multiplicities, 
in the sense that they involve the participation of inter-related, changing elements. When this 
suggestion is generalized, it yields that claim that any existent that involves the variation of 
mutually implicated elements may be adequately categorized as a continuous multiplicity. In 
concrete terms, this implies that time is an element involved in both the creation of all existents 
(i.e., their ontogenesis) and the variation of all actualized existents (i.e., their concrete material 
change; all the wear and tear endured by physical things as they progresses toward expiration). 
Time is the ubiquitous expression of virtual and actual change. Elaborating on the theses of 
Reimann, Deleuze further observes that the variations of continuous multiplicities enjoy 
expression as differential equations. Taken together, these yield the claim that time is an element 
of an ontogenetic circumstance, which enjoys artistic and mathematically rigourous expression.  
Mathematical representation constitutes part of the subject matter of Deleuze’s 
elaboration of temporality in The Logic of Sense. In some of this text’s most subtly argued 
passages, Deleuze elaborates on the complex relation among the temporal progression (i.e., 
Chronos, temporal succession) and eternity (i.e., Aion, eternity, the form of time). I observe that 
the archaeological record indicates that eternity is conceived of as an ancient deity that enjoys a 
plurality of (sometimes competing) attributes: as the form of the cosmos itself; as the motion of 
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all existents; further, the eternal is characterized as the ontogenetic unity, which comprehends the 
variation of particulars; as each element of the Western zodiac, and the Western zodiac as a 
whole. The claim to be derived from this plurality of identifications is that eternity is an 
ontogenetic form which comprehends discrete and varying temporal series —i.e., Chronos 
(characterized as a series of variable temporal elements) subsists as an analytically discrete 
aspect of Aion. Deleuze further observes that the variations of temporal series enjoy realization 
in both literature and mathematics. Deleuze cites Borges to illustrate than any temporal moment 
may produce multiple, competing temporal series. Deleuze further suggests that the variability of 
time may be elaborated as a productive relation of the type that enjoys symbolic representation 
as a species of differential equation.  
Among the multiple aspects of temporality, there obtains aspects of qualitative variation. 
With this observation, we may (once again) observe the inadequacy of reductive explanations 
which attempt to specify time as mere quantitative succession. In my fourth chapter, I develop 
the claim that temporal progression involves the axiologically valent recurrence of variable 
particulars. Here, the object of analysis is the concept of temporal repetition, elucidated though 
reference to Deleuze’s readings of Kierkegaard and Marx. In Kierkegaard’s curious text, 
repetition tends to be identified as a tumultuous affair. In terms of its qualitative content, 
repetition is not unlike the agonies of Job; it is akin to the lived experience of being trapped in a 
closed temporal continuum in which one endures the agony of a thousand little cuts inflicted 
without end; it suggests the ceaselessness of Sisyphean labours. Repetition is the subject of a 
multitude of Greek myths in which capricious Gods extracted torturous revenge for any 
perceived sleight. Kierkegaard explicitly associates Ilithyia the — Greek goddess of childbirth 
— with a cycle of temporal variation. This further implies that the human gestational cycle is to 
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be associated with repetition. It is important to observe that these types of repetition are not akin 
to serial recurrence of an invariant term. If we are to characterize the human gestational cycle 
with repetition, it is only with the acknowledgement that the entity participating in this repetition 
is undergoing change. Marx further illustrates this type of repetition through reference to the 
European revolutions of the nineteenth century. Blood flowed through the streets, and the lives 
of labourers were cheap in Italy, Spain, and Portugal during the summer of 1820; half-way 
through a decade of immiseration, the Decemberists challenged (and lost their lives) to the 
armies of an illegitimate Czar; the Greeks sought to gain independence from their Ottoman 
rulers; in France, the Bourbons tried to return the nation to its former glory; in Brussels, the 
urban proletariat tried to cast off the yoke of emergent capitalism. These illustrate repetition of 
the form of revolution involving radically different particular circumstances. Taken together, 
these suggest the strange sort of repetition associated with a cycle involving the emergence of 
non-identical terms comprehended by a self-identical form — i.e., the recurrence of the form of 
time which is populated by variable content; temporal repetition of involving the production of 
axiologically valent, ontologically unprecedented particulars.  
Perhaps no artform is more able to express temporal change than the cinema. In the 
Cinema texts, Deleuze radically reformulates his concept of time. The influence of Bergsonian 
theses about the nature of duration, as well as the complex relation of virtuality and actuality can 
be found on practically every page of the Deleuze’s two-volume analysis of film. Deleuze 
suggests that when pictures began to move, this changed our conceptualization of the nature of 
temporality. Some of cinema’s most magical moments — e.g., Rutger Hauer’s observation (in 
Blade Runner)82 that every moment of lived experience becomes lost to time, like tears in the 
 
82 Ridley Scott (dir.), Blade Runner, (The Ladd Company: 1992). 
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rain — illustrates the capacities of film to express the qualitative aspects involved with temporal 
progression. Deleuze further suggests that these filmic moments illustrate points of inflection 
(i.e., singularities), in which temporality undergoes a metaphysical change from virtuality to 
actuality. It is here — immediately following his elaboration of the oddly named “pure optical 
and acoustic situations” — that Deleuze puts forward what is perhaps one of the most fascinating 
claims in the history of the aesthetics of cinema: the filmic artwork need not involve mimesis, in 
the sense that none of the film’s expressed realities must correlate to (represent) entities or 
processes of the physical world. This implies that aspects of filmic temporality — i.e., 
photographed temporal series; the putatively discrete durations of a character’s (or community’s) 
memorial past and lived present, all temporal rhythms and temporal continuums presented in any 
film — are determined through correlation with the relatively autonomous aspects of 
cinematically presented reality. Deleuze further observes that film illustrates the transformation 
of virtual entities and processes into actuality. When combined with the stipulations that the past 
tends to obtain virtually (i.e., as any of the species of immaterial ideations, as any of the plurality 
abstract entities; the content of memory) and that the present tends to be associated with the 
actualization of qualitatively valent aspects (i.e., as lived experience), this yields the claim that 
the cinema illustrates the ongoing inter-relation of these as simultaneously obtaining entities — 
film shows the past and present to be contemporaneous. 
One of the principal implications of the suggestion that putatively discrete dimensions of 
time — the past and the present — enjoy contemporaneity is that the relation of temporal 
succession is revealed to be an inadequate means of expressing societal change. I develop 





reference to all of Marx, the anthropological investigations of Jacobs and Clastres, as well as 
Spinoza’s concept of immanent causality. Marx’s elaboration of the development of pre-
capitalist economic modes of production is adduced to support the claim that society evolves 
stochastically. Marx observes that various societal mechanisms of producing commodities do not 
obtain in a linearly serialized fashion. Further, Marx observes that different modes of production 
— which very well might enjoy contemporaneous existence as elements of the same duration of 
the same society — might involve different temporal scales. In concrete terms, two (or more) 
modes of production in the same society might produce commodities at different temporal rates. 
Taken together, these observations yield the substantive claim that societal evolution (as 
measured by the modifications involved with modes of production) tends not to involve 
determination as a linear temporal series. Each of Jacobs and Clastres are (mildly) critical of 
Marx. Jacobs suggests that the temporal progression implied by Marxian evolution needs to be 
inverted. Here, the claim is that instead of the primitive agricultural practices yielding a surplus 
accumulation, which ultimately gives rise to the city state, the Paleolithic world enjoyed urban 
accumulations which yielded the emergence of rural farming. Deleuze and Guattari observe that 
Clastres suggests there is no temporal disparity among putatively discrete forms of social 
organization. In concrete terms, the State and rural modes of organization obtain as competing 
aspects of the same duration. No evolutionary progression obtains among discrete modes of 
social organization; though it is the case that the farm is non-identical to the city, temporal 
displacement is not one of the differentiae separating these two aspects of the societal form; the 
rural and the urban are co-existing, contemporaneous aspects. I further observe that temporal co-
existence of mutually implicated entities suggests their immanent variation. Through reference to 
Spinoza, I suggest that Deleuze and Guattari tend to conceive of society as involving 
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instantaneous variation — society changes in a non-decomposable temporal duration. These 
yield the observation that it is inadequate to characterize societal change as an expression of 
temporal succession. 
Deleuze’s nuanced thought on the nature of temporality invites a reconceptualization of 
the concept. Perhaps the most mercurial of philosophical concepts, temporality is implicated in a 
plurality of aspects of reality. Indeed, the mind staggers to conceive of some aspect of reality that 
does not involve at least one aspect of temporality. Once identified as among the powers of 
ancient gods, time came to be thought of as an ontogenetic force. Time is that which participated 
in — and still is involved with — the creation of the universe. Under the guises of the memorial 
past, the vibrant present and the burgeoning future not yet realized, time is the content of a 
multitude of artistic expressions. Further, time is the immanent variation of inter-related aspects 
of every societal form that ever was or ever will be. Throughout these analyses, I have argued 
that Deleuze suggests that temporality may be identified as the interaction of these non-reducible 
aspects. For these reasons, there is no singular philosophy of time which may be associated with 
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